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ABSTRACT 
The study of orangutan (Pongo spp.) cognitive complexity regarding tool use and 
manufacture is essential for accurate modeling of hominid evolution. Orangutans 
demonstrated comprehension of causal relations in four studies of tool use and manufacture. 
Study subjects were 3 captive orangutans (Great Ape Trust, Des Moines, IA). The distinction 
between rigid and flimsy tools was explored in the first study. The apes demonstrated 
comprehension by choosing the rigid tools significantly more than the flimsy tools to solve a 
problem. In the second study, the results provide support for orangutan comprehension of 
tool and apparatus properties in an extension of the tube task (Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989). 
In the first of two experiments, orangutans were required to manipulate or modify tools for 
retrieval of a reward from a tube. The apes demonstrated a greater degree of comprehension 
than has been reported previously for this problem (Visalberghi, Fragaszy, & Savage-
Rumbaugh, 1995). A second variant of the tube task, the blocked tube, required sequential 
modification to the tube before tool insertion. Although the results of the second experiment 
were not entirely conclusive, comprehension of sequential modifications is suggested. The 
trap-tube apparatus, involving horizontal and vertical tubes containing obstacles, was 
presented in the third study. The results of the trap tube studies support the conclusion that 
causal cognition is a capacity present in orangutans, with individual variation an important 
factor in its detection. In the final study, tool manufacture was explored by presenting the 
apes with a series of novel experiments requiring construction of tools allowing for 
absorption, stabbing, raking and probing. Tool modifications were recorded in all 
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experiments, with differences between tools for a given experiment supporting an orangutan 
“tool kit.”   
The results of these studies of tool use and manufacture by orangutans support the 
interpretation that these apes use tools with cognitive complexity involving an understanding 
of causal relations. Suggestions that the understanding of causal relations is a uniquely 
human ability and that the nonhuman great apes may lack this ability are not supported. 
Based on the accumulated data of the four studies presented in this dissertation, the 
hypothesis was supported that orangutans comprehend relevant tool properties and have or 
can develop an understanding of causal relations. These results support that the last common 
ancestor shared by the lineage leading to the African and Asian great apes, including humans, 
had the ability for causal understanding. 
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The study of animal tool use and manufacture is important for elucidating the 
cognitive complexity of an organism. “Tool behavior
1
” is significant, as through it we can 
explore an individual’s causal understanding between the tool, actions, and the resulting 
consequence or desired effect. Using tools is an important aspect of being human (Byrne, 
2004). Historically, tool use was considered a defining human attribute, with humans 
regarded as “man the tool-maker” (Oakley, 1964). This is no longer true, as many animals 
use tools (Beck, 1980; Chappell, 2006; McGrew, 1992); however, this does not diminish the 
significance of this behavior. In hominan
2
 evolution, stone tool manufacture and use was an 
important factor differentiating our lineage from the other great apes (Toth & Schick, 2006). 
However, it is likely that tool use and manufacture has had a much longer history in the 
hominid
2
 lineage than is evidenced archaeologically (Begun, 2004; Panger et al., 2002).  
Tool use and manufacture by humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes), bonobos (P. paniscus), gorillas (Gorilla spp.), and orangutans (Pongo spp.) 
suggests that tool behavior was present 11-18 mya in the last common ancestor these apes 
shared (Begun, 2004; Goodman et al., 1998; Steiper & Young, 2006; van Schaik, 2004). This 
suggests that tool behavior was present in hominids before 2.5 mya, when the first stone tools 
appear (Semaw et al., 1997; Yamakoshi, 2001). Thus, there is a long span of time (18 – 2.5 
                                                
1
 The phrase “tool behavior” refers to tool use and tool manufacture by an animal, as used by Beck (1975, 
1980), Bermejo, Illera, & Sabater-Pi (1989) Frost (1980), Herzfeld & Lestel (2005), Sugiyama (1989), Susman 
(1998), and Wynn (1990, 1993). Its use is appropriate as it encompasses tool use and tool manufacture. 
2
 Throughout this dissertation, hominan is used to refer to bipedal great apes, including humans and our extinct 
relatives. Hominid is used in reference to the members of the Family Hominidae, including the lineages of the 
African and Asian great apes (including humans) (Mann & Weiss, 1996; Groves, 2001).  
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mya) when hominids likely used tools, but for which there is no direct archaeological 
evidence. 
The aim of the present study is to elucidate the cognitive skills involved in tool use 
and manufacture in orangutans to assist in the anthropological reconstruction of hominid 
evolution. This research is significant, as the level of cognitive complexity involved in great 
ape tool use and manufacture is poorly understood. Some researchers suggest great apes use 
tools only through associative learning and without cognitive complexity (Kummer, 1995; 
Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Povinelli, 2000; Premack, 2007; Tomasello, 1998, 2000; Visalberghi 
& Tomasello, 1998). Despite this sentiment, recent research on this topic provides support 
for causal understanding (Bania et al., 2008
3
; Call, 2006
3
; Furlong et al., 2008
3
; Hermann et 
al., 2008
4
; Mendes et al., 2007
5
; Mulcahy & Call, 2006
4
). However, we do not have a 
comprehensive framework for explaining the level of causal understanding present in 
nonhuman animals, and some researchers continue to argue for its absence in nonhuman 
primates (Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Premack, 2007). 
Orangutans in particular can illuminate our knowledge on this topic and on the 
evolution of hominid cognitive abilities, as their ancestral line was the first to diverge from 
the lineage that eventually led to the other great apes, including humans (Steiper & Young, 
2006). This places orangutans in the position of assisting in delineating biological and 
cognitive traits characterizing the hominid lineage. For instance, study with orangutans, in 
addition to research with the other great apes, makes it possible to identify traits that are 
unique to Pongo, to all great apes, and to only humans.   
                                                
3
 Chimpanzees 
4
 Bonobos, chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans 
5
 Orangutans 
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Wild and captive orangutans use tools to interact with their environment and to solve 
foraging problems (Lethmate, 1982; van Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul, 1996). Many researchers 
consider captive orangutans the most skilled tool manipulators of the apes, perhaps related to 
their persistence and diligence in problem solving situations (Lethmate, 1982; Tomasello & 
Call, 1997). The present study expands on our knowledge of great ape cognition by studying 
orangutan comprehension of tool related behaviors, specifically regarding causal 
understanding. Understanding causal relations is a cognitively complex behavior that allows 
humans to use tools in sophisticated ways (Visalberghi, 2002). Causal understanding of tool 
use and manufacture involves a comprehension of how and why a tool can be used or 
modified to cause a specific effect (Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998). For example, Sumatran 
orangutans construct tools for insect extraction modifying branches by subtracting leaves, 
twigs and sometimes bark, followed by fraying of the ends of the branch (van Schaik et al., 
1996; Fox, Sitompul, & van Schaik, 1999). Does this behavior include an understanding of 
why the modifications are relevant? Such comprehension requires an individual to understand 
how environmental objects interact and the significance of their actions through the 
knowledge of cause and effect relations (Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998).  
Causal understanding is not a requirement of tool use (Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989). 
Studies on nonhuman tool use demonstrate that while many species use tools, there is 
variation in the complexity of the tool use and corresponding variation in the cognitive 
complexity of the species (Beck, 1980). Tool use in some animals has a strong genetic 
influence. For example, archerfish (Toxotes spp.) use water as a tool, spitting at prey insects 
above the water’s surface. Environmental experience is not required for acquisition of 
spitting behavior in these fish, suggesting a genetic rather than a cognitive basis (Vierke, 
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1973; Beck, 1980). In other species, such as tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), 
associative learning may direct tool use, with successful use coming through trial and error 
behavior without comprehension (Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989; Visalberghi et al., 1995; 
Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1996). Though comprehension is not a prerequisite for tool use, it 
allows for more effective use (Visalberghi, 2002). Specifically, it allows the user to apply the 
function of the tool to a specific problem and to deal with variations of a problem without 
motoric trial and error. Comprehension of the cause and effect relations of using a tool 
characterizes much of human tool use (Visalberghi, 2002), however, associative learning is 
important in human tool use as well (Shanks, 2007). 
Field research supports a sophisticated level of comprehension of tools by apes. 
Boesch and Boesch (1983), for example, documented chimpanzees transporting specific 
stones some 500 m for nut cracking, while van Schaik et al. (1996) documented Sumatran 
orangutans (Pongo abelii) manufacturing tools specifically for complex foraging problems. 
These examples suggest causal understanding is present, implying planning and a 
comprehension of tool properties; however, field observations alone cannot demonstrate this 
level of understanding (Visalberghi, Fragaszy, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995). That some 
animals use tools does not prove they do so with the same cognitive skills as humans, as the 
role of associative learning is often unclear. Povinelli and Dunphy-Lelii (2001) argue that the 
human capacity for explanation may be a universal trait of our species. They argue the 
human mind may be biologically adapted to explain events (Povinelli & Dunphy-Lelii, 
2001). Povinelli and Dunphy-Lelii point to research that has indicated human children may 
have a better conceptual understanding of causal relations than apes (Povinelli, 2000). 
Similarly, Tomasello (1998, 2000) has suggested that the comprehension of causal relations 
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is a uniquely human ability. However, research into this question has been neither complete 
nor conclusive, with only a small number of primate species studied thus far. Through the 
present study, I seek to understand the level of cognitive complexity associated with 
orangutan tool use and manufacture, in particular regarding causal understanding.  
1.1 Hypothesis 
I hypothesized that orangutans have or can develop an understanding of causal 
relations associated with tool using and tool making. If existing, causal understanding allows 
comprehension of what properties of a tool are relevant for solving a specific problem. It 
would also allow them to solve problems without motoric trial and error. This hypothesis is 
based on the evidence of flexible and complex use and manufacture of tools by orangutans in 
their natural habitat and in captivity (Fox et al., 1999; Galdikas, 1982b; Lethmate, 1982; van 
Schaik et al, 1996).  
1.2 Dissertation Organization 
 This dissertation presents four data chapters, each contributing to the topic of 
comprehension of tools by orangutans, with an underlying theme of exploring causal 
cognition. In Chapters 2 and 3, I address the understanding of tool properties, exploring 
properties such as rigidity, flexibility, size, shape, and length. In Chapter 4, I examine causal 
cognition by replicating and extending a well-established study in the field of causal 
understanding, the trap-tube task. In Chapter 5, I examine tool manufacture by presenting the 
apes with a series of novel experiments, each requiring the construction of tools. I conclude 
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the dissertation in Chapter 6 with a general discussion of my findings, including 
recommendations for future research. 
1.3 Literature Review 
 In this review, I discuss the literature regarding causal understanding, tool use, and 
tool manufacture, with a specific focus on the nonhuman great apes
6
. I will define terms, 
explain important concepts, and address the significance of the study from an evolutionary 
context. Along these lines, I draw specific attention to orangutan behavior and hominid 
evolution. Literature pertaining to specific aspects of the experimental component of this 
dissertation is reviewed in subsequent chapters. 
1.3.1 Tool Use and Manufacture 
The study of tool-use and manufacture is an informative method for evaluating ideas 
regarding the cognitive processes of nonhuman animals. Many nonhuman animals use tools, 
and to varying degrees of complexity (Beck, 1980). For example, tool use has been 
documented in insects (Pierce, 1986), birds (Hunt, Lambert, & Gray, 2007; Levey, Duncan, 
& Levins, 2004; Tebbich, Taborsky, Fessl, & Dvorak, 2002), and mammals (Michener, 
2004; Bauer, 2001; Shuster & Sherman, 1998; Smolker, Richards, Connor, Mann, & 
Berggren, 1997; Wickler & Seibt, 1997) (see Beck, 1980 for an early review of tool behavior 
in animals, McGrew, 2004 for chimpanzees, and Fragaszy, Visalberghi, & Fedigan, 2004 for 
monkeys). However, tool use is most widespread in anthropoids of the Primate Order. Tool 
use is documented in both monkeys (baboons, Papio: van-Lawick-Goodall, van-Lawick, & 
                                                
6
 Through the remainder of this dissertation nonhuman is dropped from nonhuman great apes for brevity.  
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Packer, 1973; capuchins, Cebus: Visalberghi, 1993; macaques, Macaca: Watanabe, 
Urasopon & Malaivijitnond, 2007) and great apes, including bonobos (Ingmanson, 1996), 
chimpanzees (McGrew, 1992; Whiten et al., 1999, 2001), gorillas (Breuer, Ndoundou-
Hockemba, & Fishlock, 2005; Wittiger & Sunderland-Groves, 2007) and orangutans 
(Galdikas, 1982b; van Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul, 1996; van Schaik et al., 2003).  
Before discussing the topic in depth however, tool use must be defined. Beck (1980) 
defined tool use as: 
The external employment of an unattached environmental object to alter more 
efficiently the form, position, or condition of another object, another organism, or the 
user itself when the user holds or carries the tool during or just prior to use and is 
responsible for the proper and effective orientation of the tool. (p. 10) 
 
Although other definitions of tool use are available (Alcock, 1972; Lestel & Grundmann, 
1999; St. Amant & Horton, 2008; van Lawick-Goodall, 1970). I use Beck’s (1980) definition 
here both for its general acceptance by researchers studying animal tool-use, and as it 
sufficiently differentiates this behavior from other types of object related behaviors (see St. 
Amant & Horton, 2008 for suggested definition modifications). In addition, I define other 
related phrases that I will refer to, namely tool kit, tool set, tool composite, metatool, 
secondary tool, and tool crafting (Table 1-1).  
Tool use can be analyzed by the complexity of the user’s actions. Matsuzawa (2001) 
outlined three levels of tool use that are valuable in characterizing the complexity of this 
behavior. In Level 1, only two objects are involved, with one relationship existing between 
these objects. This characterizes most of chimpanzee and orangutan tool use. Probing with a 
tool for insects is an example of Level 1 tool use (Goodall, 1968; McGrew & Rogers, 1983; 
Bogart & Pruetz, 2008). In Level 2, there are two kinds of relations involved. Nut cracking 
  
 
8 
by West African chimpanzees (P. t. verus) is an example of level two behavior, as the two 
types of relations are between the hammerstone and the nut, and the nut and the anvil 
(Boesch & Boesch, 1983; Hannah & McGrew, 1987; Matsuzawa, 1992; Whitesides, 1985). 
Level 3 is the most complex expression of tool use observed in nonhuman primates, in the 
form of metatool use. In this situation, there are three relations between objects. The use of a 
wedge to stabilize an anvil during nut cracking by chimpanzees is an example of metatool 
use (Matsuzawa, 1991, 1994). In metatool use, subgoals must be implemented to reach the 
final goal. In addition to metatool use in chimpanzee nut cracking, this behavior has also 
been recorded in captive New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) (Taylor et al., 
2007).  
Table 1-1. Terms describing tool behavior 
Term Definition Ape Species Examples 
Tool Kit* Tools used by an individual that 
are manufactured differently 
depending on the context 
Pongo abelii; Pan 
troglodytes 
Boesch & Boesch, 1990; Fox, van 
Schaik, & Sitompul, 1999; 
Goodall, 1964, 1968; van Schaik, 
Fox, & Sitompul, 1996; Nishida, 
1980; Sanz & Morgan, 2007; 
Teleki, 1974 
Tool 
Composite 
Two or more tools, each having 
different functions, used in 
combination to achieve a goal 
Pan troglodytes Sugiyama, 1997; McGrew, 2004 
Tool Set** Two or more tool types used in 
a sequence to achieve a goal, 
order of use is important  
Pan troglodytes Brewer & McGrew, 1990; Sanz & 
Morgan, 2007 
Metatool A tool that improves the 
functioning of another tool 
Pan troglodytes Matsuzawa, 1991, 1994 
Secondary 
Tool 
Tools used to make other tools. 
An object transforming another 
object into a tool  
Captive individuals 
only. Pan spp., 
Pongo spp.  
Kitahara-Frisch, 1993; Schick et 
al., 1999; Toth, Schick, & Savage-
Rumbaugh, 1993; Wright, 1972 
Tool Crafting Form of tool manufacture 
involving hierarchical 
manufacture with fine, 3D 
sculpting 
Pan troglodytes Pruetz & Bertolani, 2007 
*See McGrew (1992) and Beck (1980) for summaries of tool kits in chimpanzees.  
**Sugiyama (1997) considered a tool set a type of tool composite. McGrew (2004) disagreed with this and 
clarified the definition of a tool composite. 
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Orangutan Tool Use 
Most tool use by orangutans (wild, captive, and rehabilitants
7
) are contained in 15 
broad categories (Table 1-2). I will examine each of these in detail. Tool use by captive and 
rehabilitant orangutans, which may have socially learned the behavior from humans, is 
included in this review, as are tool related behaviors that may have been socially learned in 
wild apes. These examples are included since the mode of tool use acquisition does not 
preclude the absence of causal understanding.      
1) Weapons and Display 
The most common tool-using behavior seen in wild orangutans is the use of objects in 
agonistic displays. In 1712, Beekman observed orangutans in their natural habitat using tools 
in their displays, throwing stones, sticks and other objects at humans observers (in Harrisson, 
1962). Similarly, Wallace (1869) noted orangutans’ persistence at breaking and throwing 
branches at their human observers. Davenport (1967), MacKinnon (1971), and Galdikas 
(1982b) also documented orangutans using branches in displays, often dropping objects on 
human observers. Galdikas (1983) observed wild orangutans “snag-crashing,” in which a 
large dead branch, or “snag,” was pushed out of the tree and towards intruders. Peters (2001) 
noted that Gunung Palung orangutans throw fruit at humans, in addition to branch dropping. 
Regarding close contact defense, Galdikas (1989) recorded a juvenile wild orangutan 
whipping a branch to drive away wasps. Rijksen (1978) observed an orangutan waving a 
twig at a bee swarm during an attack. In terms of rehabilitant orangutans, Galdikas (1982b) 
documented them using sticks to hit others, recorded unaimed throwing often, and witnessed 
                                                
7
 Rehabilitants are orphaned orangutans residing in sanctuaries. 
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one instance of aimed throwing. Rijksen (1978) observed rehabilitants aimed throwing of 
sticks and stones at snakes and other animals. In captive situations, Köhler (1993) noted a 
captive orangutan using sticks and stones as weapons, and Ellis (1975) documented zoo 
orangutans using sticks in agonistic displays.     
2) Protection from Sun and Rain 
Another common observation of orangutan tool use is their preoccupation with 
placing objects on or over their head, often linked in the wild to sun and rain protection. 
MacKinnon (1971,1974) documented Bornean orangutans placing vegetation on their head 
and backs presumably for sun or rain protection or in play. He also recorded orangutans 
constructing overhead shelters to protect themselves from the rain and sun. Wallace (1869) 
reported that, according to his native guides, orangutans often cover their body with leaves as 
rain protection. However, orangutans in captivity, even indoors, often place sheets and other 
types of objects over their head and therefore appear to have a natural propensity to do so. 
Galdikas (1982b) believed they might be genetically inclined to this behavior.  
3) Protection from Vegetation and Insects 
Orangutans also use items to protect their hands and feet. Rijksen (1978) observed 
rehabilitants using paper, leaves, or a “gunny sac” to hold the spiny durian fruit (Durio 
oxleyanus) when trying to pry it open. He also observed wild orangutans using leaves to 
protect the hand during inspection of an ant nest (Rijksen, 1978). Fox and bin’Muhammad 
(2002) described orangutan use of a “leaf pad” while foraging in a thorny tree at Agusan in 
Sumatra. The orangutan gathered leaves into a stack, forming a pad, which he then placed 
under his feet or his hands, transferring to whichever location supported his body weight on 
the thorn covered tree.   
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4) Leverage and Prying 
Captive orangutans and rehabilitants have demonstrated they can use objects for 
leverage and prying. Yerkes and Yerkes (1929) described a female orangutan using a nail as 
a lever. Hornaday (1922) described a Bronx Zoo orangutan using a lever on several 
occasions in an attempt to bend the iron bars of his cage. Rijksen (1978) observed 
rehabilitant orangutans using stick levers, inserting the sticks into termite and ant nests. 
Galdikas (1982b) noted Tanjung Puting rehabilitants pry open containers with sticks. Finally, 
Miles (1990) reported the sign language enculturated orangutan Chantek using a screwdriver 
to pry apart two boards.   
5) Extension of Reach 
Orangutans in rehabilitation and captive situations often use tools to extend their 
reach. The reaching object itself varies but can include bedding materials, sticks, and food 
items. For example, Yerkes and Yerkes (1929) described an orangutan using bedding 
materials (a sack) to reach an orange that was out of reach from the cage. After the orange 
was placed even farther out of reach, the orangutan hesitated for a long period and then 
solved the problem by making use of two bedding items. This example suggests an insightful 
solution to the problem (see discussion of insight in section 1.3.3). Sheak (1922) described an 
instance with an orangutan removing a sweater he wore and using it reached a walnut out of 
reach beyond his cage. Ellis (1975) documented several instances of tool use with three 
captive orangutans at the Oklahoma Zoo, including using sticks, lettuce and kale leaves to 
rake in out-of-reach objects (the vegetables were first modified, with the orangutan removing 
the leaves, leaving the spine). In addition, Rijksen (1978) and Galdikas (1982b) recorded 
rehabilitant orangutans using tools to reach for food. 
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Lethmate (1982) conducted several experiments with captive orangutans, many of 
which featured reaching tools. He found that orangutans could join sticks and tubes together 
to make longer sticks to use as a raking tool. They could also learn how to taper the sticks to 
fit into an attachment tube, which then could be used to acquire an object (Lethmate, 1982). 
Köhler (1993) and Yerkes (1916) investigated reaching tasks with orangutans, finding them 
quite able to use sticks to retrieve objects. 
In wild orangutans, Galdikas (1982a) documented an adult male detaching a dead 
branch and using it to scratch. Fox and bin’Muhammad (2002) observed an orangutan 
attempting to transfer from one tree to another 3-4 meters away. After failing to both reach 
the tree manually and to “tree sway” close enough to the next tree, the orangutan broke a 
branch from his current tree and used it to reach toward the other tree. After two failed 
attempts, as the stick was too short, he dropped the stick and broke off another stick, which 
was twice as long as the first. He was successful in this attempt at reaching the neighboring 
tree, using his branch to hook onto the terminal branches, pulling the limb toward him for 
transfer.   
Orangutans also use sticks to probe, either in exploration or in food extraction. 
Rijksen (1978) observed rehabilitants at Ketambe using sticks to poke at objects, including a 
caged clouded leopard. Galdikas (1982b) noted rehabilitants dabbing and poking at other 
apes and probing openings in trees and walls. In captivity, Ellis (1975) and Nakamichi (2004) 
recorded zoo orangutans using sticks as probing tools as well. Most notably, van Schaik et al. 
(1996) described habitual tool use by wild Sumatran orangutans who make and use probing 
tools to extract insects, honey, and seeds.    
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6) Cleaning and Wiping Body 
Orangutans will use cloth or vegetation to clean themselves or their surroundings. 
Wild orangutans will wipe feces from their bodies with leaves and use leaves to wipe saliva 
from around the mouth after eating (MacKinnon, 1974; Rijksen, 1978). Rehabilitants also 
use vegetation to wipe their faces and remove feces from their body (Galdikas, 1982b; 
Russon & Galdikas, 1993). Many captive and rehabilitant orangutans exhibit such cleaning 
behaviors, possibly emulating or imitating their human caregivers (Russon, 1999; Russon & 
Galdikas, 1995).  
 7) Vocalization Modification 
Orangutans at Gunung Palung National Park in Borneo regularly use leaves as tools 
to modify their kiss-squeak vocalization during agonistic displays towards humans (Peters, 
2001). First, the ape strips leaves from a branch, then holds the leaves to their mouth and 
performs their vocalization without crushing the leaves. Peters found that sound spectrograph 
analysis confirmed the vocalizations were four times louder when leaves were used.  
8) Balancing, Propping, and Stacking 
Orangutans in captive situations use objects such as boxes and poles as aids to reach 
items placed out of reach. Yerkes’ (1916) work on this topic was likely one of the earliest, 
finding a young orangutan able to stack boxes for this purpose, though not without struggle. 
Lethmate’s (1982) research is the most thorough on this topic, with orangutans adept at 
transporting stacking devices to the correct location, and even configuring a box tower to 
acquire an out-of-reach reward. In terms of pole use as a ladder, Galdikas (1982b) observed a 
rehabilitant using a stick as a prop to climb up to a window.  
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9) Pounding or Hammering 
Stick use is not limited to reaching, probing, and propping; orangutans also use sticks 
and other objects to pound or hammer on items they intend to open, such as encased fruit. 
Galdikas (1982b) recorded this behavior with rehabilitant orangutans, with the apes using 
sticks to hammer coconuts and durian fruit. Russon and Galdikas (1993) documented 
rehabilitants hammering sticks with other sticks. In Sumatra, orangutans pound open or chip 
at termite mounds with sticks, and the sticks used for this purpose are significantly thicker 
than sticks used for other purposes, such as honey dipping (van Schaik et al., 1996).   
10) Digging 
Orangutans use tools to dig for objects. Harrisson (1962) observed tool-use, such as 
digging with a stick. Galdikas (1982b) also documented a variety of situations involving 
digging.  
11) Contain Water and Food  
Using devices such as plastic bags, vegetation, and empty husks to contain food and 
water has been observed in captive and rehabilitant orangutans. MacKinnon (1974) found a 
rehabilitant orangutan using a bag as a sponge to absorb water, squeezing the water out. 
Galdikas (1982b) recorded rehabilitants using vegetation, plastic bags, and cloth in a sponge-
like manner. Galdikas also observed rehabilitants using coconut shells to contain water. 
Lethmate (1976, 1982) investigated the use and construction of drinking tools by captive 
orangutans. The tools consisted of sticks, splinters, and leaves that were dipped into the 
liquid (Lethmate, 1982). Rogers and Kaplan (1994) reported rehabilitant orangutans using 
leaves as a feeding vessel, with the ape first detaching the leaves from the substrate followed 
by shaping the leaves into a fan shaped surface on which masticated food was placed.  
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12) Swing Tools 
Orangutans in captivity can construct swing tools (Beck, 1980; Jantschke, 1972; 
Lethmate, 1982; MacKinnon, 1978). This form of tool manufacture involves the reshaping of 
an object through knotting, weaving or braiding to make a suitable affordance, i.e. swing, 
from which to lay or sit (Lethmate, 1982). These tools alter the position of the user, and thus 
are considered tool use. Lethmate (1982) noted that orangutans excel at this behavior over 
chimpanzees.   
13) Auto-erotic Tools 
Orangutans also have been documented to use tools for sexual stimulation. This 
behavior has been observed in captivity (Becker, 1984), rehabilitants (Rijksen, 1978) and in 
the wild (van Schaik, van Noordwijk, & Wich, 2006) in both males and females.    
14) Water as Tool 
Captive orangutans used water as a tool in an experimental study (Mendes, Hanus, & 
Call, 2007). Orangutans spontaneously used water to fill a tube to retrieve an out-of-reach 
peanut.   
15) Use of Human Objects 
The tool use of captive and rehabilitant orangutans is probably most exaggerated in 
their use of human-made objects and tools. Hornaday (1922) made several observations of 
the orangutans at the New York Zoological Park using forks, teapots, teacups, bottles, 
toothpicks, matches, tricycles, bicycles, clothing, hammers, and keys. Ellis (1975) recorded 
zoo orangutans using rubber tires as water and chow holders, which they moved around their 
enclosure as needed. Galdikas (1982b) noted their use of human artifacts such as using eating 
utensils, cups, hoes, ladders, grooming aides, cloths, ladles, and plastic bags. MacKinnon 
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(1974) also reported a rehabilitant using a drinking tool, where an individual used a 
polythene bag as a sponge, gathering water in it and squeezing it out. Russon and Galdikas 
(1993) documented many novel orangutan behaviors involving tools, such as siphoning fuel 
using a hose, removing weeds with a hoe or spade, hammering nails into wood with a 
hammer, saw or axe, using a boat and paddles to cross water, painting buildings and shelves, 
sharpening axe blades, sweeping the path with trigs or a broom, and chopping wood.   
Orangutan Tool Manufacture 
Tool manufacture is defined as “any modification of an object by the user or a 
conspecific so that the object serves more effectively as a tool (Beck, 1980, p.11). Beck 
cataloged four types of tool modification in animals, 1) Detach – removing tools from a 
substrate, 2) Subtract – removing objects from potential tools, such as stripping leaves, 3) 
Add or combine  – for example, joining sticks to make a longer tool, and 4) Reshape – for 
example, chimpanzees crumpling leaves to make a sponge (Goodall, 1968; Matsusaka & 
Kutsukake, 2002; McGrew, 1977). The first type of tool modification, detach, is the simplest 
form, and this type of modification has been documented in both non-primates and primates 
(Beck, 1980; Fox et al., 1999; Hart et al., 2001; Hunt, 1996; Westergaard & Suomi, 1995; 
Wittiger & Sunderland-Groves, 2007). Subtract, add and reshape are behaviors that are more 
restricted in wild animals, but are well documented in chimpanzees and orangutans. All four 
types of tool modification have been documented in orangutans, as summarized in Table 1-3.
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Table 1-2. Orangutan tool use 
* Captive studies
Tool Use References 
Weapons and display  Beekman, 1712 (in Harrisson, 1962); Davenport, 1967; *Ellis, 1975; Galdikas, 
1982b, 1983, 1989; *Köhler, 1993; MacKinnon, 1971; Peters, 2001; Rijksen, 1978; 
Wallace, 1869 
  
Draping Galdikas, 1982b; MacKinnon, 1971, 1974; Wallace, 1869 
  
Padding and covering Fox & bin’Muhammad, 2002; Rijksen, 1978; van Schaik, van Noordwijk, & Wich, 
2006 
  
Leverage and prying *Hornaday, 1922; Galdikas, 1982b; *Miles, 1990; Rijksen, 1978; *Yerkes & 
Yerkes, 1929 
  
Extension of reach *Ellis, 1975; Fox & bin’Muhammad, 2002; Fox, van Schaik, & Sitompul, 1999; 
Galdikas, 1982a, 1982b; *Lethmate, *1977a; *1977b, 1982; *Köhler, 1993; 
O’Malley & McGrew, 2000; Rijksen, 1978; *Sheak, 1922; van Schaik, Fox, & 
Sitompul, 1996; van Schaik, Fox, & Fechtman 2003; van Schaik, van Noordwijk, & 
Wich, 2006; *Yerkes, 1916; *Yerkes & Yerkes, 1929 
  
Cleaning or wiping 
body 
Galdikas, 1982b; MacKinnon, 1974; Rijksen, 1978; Russon, 1999; Russon & 
Galdikas, 1993, 1995 
  
Vocalization 
modification 
Peters, 2001 
  
Balancing, propping 
and stacking objects to 
climb 
Galdikas, 1982b; *Lethmate, 1982; *Yerkes, 1916 
  
Pounding or 
hammering  
Galdikas, 1982b; Russon & Galdikas, 1993; Fox, van Schaik, & Sitompul, 1999; 
van Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul, 1996 
  
Digging Galdikas, 1982b; Harrisson, 1962 
  
Containing water and 
food 
Galdikas, 1982b;  *Lethmate, 1976; MacKinnon, 1974; Rogers & Kaplan, 1994 
  
Swing tools *Beck, 1980; *Lethmate, 1982; *Jantschke, 1972; *MacKinnon, 1978 
  
Water as a tool *Mendes, Hanus, & Call, 2007 
  
Auto-erotic tool use *Becker, 1984; Rijksen, 1978; van Schaik, van Noordwijk, & Wich, 2006 
  
Use of human objects  *Ellis, 1975; Galdikas, 1982b; *Hornaday, 1922; MacKinnon, 1974; Russon & 
Galdikas, 1993, 1995 
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Table 1-3. Orangutan tool manufacture 
Type of Modification References 
Detach 
Davenport, 1967; Fox & bin’Muhammad, 2002; Fox, Sitompul, & van Schaik, 1999; 
Galdikas, 1978, 1982b; Horr, 1975; MacKinnon, 1971, 1974; Peters, 2001; Rijksen, 
1978; Schultz, 1961; van Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul, 1996; Wallace, 1869 
  
Subtract 
Fox, Sitompul, & van Schaik, 1999; *Nakamichi, 2004; van Schaik, Fox, & 
Sitompul, 1996; *Visalberghi, Fragaszy, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995 
  
Add or Combine *Lethmate 1977a, 1977b, 1982 
  
Reshape 
Fox, van Schaik, & Sitompul, 1999; *Jantschke, 1972; *Lethmate, 1982; *Köhler, 
1993; MacKinnon, 1978; *Nakamichi, 2004; van Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul, 1996; 
*Wright, 1972  
* Captive Studies 
 Orangutans often make tools in the context of detach, removing branches from trees 
for displays and removing large leaves to create shelter. Van Schaik et al.’s (1996) study of 
wild orangutan tool manufacture suggests that for detach and subtract, representational 
planning may be involved, as orangutans exhibit flexible understanding of the foraging 
problems.  
Van Schaik, Fox and Sitompul (1996) described habitual tool use and manufacture 
involving detach, subtract, and reshape by wild Sumatran orangutans at Suaq Balimbing. 
Tool manufacture was observed for the purposes of insect, honey, and seed extraction. For 
extraction of termites, ants, bees and stingless bees, the tools (N=70), fresh branches with an 
average length of 70 cm, were first modified by subtracting leaves, twigs and sometimes 
bark, followed by the reshaping and fraying of the ends. After modification, the tool was held 
in the hand and used to prod bees and ants from their nests, hammer at the nests, or extract 
honey or insects from nests. Fox, Sitompul and van Schaik (1999) noted that the orangutans 
were not always successful, sometimes probing and leaving without eating, often using 
multiple tools during one extraction. Fox et al. (1999) described significant variation between 
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insect extraction tools depending on the context, with tools for termites relatively wide and 
rarely stripped of bark. Tools used to obtain stingless bees were of medium width and were 
often bark stripped, and tools for anting were the thinnest and nearly always bark stripped. 
Van Schaik et al. (1996) also noted that tools used for chipping at termite nests were the 
thickest, compared to smaller tools used for probing or extracting.  
Orangutans at Suaq Balimbing also used tools (N=43) to extract seeds from Neesia 
spp. fruits, as irritating hairs protect the fruit (van Schaik et al., 1996; Fox et al., 1999). The 
tool consisted of a single, thin, short twig, modified by bark subtraction. Holding the tool in 
the mouth, orangutans scrape out the hairs from the fruit, through cracks in the husk, to 
obtain the seeds. They also use the twig to push the seeds to the top of the fruit where they 
can be licked or picked out. Orangutans often carry the tool with them between foraging 
sites, an indicator of foresight (Fox et al., 1999). When the Neesia fruit ripens through the 
fruiting season, the husk cracks and widens. Fox et al. (1999) hypothesized correctly that tool 
width would also increase across the several months of the fruiting season as the crack 
widened. They noted that this type of tool use has been observed 40 km to the southeast at 
Trumon which, up until 1990 shared a contiguous forest with Suaq Balimbing. This behavior 
is absent at Ketambe however, which has a contiguous forest with Suaq Balimbing (van 
Schaik & Knott, 2001).   
Additional evidence for tool manufacture comes from captive situations. Wright 
(1972) studied stone flaking with a young male orangutan. The experiment was composed of 
two stages – tool use and tool making. During the tool use stage the orangutan was provided 
with a flake of stone and a food reward box that was tied shut with a cord. In order to obtain 
the reward, the orangutan had to cut through the cord. By the end of the second session, the 
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orangutan could successfully obtain the reward. The second stage, tool making, began with a 
demonstration. The ape was then provided with the core (anchored to prevent holding), the 
hammerstone, and allowed to attempt to flake the core. After five sessions and additional 
demonstrations, the ape learned the procedure of flaking and was able to cut the cord to 
obtain the food. Wright concluded that orangutans are able to use stone technology, and 
possibly by reference, such skills may not have been lacking in Australopithecines. However, 
the anchoring of the core, rather than allowing it be freely held is a serious experimental flaw 
if the goal was to determine if Australopithecines would have been capable of flint knapping 
in the way we suppose our ancestors did. Imposing such a restriction on the experiment limits 
the interpretation. Nevertheless, Wright’s work was pivotal in showing the complex 
modification abilities of orangutans and their ability to learn a complex tool manufacturing 
process (see Schick et al., 1999 and Toth et al., 1993 for similar study with captive bonobos).   
Lethmate’s (1982) many studies of captive orangutans further substantiate their 
abilities to modify tools in captivity. He found them able to split sticks, tapering the ends and 
joining them with tubes to make a five sectioned stick, and even able to search for the 
components of the sticks. One orangutan demonstrated understanding of the properties of the 
tool by attempting to repair a broken twig that he was attempting to use to reach an out-of-
reach object, by wrapping it in wood-wool. Lethmate argued that this behavior might support 
the notion that apes can use tools to make tools as supported by Wright’s (1972) work. 
Lethmate’s and Wright’s studies with captives are crucial in demonstrating that orangutans 
are capable of advanced types of tool manufacture, such as add or combine, and reshape. 
However, neither of these studies clarified whether causal understanding is a part of 
orangutan tool manufacture.  
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1.3.2 Causal Understanding 
Causal understanding of how a tool functions requires an individual to comprehend 
the cause and effect relations of how objects interact, and also to understand the significance 
of their own actions on objects (Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998). An individual that 
understands the causal relations involved in a tool task comprehends how their behavior 
causes specific results. To Visalberghi and Tomasello “there is some ‘mediating force’ that 
binds the two events to one another which may be used to predict or control those events” (p. 
189). Causal understanding depends on experiences; specifically, the ability to gain and 
synthesize knowledge so that hypotheses can be made regarding future actions (Visalberghi, 
1997). Thus, the key to the study of causality is not that an individual uses trial and error to 
explore and learn about the situation, but that the individual demonstrates the ability to form 
mental hypotheses regarding what has been learned and then apply this information to novel 
situations. Dickinson and colleagues (Dickinson, 1994; Dickinson & Shanks, 1995) 
summarized this with the causal model, which suggests that behavior can be guided by 
abstract knowledge regarding a causal connection. This is in contrast to the associative 
model, which posits that behavior is governed by stimulus-response associations (Cobos, 
López, Cãno, Almaraz, & Shanks, 2002). Causal understanding is distinguished from 
comprehension based on associative learning in that it allows the individual to respond to 
novel situations without relying on the formation of a new association (Visalberghi & 
Limongelli, 1996).  
Visalberghi and Tomasello (1998) described causal understanding as consisting of 
three hierarchical components: 1) Antecedent and consequent events, the mental pairing of 
causes and effects through associative learning based on spatial and temporal aspects; 2) 
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Explanatory attitude, the creation of a hypothesis regarding how the cause and effect are 
related, which may be tested and can lead to additional hypotheses. This ability to examine 
multiple possible explanations is critical for causal understanding; 3) Mediating forces, the 
development of an explanation for why one cause leads to an effect.   
Researchers have postulated that causal understanding is not an ability that is either 
entirely present or absent in an organism. Kummer (1995) framed the levels of causal 
understanding on a continuum ranging from weak causal knowledge to strong causal 
knowledge (causal reasoning). Weak causal knowledge is indicated when a connection 
between two events exists, but the reason for the connection is unclear to the tool user. 
Learning through association results in such knowledge. Shanks (2007) described 
associationism as a simple connection between events, with one event automatically linked to 
another. Weak causal knowledge through associative learning is found in all animals 
(including humans) (Kummer, 1995). Weak causal knowledge is significant in that it allows 
animals to attempt to control their environment (Dickinson & Shanks, 1995). Strong causal 
knowledge indicates an understanding of the connection between events (Dickinson & 
Shanks, 1995). Kummer argued that strong causal knowledge is only found in humans (also 
see Premack, 1994).   
Strong causal knowledge allows for flexible behavior in response to novel situations, 
resulting in ‘causal reasoning’ (Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998). Visalberghi and Tomasello 
described causal reasoning as composed of four forms: 1) comprehension, and individual 
understands a cause leads to an effect, with cause and effect related by a mediating force, 2) 
prediction, a subject observed only the event (antecedent), but can predict the result (effect) 
by using the mediating force, 3) postdiction, a subject observed the effect or result only and 
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infers backward to the antecedent, 4) production, a subject intervenes in the chain so that 
cause and effect are in their control.  Prediction, postdiction, and production demonstrate 
causal reasoning, and offer the strongest evidence for causal understanding (Visalberghi & 
Tomasello, 1998). Dunbar (2000) considered causal reasoning a fundamental aspect of the 
operation of sophisticated cognitive processes, noting it allows for the mental rehearsal of 
strategies.  
Causal understanding pertains to both the physical domain (object use, tool behavior, 
categories, space and quantity) and the social domain (social relations with other 
individuals). Causal understanding in the social domain involves solving social problems and 
making predictions regarding the behavior of other individuals (Cheney, Seyfarth, & Silk, 
1995; Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998). For example, researchers have found that baboons 
recognize causal relations in the social realm (Cheney et al., 1995). In particular, when 
subjects were played recordings of causally inconsistent vocalizations, such as a dominant 
individual giving a fear bark to a subordinate, they responded more strongly than to causally 
consistent recordings (Cheney et al., 1995). Visalberghi and Tomasello assume that the forms 
of causal understanding are the same in both the social and physical domains. They recognize 
that the “mediating forces” will be different, such as gravity in the physical domain, and 
intentions and social knowledge in the social domain. These authors are not convinced that 
nonhuman primates excel to a greater extent in either the physical or the social domains, 
seeing understanding as limited in both domains. In attempting to disentangle the evolution 
of causality, they noted further research is required to understand the degree of transfer 
between the physical and social domains. They propose that some primates might have 
evolved limited skills in causal understanding in the physical domain, likely related to 
  
 
24 
foraging. Other primates may have developed some limited skills for causal understanding in 
the social context in relation to group dynamics. This view leaves many questions 
unanswered in the study of the evolution of causality. Hauser and Spaulding (2006) echo this 
point, noting that evolution regarding causal inference is not well understood. 
Development of Causal Understanding 
Piaget’s (1952) theory of sensorimotor development stages in humans is key to 
understanding the cognitive abilities of apes because of our many physical, mental, and 
developmental similarities. In the present study, I focused on a Piagetian perspective, 
following in the tradition of many primate comparative psychologists who have recognized 
the value of this framework for outlining basic comparative guidelines (Bard, 1990; 
Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1977; Gibson, 1977; Mathieu, Daudelin, Dagenais, & Decarie, 1980; 
Parker, 1977; Pepperberg, 2002; Spinozzi & Potì, 1993; Suda & Call, 2005, 2006). However, 
Piaget’s theory is not the only perspective in comparative cognition (for a review see Parker 
& McKinney, 1999). Piaget’s theories have been criticized as being too anthropocentric for 
comparative cognition (Pepperberg, 2002). Additionally, research has shown that some of the 
age approximations for the developmental stages are not reliable (Baillargeon & Kotovsky, 
1995; Case, 1985, Case et al., 1996; Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975). However, as Pepperberg argued, 
the value in using this perspective is not in the specifics, but rather in that it specifies that 
developmental stages exist and that progress through the stages can be measured and used to 
compare cognition and development between species (Pepperberg, 2002). 
Table 1-4 summarizes sensorimotor skill development in human children and the 
corresponding development of causal understanding according to Piaget (1952, 1954). Most 
relevant to the present study are stages five and six. Stage 5 in sensorimotor development in 
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terms of causality corresponds to perceiving causal relations, but where the actor is unable to 
understand what caused an effect when only presented with the effect. Using a tool and 
relating one object to another through trial and error experimentation is indicative of stage 
five development. In humans, children can solve tool tasks using trial and error means at 
around 10-18 months of age (Piaget, 1954).  
Table 1-4. Summary of Piaget’s sensorimotor skills and causal understanding 
development in humans 
Stage Age 
(mos.) 
Sensorimotor skills 
(Piaget, 1952) 
Development of causality 
(Piaget, 1954) 
First 0-1 
Uses reflexes to interact with the 
world  
Does not have a notion of causality 
    
Second 1-4 
Primary circular behaviors (ex. 
thumb sucking) 
Does not have a notion of causality; does 
not understand objects or object relations 
    
Third 4-8 
Secondary circular reactions, 
beginning to recognize objects 
outside the self, able to relate 
objects to one another 
Notion exists that actions cause effects, 
occurs without an understanding of how 
causes and events are actually related. 
Causal understanding is not yet present. 
    
Fourth 8-12 
Actively searches for hidden 
objects, retains a mental image 
of an object even when it is out 
of sight 
Cause and effect relations exist for the 
child, but the child cannot perceive the 
relation between objects and actions 
    
Fifth 12-18 
Tertiary circular reactions, 
involves tracking visible 
displacements 
Capable of perceiving causality, of 
recognizing a relation between cause and 
effect  
    
Sixth 
 
16-24 
Able to track an invisible 
displacement and can use mental 
trial and error to solve problems  
Causal relations can be mentally 
represented, able to reconstruct causes 
when views only the effect, and to predict 
the effects that result from causes 
 
The tool-using abilities of all great apes, in the wild and in captivity, demonstrate that 
great apes reach at least stage five development. The use of tools by many monkeys, such as 
Cebus, Macaca, and Papio, in their natural habitats also supports stage five development 
(Leca et al., 2008; Ottoni & Izar, 2008; Oyen, 1979; Parker & Gibson, 1977). In the 
experimental setting, monkeys that do not naturally use tools can learn tool-using and can 
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make distinctions between different types of tools (Hauser, 1997; Santos, Pearson, Spaepen, 
Tsao, Hauser, 2006). These examples suggest that stage five development might be found in 
all monkeys and apes. For further support of stage five development in monkeys and apes see 
reviews by Parker and McKinney (1999), Tomasello and Call (1997) and Gómez (2004). 
Stage six involves mental representation and signifies entering a mental world where 
objects such as tools can be manipulated cognitively not only motorically (Piaget 
1936/1974). Stage six representation is a required prerequisite to comprehend abstractions 
such as those required for causal understanding (Piaget, 1962). Comprehension of causal 
relations appears early in human development (Bullock & Gelman, 1979; Gopnik & Sobel, 
2000; Shultz, 1982; Shultz, Altmann, & Asselin, 1986). Human children can detect causal 
mechanisms, visible and invisible, by 3 years of age (Gopnik & Schulz, 2004). Human 
children can provide explanations for events by 4 or 5 years of age (Crowley & Siegler, 
1999). By 5 years of age, human children have extensive causal knowledge of their 
environment (Gopnik & Schulz, 2004). In humans, the ability to comprehend causal relations 
is not either present or absent; it develops as a continuum as human children grow, and builds 
on other knowledge (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1996). For example, children and 
chimpanzees may learn to use a tool, later learn why it is an effective tool, and still later 
comprehend the effect of their actions with the tool (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1996). The 
ability to understand causality should be thought of as a capacity, with the skill increasing 
through development (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1996). Visalberghi and Limongelli noted 
that a species’ understanding of causality is multifaceted, with comprehension varying 
regarding different domains (physical or social) or physical principles (such as gravity, 
weight, or size) (also see Piaget, 1952, 1954).  
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Support for stage six development regarding tool related behaviors in chimpanzees 
and orangutans comes from observation of tool use and manufacture (Tomasello & Call, 
1997). Both wild chimpanzees and orangutans manufacture and select appropriate tools with 
particular features, such as length, width or size, without apparent trial and error (Boesch & 
Boesch, 1983; Boesch-Achermann & Boesch, 1993; Fox et al., 1999; Goodall, 1986; Pruetz 
& Bertolani, 2007; Sakura & Matsuzawa, 1991; van Schaik et al., 1996). However, 
Visalberghi, Fragaszy, and Savage-Rumbaugh (1995) noted that field observations of wild 
animals do not alone demonstrate comprehension, as the ontogeny of the skill is rarely 
observed, and the tool using experience of the animals is unknown. The major problem with 
detecting and demonstrating causal understanding is that only rarely in the wild is the 
ontogeny of a novel tool-using behavior in a population or individual observed by humans. In 
cases in which the origin of such behavior is not observed, it is not possible to prove that the 
tool user was aware of the causal relations. The user may have learned how to use the tool by 
associative learning or may have socially learned the behavior without an appreciation of 
causal relations. 
Experimental studies of causality suggest that apes understand how tools function to a 
greater degree than monkeys (Visalberghi et al., 1995; Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994;  
Visalberghi and Trinca (1989) presented a task to capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), placing 
a food reward inside a horizontal transparent tube. When given a series of complex tools that 
required modification, the monkeys did not behave as though they understood the causal 
features of the task. When Visalberghi, Fragaszy, and Savage-Rumbaugh (1995) 
administered this to chimpanzees, bonobos, an orangutan, and capuchins, they found that the 
apes performed better than the monkeys. Further studies conducted by Visalberghi and 
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colleagues (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994; Limongelli, Boysen & Visalberghi, 1995) 
provide support that chimpanzees understand causal relations more so than capuchin 
monkeys. Unfortunately, the scope of these studies regarding the number of subjects, species, 
and experimental methodologies is too limited to provide a complete description of causal 
understanding in great apes. The literature regarding this topic will be explored in depth in 
the following chapters.  
Returning to stage six development in general, supporting evidence for stage six 
abilities can also be found in other cognitive domains. Regarding orangutans, support for 
cognitive abilities such as mirror self-recognition (for review, see De Veer & Van den Bos, 
1999) and deferred imitation (Bjorklund, Bering, & Ragan, 2000) suggests stage six 
cognitive skills. De Blois, Novak, and Bond (1998) found supporting evidence for stage six 
object permanence skills in orangutans, and an absence of such skills in squirrel monkeys 
(Saimiri sciureus). However, it is unclear if great apes progress across domains 
synchronously in terms of acquisition of stage six skills. Although humans develop 
synchronously across different domains, arguments for and against synchronous development 
in great apes exist in the literature regarding great apes (Bard, 1990; Parker & McKinney, 
1999). As such, it is difficult to argue that the presence of stage six skills in some domains 
(e.g., object permanence) is support for it presence in other domains (e.g., causal 
understanding). For additional review of this topic, see Parker & McKinney (1999), 
Tomasello and Call (1997) and Gómez (2004). 
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1.3.3 Tools and Cognition 
 Tool use can be classified into different types, which allows focus on specific 
cognitive behaviors. Parker and Gibson (1977) divided this behavior into: 1) context-specific 
proto tool use, 2) context-specific tool use, 3) intelligent proto tool use, and 4) intelligent tool 
use. Proto tool use is distinguished by the lack of a tool, instead involving manipulations 
directed on the goal object. For example, a chimpanzee drumming with their hands on a 
baobab tree demonstrates proto tool use (Acardi, Robert, & Mugurusi, 2004). A human 
drumming on a tree with a stick is classified as true tool use. Context specific tool use is 
limited to the circumstances in which it was learned. Parker and Gibson described intelligent 
tool use as involving trial and error behavior that can also involve an understanding of the 
causal relations. Furthermore, Parker and Potì (1990) noted that intelligent tool use allows for 
learning complex tasks through directed trial and error and insight. Beck (1986) proposed 
intelligent tool use depends on the use of internal representation, allowing for prediction of 
how to manufacture and use tools. Intelligent tool use is the focus of the present study, 
specifically the aspect of causal understanding.  
Most individually learned tool-related behavior is acquired via trial and error learning 
in human and nonhuman animals (Hall, 1963). In trial and error learning an individual 
responds to a situation with a variety of methods. If one of these methods produces a positive 
result, the method is reinforced and the individual is likely to continue the behavior (Beck, 
1980). Trial and error learning is often equated with associative learning. In associative 
learning, a cognitive link is made between a stimulus and a reinforcer without an abstract 
comprehension of how or why there is a connection (Nissani, 2004, 2006). However, this 
equation of trial and error learning to associative learning is inappropriate, as in trial and 
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error learning there is often not evidence to delineate whether it is an association or 
comprehension that was formed. Trial and error behavior and even associative learning may 
have a significant role in the development of causal understanding (Piaget, 1954). Piaget 
(1954) hypothesized that the origin of causal understanding may be in the combination of the 
effort associated with an action and the detection of association between stimuli and events. 
An alternative mode of an individual acquiring tool use or manufacture is by insight 
learning. Many researchers consider the great apes as the most skilled nonhumans at 
insightful problem solving (Byrne, 1995; Mendes, Hanus, & Call, 2007; Tomasello & Call, 
1997). However, observations of insightful solutions have been recorded in other animals as 
well, in particular in birds (Heinrich, 2000; Seed, Tebbich, Emery, & Clayton, 2006; Thorpe, 
1943; Weir, Chappell, & Kacelnik, 2002). An insightful solution is characterized by 
numerous unsuccessful attempts to solve a problem, followed by a respite in which the 
individual is not engaged in the problem, and ending with a sudden solution to the task 
(Beck, 1980). Beck postulated that it is this period of non-problem directed behavior that is 
critical to insight learning. It is during this time that mental manipulation of the task may be 
occurring, leading to a solution. Beck (1980) described several studies (Beck, 1967, 1973) in 
which the animal attempted to solve the problem, failed, engaged in some unrelated activity, 
and then suddenly solved the problem. Flexibility is also associated with learning acquired by 
insight, with the individual able to transfer gained knowledge to novel situations 
(Mackintosh, Wilson, & Boakes, 1985). Insight learning implies stage six Piagetian 
development, as it requires mental trial and error to solve the problem. 
Köhler’s (1925) studies of the mentalities of several chimpanzees on Tenerife, of the 
Canary Islands, are the most referenced on the topic of insight. He conducted a range of 
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experiments to probe chimpanzee intelligence, for example, presenting problem solving 
situations involving box stacking, string pulling, and stick modification and raking. In one of 
the problems, a food reward was placed out of reach beyond the cage. The apes were given 
sticks of different lengths, that although too short to reach the food individually, could be 
assembled as one long stick to reach the food. One of the apes, Sultan, is often referenced for 
his insightful joining of the sticks and solving of the problem. Documentation by Köhler 
emphasized that it appeared that Sultan understood the nature of the task and the nature of the 
tools. For instance, once he gained the knowledge of how to assemble the tools, he never 
attempted to put two sticks together that would not fit, seemingly knowing that sticks of the 
same diameter would not fit together. To Köhler, it appeared that once Sultan understood 
how the objects functioned, he solved the task with insight. In addition, once Sultan 
assembled the stick he did not misuse it, such as pushing the food the wrong way. He used it 
to directly pull the reward to him, without apparent trial and error. However, once the stick 
was assembled, Sultan may have only had to rely on his past knowledge of how to use sticks. 
Köhler’s work analyzed by modern means supports that the skills used by the chimpanzees 
were gained via associative learning and operant training (Chance, 1960; Povinelli, 2000). 
Support for this conclusion comes from replications of Köhler’s work. Pechstein and Brown 
(1939) and Wazuro (1962, in Windholz, 1984) in separate replications of Köhler’s two-stick 
experiment, concluded the solution was gained through trial and error methods. In addition, 
Pavlov (in Windholz, 1984) concluded box stacking in chimpanzees was attributable to trial 
and error methods. Schiller (1952) found that chimpanzees stack boxes and assemble sticks 
even in the absence of a problem to solve, in the context of play. Such research led Windholz 
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and Lamal (2002) to conclude there was little reason to support Köhler’s interpretation of 
insightful behavior.    
Critique of Köhler’s work is not to imply that insight has not been documented in 
great apes. The ability to use insight to solve a task has been documented in orangutans 
(Lethmate, 1979, 1982). However, it is not a commonly observed phenomenon. Lethmate 
(1982) noted that of thousands of trials of various problem-solving tasks with orangutans, 
only nine instances of what appeared as insight learning were observed. He reported probable 
insight learning involving a task with one orangutan in which a food reward was secured out 
of reach in a horizontal tube (Lethmate, 1982). The subject’s initial approaches to the 
problem were incorrect responses, including biting the tube and attempting unsuccessfully to 
reach the reward. In the 29
th
 trial, however, the orangutan left the tube, sat two meters from it 
and engaged in play behavior with a blanket. Then, after glancing at the tube, the orangutan 
returned to it and correctly inserted the stick into the tube, solving the problem. Lethmate 
reported that on all future trials he solved it correctly. This behavior demonstrated that when 
the subject was not engaged in the task he was mentally contemplating the situation, finally 
coming to the insightful solution. A study of quantity judgment and ordinal competence in 
orangutans conducted by Shumaker, Palkovich, Beck, Guagnano, and Morowitz (2001) 
demonstrated insight, with comprehension emerging between experimental sessions. More 
recently, a study in which water was used as a tool to retrieve an out-of-reach peanut in a 
tube suggested the ability for insightful problem solving behavior in orangutans (Mendes et 
al., 2007). Observations of chimpanzees using tools in their natural habitat also support 
insightful solutions. For example, Sakura and Matsuzawa (1991) observed that Bossou 
chimpanzees, when their typical stone tools were unavailable for use as an anvil, were able to 
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immediately make an anvil from a fallen tree. Observations of chimpanzees making ladders 
in captivity to scale enclosure walls may also be insightful as the behaviors appeared 
spontaneous and without apparent trial and error (Menzel, 1972; Tomasello & Call, 1997). 
Studies such as these supports that apes can use insight learning to solve problems and may 
understand the causal features of the task. These examples suggest great apes can mentally 
manipulate problems, coming to understand causal relations insightfully in some situations.  
1.4 Significance of Study 
1.4.1 Tool use and the Reconstruction of Hominid Evolution  
The study of tool use in the great apes, particularly in orangutans and chimpanzees as 
they show customary
8
 and habitual
9
 use both in the wild and in captivity, is important in 
reconstructing the evolution of such behavior in hominids. Tool use and manufacture have 
long been argued as important to human evolution (Darwin, 1871; Washburn, 1960; Napier, 
1960; Byrne, 2004). By studying tool-using and making by nonhuman great apes, researchers 
attempt to reconstruct the cognitive abilities of extinct tool-using hominans (Byrne, 2004). 
The oldest record of stone tool use in hominans dates to 2.5 mya (Semaw et al., 1997). 
Humans diverged from the lineage leading to chimpanzees and bonobos around 6 mya 
(Begun, 1999). It is typically assumed that as chimpanzees use tools in the present, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize the last common ancestor of our lineages had some type of 
                                                
8
 The behavior occurs in most members of the population (or minimally, one age-sex class) (Whiten et al., 
1999). 
9
 Habitual behavior is not customary, but has been repeatedly documented in several individuals in a population 
(Whiten et al., 1999). 
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chimpanzee-like tool behavior (Yamakoshi, 2001). Mercader et al.’s (2007) archaeological 
finding of stone-tool use for nut cracking in chimpanzees, dating to around 4,300 years ago 
supports the scenario that tool use and manufacture by chimpanzees has a long history. 
However, even presuming the last common ancestor used tools in a chimpanzee fashion, 
there is a large span of time, from 6-2.5 mya for which we have no material record to analyze 
tool use or manufacture (Yamakoshi, 2001). Without archaeological evidence for tool use 
during this period, we are left to study modern tool-using species to hypothesize about the 
development of tool use from our last common ancestor to the first tools found in the 
archaeological record, Oldowan style tools.   
By studying orangutans we can deduce: 1) traits that are uniquely orangutan (if a skill 
is only found in the Pongo genus), 2) traits likely shared by all species since the lineages split 
(if shared between chimpanzees and orangutans), and 3) traits unique to the human lineage 
(if such traits are not found in any of the living great apes) (van Schaik, 2004). This allows us 
to make reasonable predictions regarding the cognitive skills of an extinct taxon that included 
early bipedal apes, i.e. hominans. With a better understanding of the possible cognitive 
capacities of these extinct species we can make more informed judgments regarding the 
evolution of those traits that were pivotal to humankind, such as the evolution of tool use.  
Van Schaik (2004) noted that orangutans are important in terms of the study of 
human evolution because if a trait is found in common between chimpanzees and orangutans, 
it suggests the trait is common to all great apes. A trait found only in chimpanzees and 
humans, but lacking in orangutans, suggests it derived more recently in our evolutionary 
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history. For example, evidence of cultural
10
 variation in orangutans (van Schaik, Ancrenaz et 
al., 2003) challenges theories that culture is unique to humans, and supports the hypothesis 
that it has been in the hominid lineage for 11-18 mya (van Schaik, 2004).  The same 
reasoning can be applied to the cognitive skills associated with orangutan tool related 
behaviors regarding causal cognition. The presence of tool use in both orangutans and 
chimpanzees suggests this ability has been present for millions of years (van Schaik et al., 
2003). Support for complex cognition such as causal understanding of tool properties has 
profound repercussions on discussions regarding the origin of tool use and manufacture, as it 
would provide a mechanism for how hominids conceptualized tools. If present, causal 
understanding would have allowed hominids to manufacture tools with comprehension rather 
than only trial and error experimentation. This would have been significant to hominid 
evolution in their responses to novel situations, and may have played an important role in 
how hominans interacted in their environment. 
The study of living apes can serve in modeling hominid evolution through referential 
or conceptual models. Yamakoshi (2001) proposed that early hominans, evolving from a 
fruit-eating ancestor, would have needed to adapt to new niches imposed by woodland or 
savanna by possibly eating tubers or meat. Study of orangutans and other apes can contribute 
to modeling how hominans could have made such a transition, as extinct hominans may have 
used behavioral adaptations to expand their niche (see Moore, 1996 for use of savanna 
chimpanzees as a referential model). However, there are significant obstacles in using a 
living species to model an extinct species’ behavior. These obstacles include the difficulty in 
                                                
 
10
 Culture is defined as “all group-typical behaviour patterns, shared by members of animal communities, that 
are to some degree reliant on socially learned and transmitted information (Laland & Janik, 2006, p. 542) 
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choosing an appropriate living model and the significant differences that may exist between 
the habitats, behaviors, anatomy, and physiology of the compared taxa (Tooby & DeVore, 
1987; Sayers & Lovejoy, 2008). Tooby and DeVore (1987) argue for discarding the use of 
referential models in the reconstruction of hominan evolution. They suggest use of 
conceptual models, accepting that no present species will perfectly model an extinct one. 
Sayers and Lovejoy (2008) also caution against focusing on a single species, such as 
chimpanzees, in modeling human origins. They remind us that chimpanzees are not 
australopithecines, and caution must be employed when attempting to explain hominan 
divergence using data from extant species. Regardless of how we use data from great apes in 
reconstructive models, the importance of studying great apes is clear as many human 
cognitive traits, once thought uniquely human, can be found in some capacity in the 
nonhuman great apes (Gibson, 2002). Continued research with great apes, in conjunction 
with advancements in paleoanthropology, is important in supporting or refuting the use of 
referential or conceptual models. 
 The evolution of causal understanding has important implications for the reconstruction 
of hominid evolution, as a key factor missing is how some hominid tool using or 
manufacturing behaviors were innovated
11
. Beck (1980) noted that most tool behavior is 
learned via trial and error methods. However, more difficult tool technology, such as 
involving hunting or digging, would be more likely innovated with an understanding of 
causal relationships. For example, chimpanzees observed by Pruetz and Bertolani (2007) 
                                                
11
 Innovations are defined as “new behavior patterns derived by modifications of previous ones” (Slater & 
Lachlanstimuli, 2003, p. 117). An innovation is a novel behavior that is not a consequence of social learning or 
environmental induction (Ramsey, Bastian, & van Schaik, 2007). 
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create a sharp point on the end of a stick to use in the manner of a spear. How did the 
innovator of this behavior learn to create a sharp tool? With such a complex behavior, it 
seems improbable it was learned through physical trial and error. It seems more reasonable to 
hypothesize the original innovator of the behavior recognized cognitively the association 
between a sharp tool and stabbing the prey species. It is impossible to know if the other 
community members who share this behavior made this connection as well, as they probably 
socially learned the behavior from the innovator. However, this does not depreciate the 
importance of the cognitive capacity of the individual who innovated the behavior. Such 
examples lead to the hypothesis that causal understanding must be involved in tool use or 
manufacture that involves complex innovations involving multiple hierarchical steps. 
Wolpert (2003) argued that complex tool making is not possible without an understanding of 
causality. He noted that technology, such as tools, drove human biological and cultural 
evolution, which resulted in the importance of causal understanding.  
 The invention
12
 of a hunting or digging tool may have been pivotal in the evolution of 
hominans from a chimpanzee-like ancestor. These tools would have allowed hominans to 
exploit new ecological niche (Yamakoshi, 2001). Pruetz and Bertolani’s (2007) observations 
of chimpanzees making hunting tools is significant to this argument, as is Hernandez-Aquilar 
and colleagues’ (2007) documentation of chimpanzees using tools to dig plant underground 
storage organs
13
. These types of tools may be similar to those that in hominan evolutionary 
history allowed humans to exploit their environment in novel ways, and in conjunction with 
                                                
12
 Ramsey, Bastian & van Schaik (2007) consider inventions a special type of innovation, which are rarer, more 
novel, and requires complex cognition. 
13
 Capuchin monkeys also have been documented to dig for underground tubers (Moura & Lee, 2004).  
Research supports the interpretation of parallel evolution between capuchin monkeys and great apes as regards 
to tool behavior (Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1990; Westergaard, Kuhn, Babitz & Suomi, 1998). 
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other evolutionary pressures, led hominans down a very different path from chimpanzees.  
 Yamakoshi (2001) noted that ecological pressure had a large role in the evolution of 
tool use in the extant great apes. For early hominans, ecological pressure would have been a 
driving force in the evolution of tool use as individuals sought new ways to survive and 
reproduce in their environment. However, the absence of tool use for extractive foraging in 
Bornean orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), which also face ecological pressures, suggests a 
more complex model. Van Schaik, Deaner, and Merrill’s (1999) model regarding the 
evolution of tool use linked ecological conditions for extractive foraging, dexterous 
manipulative skills, cognitive capabilities for social learning, and conditions for social 
transmission and tolerance. Yamakoshi noted that in terms of hominan evolution, a positive 
feedback of tool use and gregariousness might have occurred. Van Schaik et al.’s model 
provided a framework for understanding why the more gregarious wild Sumatran orangutans 
use tools more than the comparatively less gregarious Bornean orangutans. It is suggested 
that the higher food productivity on Sumatra allows for reduced competition and more 
tolerant individuals resulting in social learning opportunities (van Schaik et al., 1999). 
However, species differences between Sumatran and Bornean orangutans may be influencing 
behavior. Research on the effect of genetically influenced species differences between the 
cognitive skills of Pongo abelii and Pongo pygmaeus would be beneficial to this discussion. 
Taylor and van Schaik (2007) found a smaller cranial capacity (CC) in P. pygmaeus morio 
compared to P. pygmaeus pygmaeus and P. abelii. Their analysis linked brain size to poor 
diet and a relatively poor habitat (Taylor & van Schaik, 2007). However, the relation 
between brain size and cognitive abilities is unclear (Russon & Begun, 2004). 
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1.4.2 Evolution of Tool Use by Great Apes 
Understanding what factors may have contributed to the evolution of causal 
representation is important for realizing the implications this cognitive trait may have to 
individuals’ interactions with the environment. Byrne (2000) noted that, as with any trait, 
morphological or behavioral, it is necessary to examine both historical factors, such as when 
the character evolved in the lineage, and causative factors, such as what environmental 
features significantly favored the evolution of the character. The present study provides 
information on the historical aspect, in determining when causal understanding evolved in 
the Primate Order, specifically its presence in orangutans. If causal understanding is present 
in orangutans, it will support the hypothesis of it being a shared trait of all hominids.  
Regarding causative factors, there is no clear consensus on what led to the evolution 
of cognition in the great apes. A variety of hypotheses have been advanced, none of which 
satisfactorily explain the cognitive elevation of the apes over most non-apes. Milton (1981) 
proposed that elevated cognitive skills in some primates were related to food distribution of 
patchy fruit resources. This has been challenged in that not all great apes are obligate 
frugivores (Byrne, 1996). Specifically for orangutans, Rodman (1973) hypothesized their 
intelligence is related to a habitat with a patchy distribution of foods. Orangutans depend on 
the rainforest for all aspects of their survival, including shelter, food, and transport. The 
forest they occupy is characterized by a large percentage of dipterocarp trees, which have an 
irregular, temporary food supply (Delgado, 2000). In addition, Rodman hypothesized that in 
order to support their large body size, orangutans must have spatial-temporal memory for 
foods, allowing them to minimize time spent searching for food. Parker and Gibson (1977) 
argued that those species that use extractive foraging techniques to access advantageous 
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foods should have elevated cognitive abilities over those who do not. They maintained that 
gaining access to embedded foods demands elevated cognitive skills as the food is not clearly 
perceivable and the extraction of it requires object manipulation skills and often tool use. 
Specifically, they argued that the great apes and hominans evolved advanced cognitive skills 
in relation to complex extractive foraging (Parker & Gibson, 1977). Tomasello and Call 
(1997) noted that Parker and Gibson have underestimated extractive foraging abilities within 
and outside of the Primate Order. Extractive foraging is found in prosimians, monkeys, apes, 
and many non-primates such as birds. For example, capuchin monkeys (Cebus spp.), also 
extractive foragers, are argued to have evolved extractive foraging skills in parallel to great 
apes (Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1990; Westergaard, Kuhn, Babitz, & Suomi, 1998). As 
extractive foraging is not unique to great apes, it cannot have been the only feature driving 
cognitive evolution (Tomasello & Call, 1997). 
Parker’s (1996) apprenticeship hypothesis is a modification to Parker and Gibson’s 
(1977) hypothesis to explain great ape cognitive evolution. Parker (1996) predicted the 
evolution of skills for social transmission such as imitation and teaching evolved in the 
context of transmission of skills for advanced extractive foraging. Although Russon (2004) 
admired this hypothesis for incorporating the social aspect of primate life with extractive 
foraging, she criticized it as well, as it did not take into account the full range of cognitive 
skills that have developed in the great apes.   
The technical intelligence hypothesis proposed by Byrne (1997) suggested that great 
ape cognition evolved in response to the many challenging technical aspects great apes face 
because of their large body size and large brains relative to other primates. These technical 
challenges include complex locomotion, a demand for finding high quality foods, and the 
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requirement for complex food processing. This hypothesis has been praised for its relevance 
to all great apes and criticized for ignoring social factors (Russon, 2004). Byrne’s theory is 
somewhat similar to Povinelli and Cant’s (1995) hypothesis that great ape cognition, 
specifically self-conception, evolved to deal with the locomotion challenges of an ancestral 
great ape with locomotor skills for “arboreal clambering” akin to modern orangutans. 
Povinelli and Cant predicted that this type of locomotion, required for a large arboreal 
animal, would result in self-awareness of the body needed to mentally represent the body’s 
relation to substrates. Russon (2004) criticized Povinelli and Cant’s hypothesis as it only 
referred to the development of self-conception and did not explain the evolution of other 
cognitive skills. Russon developed an arboreal foraging hypothesis, which is somewhat 
similar to Byrne’s (1997) hypothesis, arguing that the need for arboreal foraging knowledge 
balanced with the challenges faced by a large body size may have led to cognitive evolution 
in great apes. However, she also criticized this hypothesis for not explaining the evolution of 
social skills (Russon, 2004). In terms of orangutan cognitive evolution specifically, 
Chevalier-Skolnikoff, Galdikas, and Skolnikoff (1982) hypothesized that the evolution of 
problem solving in general may have been selected for in orangutans through the challenges 
associated with maneuvering such a large body through the complex canopy.   
As primates are social beings, social factors cannot be ignored in primate evolution. 
Specifically, Byrne and Whiten (1988) discussed the role of social manipulation, i.e. 
Machiavellian intelligence, in the evolution of primate cognition (Humphrey, 1976). 
However, again this does not serve to distinguish apes from monkeys, as monkeys are also 
social animals. Byrne (2000) discussed the importance of social situations in dealing with 
environmental problems, particularly in the enhancement of social learning and the 
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transmission of valuable knowledge for engaging the physical world. This has likely helped 
to facilitate tool use in Sumatran orangutans, as they use tools in many different ways for 
honey, insect and seed extraction whereas no such extractive foraging techniques have been 
found within the less gregarious Bornean orangutans (van Schaik et al., 1996). In addition, at 
Suaq Balimbing in Sumatra, where most insectivory is found among orangutans, the 
abundance of social insects at this site may have contributed to opportunities for innovation 
(Fox, van Schaik, Sitompul, & Wright, 2004). These findings support a complex interplay 
between ecology and social factors in the evolution of tool behavior (van Schaik, Deaner, & 
Merrill, 1999).   
In summary, the study of orangutans is critical to understanding the evolution of 
humans. Van Schaik (2004:167) noted, “human nature is part mammal, part primate, part 
great ape, and part uniquely human.” Only by thoroughly studying all aspects of great ape 
biology and cognition can we ever fully distinguish what traits are unique to the human 
lineage. The possibility that causal understanding is a trait shared between all great apes 
would provide a cognitive mechanism for how complex tool related behaviors, such as those 
involved in hunting, digging and eventual stone knapping evolved in the hominan lineage. 
Tool innovation would not rely solely on physical trial and error but would include a causal 
understanding of the problem. This could allow for a more precise and advanced ability to 
solve problems. The present study will help clarify whether causal understanding is a shared 
trait among the great apes. Such knowledge is critical if we hope to fully distinguish which 
characteristics were central to the development of humans and define who we are. 
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CHAPTER 2. DEMONSTRATION OF ORANGUTAN (PONGO SPP.) 
CAUSAL UNDERSTANDING OF TOOL PROPERTIES 
A paper submitted to The Journal of Comparative Psychology 
Kristina R. Walkup, Robert W. Shumaker, Jill D. Pruetz 
Abstract 
Comprehension of the tool properties of rigidity and flexibility was explored in 
orangutans (Pongo spp.) through an extension of Povinelli, Reaux, and Theall’s (2000) 
flimsy-tool problem. Captive orangutans (N=3) were presented with three unfamiliar pairs of 
tools to solve a novel problem. Solving the problem required selection of a rigid tool to 
retrieve a food reward. Each pair of tools contained one tool with rigid properties (functional) 
and one tool with flimsy properties (non-functional). The orangutans chose the functional 
tools significantly more often than the non-functional tools. Moreover, the orangutans 
demonstrated this within the first test session, demonstrating pre-existing comprehension of 
the properties of rigidity and flexibility, as well as the ability to apply this understanding to 
the task at hand. The results of this study demonstrate that orangutans can recognize relevant 
tool properties, supporting the interpretation that they have a causal understanding regarding 
tool properties.  
Introduction 
The study of tool use by orangutans (Pongo spp.) can assist in delineating cognitive 
similarities and differences between human and nonhuman great apes. Tool use is significant, 
as through it we can explore an individual’s causal understanding between a tool, their 
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actions, and resulting effects. The lineage leading to modern orangutans split from that 
leading to humans, gorillas (Gorilla spp.), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and bonobos (P. 
paniscus) approximately 18 mya (Steiper & Young, 2006). The orangutan and human 
genome diverges by approximately 3% (Chen & Li, 2001). Cognitive similarities are 
apparent, with research supporting such capacities in orangutans as mirror self-recognition 
(Swartz, Sarauw, & Evans, 1999), quantity judgment and ordinal competence (Shumaker, 
Palkovich, Beck, Guagnano, & Morowitz, 2001), theory of mind (Shillito, Shumaker, Gallup, 
& Beck, 2005), language comprehension (Miles, 1999), and complex tool use and 
manufacture (Lethmate 1982; van Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul, 1996).  Orangutans in the wild 
use tools in a variety of circumstances, including but not limited to using twigs or sticks for 
extractive foraging (Fox, Sitompul, & van Schaik, 1999; van Schaik, Fox, & Fechtman, 
2003), leaves to alter vocalizations (Peters, 2001), and branches to solve locomotion 
challenges (Fox & bin'Muhammad, 2002).  Orangutans in rehabilitation centers and in 
captivity use human artifacts in a variety of ways to solve problems, often imitating or 
emulating humans in the process (Call & Tomasello, 1994; Galdikas, 1982b; Russon & 
Galdikas, 1993).   
The underlying question in studies of orangutan tool use is whether there is 
comprehension of the causally relevant features of the tool properties required to achieve the 
desired goal. Causal understanding of how a tool functions is defined by an individual 
comprehending how objects interact, understanding the significance of their actions through 
knowledge of cause and effect relations (Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998). An individual that 
understands the causal relations involved in a tool task comprehends how his or her behavior 
produces the specific results attained. The present study examines orangutan causal 
  
 
45 
understanding of tool properties by presenting a novel adaption of the flimsy-tool problem 
(Povinelli et al., 2000).  
The study of causality and the understanding of tool properties have revealed some 
insight into ape minds but have also left many questions unanswered. As will be discussed in 
the following paragraphs, research with great apes has produced mixed results on this topic, 
with some studies suggesting a limited comprehension of causality (Limongelli, Boysen, & 
Visalberghi, 1995
14
; Visalberghi, Fragaszy, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995
15
), some research 
and reviewers rejecting the idea that great apes are capable of such understanding (Penn & 
Povinelli, 2007; Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998; Povinelli, 2000
14
), and still other 
researchers supporting the idea that great apes can recognize the causally relevant features of 
a task (Bania, Harris, Kinsley, & Boysen, 2008
14
; Furlong, Boose, & Boysen, 2008
14
; Fox et 
al., 1999
16
; Herrmann, Wobber, & Call, 2008
17
; Mendes, Hanus, & Call, 2007
18
; Mulcahy & 
Call, 2006
17
; Mulcahy, Call, & Dunbar, 2005
19
).  
A number of reports suggest that orangutans recognize the causally relevant 
properties of tools (Galdikas, 1982b; Miles, 1990; van Schaik et al., 1996, Fox et al., 1999). 
For example, van Schaik et al. (1996) pointed to significant differences between tools, in 
terms of width, length, and modification, for extractive foraging tasks. These authors found 
that tools used for chipping at termite nests were widest, compared to thinner tools used for 
probing for insects or extracting honey. Fox et al. (1999) concluded this behavior indicated 
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 Captive chimpanzees 
15
 Captive chimpanzees, bonobos and one orangutan 
16
 Wild Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii) 
17
 Captive orangutans, chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas 
18
 Captive orangutans 
19
 Captive orangutans and gorillas 
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an orangutan “tool kit,” with different types of tools having different functions. They found 
the apes could quickly make adjustments when the tool was inappropriate to a task, selecting 
a shorter or longer tool as necessary (Fox et al., 1999). They noted these observations are 
indicators of intelligent tool use, which Parker and Gibson (1977) defined as including trial 
and error learning to manipulate complex objects, with attendance to the features of the 
specific context and exploration with comprehension of physical causality.  
Observations of ape tool use and manufacture are difficult to interpret as regards to 
causal understanding, as typically fieldworkers are unable to observe how a novel behavior 
originated in the population (Visalberghi, Fragaszy, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995). It is 
unclear if the behavior was learned through associative processes or if causal understanding 
was involved. It is possible the behavior was learned through social learning or trial and error 
experimentation without a comprehension of the relevant features of the problem. 
Specifically, it is unclear if orangutans know how the different tools in the tool kit function in 
different circumstances, or if they only know that a specific tool works in a specific context. 
Using the appropriate tool in a novel situation would support an understanding of how the 
tool works; whereas an understanding that a given tool works would require trial and error 
exploration of the tools in a novel task (Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998).     
Relatively few experimental studies have attempted to specifically delineate 
orangutan causal understanding of tool properties. Of particular importance is the work of 
Visalberghi, Fragaszy, and Savage-Rumbaugh (1995). These authors found that an 
orangutan, along with several bonobos and chimpanzees, recognized the causally relevant 
features of tool properties to a greater degree than tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). 
In particular, when presented with a narrow transparent tube in which a food reward was 
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placed out of reach, the apes recognized that a bundle of sticks was too wide to insert into the 
tube, and instead disassembled the bundle immediately into a smaller, functional component. 
The capuchin monkeys often attempted to insert the entire bundle into the tube, using trial 
and error methods to solve the task (Visalberghi et al., 1995; Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989). 
Mulcahy, Call and Dunbar’s (2005) research involving a raking task and mental 
representation of tool properties with gorillas and orangutans also supports comprehension of 
tool properties. When presented with tools of varying lengths to acquire out-of-reach items, 
apes were more likely to select the tool of the appropriate length to solve the task. Even when 
the apes could not see the task and the tools at the same time they were able to select the tool 
of the correct length and would refuse the task significantly more when presented with tools 
that were too short (Mulcahy, Call, & Dunbar, 2005).  
 The functional choice problem presents a functional tool and a non-functional tool and 
induces the subject to select one of the tools to obtain a reward. Some monkeys have 
demonstrated the ability to discriminate between functionally relevant and irrelevant 
properties of tools (Hauser, 1997
20
; Santos, Miller, & Hauser, 2003
21
; Evans & Westergaard, 
2004
22
; Fujita, Kuroshima, & Asai, 2003
22
; Santos, Pearson, Spaepen, Tsao, & Hauser, 
2006
23
). For example, Hauser (1997) found cotton top tamarin monkeys preferred functional 
canes to nonfunctional canes, despite differences in size, shape, color, and texture. They 
concluded the monkeys were able to recognize causally relevant from irrelevant properties 
(also see Hauser et al., 1999; Hauser et al., 2002). Specifically regarding great apes, 
                                                
20
 Cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus oedipus) 
21
 Cotton top tamarins  and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) 
22
 Tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) 
23
 Cotton top tamarins and vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops) 
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Herrmann et al. (2008) explored comprehension of functional and non-functional tools in all 
four types of great ape. In “support-type” problems involving a familiar cloth tool, they 
found that individuals from all types of great ape could spontaneously choose the functional 
tools to obtain the reward. In one condition, for example, they presented apes with the option 
to choose to pull a ripped cloth (non-functional) or a non-ripped cloth (functional) to obtain a 
food reward. However, further study with apes unfamiliar with the tool material found that 
these apes also spontaneously solved the task. The results of an additional experiment with 
unfamiliar materials and more complex conditions demonstrated that apes had difficulty 
comprehending the properties of the tool if it was not in contact with the reward. However, 
the researchers found that with additional trials the apes were able to learn the distinction and 
select the functional tool (Hermann et al., 2008). 
The present study seeks to specifically understand orangutan causal understanding 
regarding the properties of rigidity and flexibility using the functional choice paradigm, a 
problem that has not been explored in orangutans. The methodology is an extension of the 
‘flimsy-tool’ problem, which Povinelli et al. (2000) examined with chimpanzees. The 
problem Povinelli and colleagues presented involved two raking tools, one with a rigid head, 
and one with a flimsy head. A food reward was placed next to each tool. Only use of the rigid 
raking tool allowed the ape to gain the food reward. They found that only one of the seven 
chimpanzees performed significantly better than chance in their selection of the functional 
tool (Povinelli et al., 2000). Additional testing with a “hybrid tool” with this one individual 
was conducted. It was suspected the appearance of the flimsy tool might have reminded her 
of a previous experiment involving snakes, which led to her preference for the rigid tool 
(Povinelli et al., 2000). The hybrid tool combined the previous tools into one tool, with a 
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head that had a flimsy half and a rigid half. This subject was allowed to choose one of two 
hybrid tools. The food reward was placed next to the rigid head on one tool and next to the 
flimsy head on the opposite tool. Her chance level of performance in this study led these 
authors to conclude she lacked comprehension of the relevant tool properties required for the 
task (Povinelli et al., 2000). 
Furlong, Boose, and Boysen (2008) replicated the flimsy-tool problem study with two 
groups of chimpanzees: a group of enculturated chimpanzees living in a research laboratory 
and a group of semi-enculturated chimpanzees at a sanctuary (Primate Rescue Center, KY). 
Furlong and colleagues defined “enculturated” as apes reared in a human cultural 
environment in which they were encouraged to interact with humans and human artifacts. In 
contrast, the apes in Povinelli’s (2000) research were also human reared, but in a non-
enculturated environment. Furlong and colleagues characterized this style as including 
rearing by humans, but without encouragement for social engagement with humans or object 
use. Unlike the individuals of Povinelli’s work, Furlong et al. found that both the 
enculturated and semi-enculturated apes demonstrated an understanding of the functional 
properties of the task by choosing the rigid tool in 80% of experimental trials. They also 
presented the “hybrid tool” to the apes and found that the enculturated individuals attended to 
the correct side of the tool; the semi-enculturated chimpanzees performed at chance levels. 
These authors concluded the apes understood rigidity as causally relevant (Furlong et al., 
2008). 
Furlong et al. (2008) comment on their and Povinelli et al.’s (2000) methodology as 
possibly “priming” the individuals to select the rigid tool through the control trials in both 
studies. The control trials served to familiarize the apes with the methodology, allowing them 
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to learn to use a rigid tool to pull in a food reward. These trials were presented before the 
experimental sessions and between experimental trials. Furlong and colleagues address this 
“priming” problem, and tried to control for it by changing the perceptual features of the tools 
in a follow-up experiment that included removing the control trials. However, it was possible 
the apes had learned to associate the property of rigidity with solving the task in the control 
trials without a comprehension of why rigidity was important. This may have led them to 
disregard the non-functional tool, without attending to the difference in appearance of the 
rigid tool.   
The present study controlled for the possibility that apes could be experimentally 
primed in two ways. First, the orangutans in this study were not provided with control trials. 
The tools were novel to the apes, and the first time they saw and could interact with the tools 
was during the experiment. Second, three sets of tools with distinctly different appearances, 
with the functional and non-functional tool of each set visually similar, were provided across 
separate trials to attempt to ensure the apes were attending to the tool properties rather than 
appearance. To further isolate the properties of rigidity and flexibility, the entire tool was 
either flexible or rigid, rather than just the head of the tool as in previous studies. Both the 
Povinelli et al. (2000) and Furlong et al. (2008) studies relied on the apes to pull in only one 
of two options, the flimsy or the rigid tool, with no opportunity to manipulate both tools. It is 
possible it was unclear or undesirable to the apes that they would not have the opportunity to 
manipulate and explore both tools. In the present study, it was deemed important that the 
apes could fully manipulate both tools so that each tool’s features were clear. Both the 
correct (rigid) and the incorrect (flimsy) tools were given to the apes, who were then allowed 
to choose which of the tools to use to solve the problem.  
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The task in the present study involved a novel apparatus consisting of a transparent 
box containing a food reward placed out of reach from the orangutans’ enclosure (Figure 2-
1). In order to open the box and retrieve the food reward the ape needed to select a 
functional, rigid tool to pry open the box, releasing the food reward. The aim of the present 
study was to examine orangutan comprehension of tool properties regarding the 
characteristics of rigidness and flexibility. Distinction between the flimsy and rigid tools and 
correct use of the rigid tool will provide support for the interpretation that orangutans use 
tools with causal understanding. Based on their competent use of tools in the wild and in 
captivity, we predicted that the orangutans would make this distinction and demonstrate a 
comprehension of tool properties and of causal relations. 
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 3 orangutans, Allie, Azy, and Knobi (Pongo spp.), housed at 
Great Ape Trust in Des Moines, Iowa (Table 2-1). All three individuals were born in 
captivity. The apes were socially housed in an enriched environment with indoor and outdoor 
access that provided for physical well-being and mental stimulation. Owing to a past medical 
condition, Allie did not have complete fine motor control in her hands, though she did have 
normal gross motor skills (Cossaboon, Clay, Antilla, Geurts, & Pietsch, 2008). This did not 
minimize Allie’s ability to participate in the research. She was able to fully grasp all of the 
tools; however, her latency to solve may have been impacted as it often took her longer to 
pick up the tool.  
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The apes were involved in cognitive research unrelated to the present study, including 
joint attention, memory, symbol acquisition, and quantity judgment. All participants have 
been observed to use tools spontaneously. However, the present methodology and the 
apparatus were novel to all participants. Research was conducted in the apes’ home 
enclosure. The apes were not food or water deprived and could enter and leave the research 
area voluntarily.  
Table 2-1. Study participants 
Participant Species Sex 
Age 
(years) 
Rearing 
Allie Pongo abelii F 13 Mother (orangutan) 
Azy Pongo pygmaeus X P. abelii 
M 30 
Nursery and Private Home*        
(i.e. humans) 
Knobi Pongo pygmaeus X P. abelii F 28 Nursery  (i.e. humans) 
*Azy was reared in a private home, with a conspecific, by human caregivers for at least one year 
 
Apparatus 
The apparatus consisted of a transparent, hollow box (15 x 15 cm) mounted on a ramp 
(75 cm long) attached to the exterior side of the apes’ enclosure (Figure 2-1). The box was 40 
cm from the enclosure, preventing the apes from reaching it without the use of a tool. The 
transparent box contained two doors, an upper and a lower door. The upper door was on the 
top of the box and allowed the experimenter to bait the box with a food reward. The lower 
door formed the base of the box which when pressed with downward force allowed the 
container to open and the food reward to fall from the box and travel down the ramp into the 
enclosure. The 20.5-cm long lower door extended 5.5 cm out from the front of the box, 
which created a target area on the door where force could be applied to open the apparatus. 
The lower door was attached to the transparent box via a hinge that was tightened to prevent 
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the door from easily opening. To open the box, the ape was required to use a tool to extend 
their reach, allowing them to pry open the container. It is noted that the placement of the 
apparatus outside the enclosure required that the apes reach through the 5 x 10 cm mesh with 
the tool, with the result that the mesh itself served as a support for the tool. 
 
Figure 2-1. Apparatus attached to the mesh enclosure as when presented to the apes. 
 
Tools 
The tools consisted of three novel pairs. Each pair contained one tool with rigid 
properties that constituted a functional tool (Figure 2-2). The other tool had flimsy or flexible 
properties resulting in a nonfunctional tool. The tool pairs were assembled so that within a 
pair, the tools resembled each other. The three pairs of tools were made of distinctly different 
materials, with the first pair consisting of wooden sticks (wood tools), the second resembling 
firehose (hose tools), and the third resembling PVC pipes, (PVC tools).  
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a)  b)  c)  
Figure 2-2. Pairs of tool presented in the study: a) wood tools, b) hose tools, and c) PVC 
tools. The rigid tool is on the left in each pair.  
 
All tools were 75 cm in length. The wood tools consisted of two cottonwood (Populus 
deltoids) branches devoid of leaves or buds. The selection of the wood tools was based on 
testing with the apparatus to ensure that the rigid tool was a sufficient diameter (3.5-4.5 cm) 
to remain rigid and the flimsy tool was ineffective (less than 1 cm), but maintaining as much 
similarity between the appearances of the tools as possible. The hose tools were cut from 
firehose (4 cm diameter). The orangutans are familiar with firehose, as it hangs throughout 
their enclosure. Azy has encountered firehose with rigid properties while living at a previous 
facility. Allie and Knobi had never encountered firehose with inflexible properties. A PVC 
pipe (2.54 cm diameter) was secured inside the rigid hose tool to provide support. The flimsy 
hose tool remained unattached to any object to retain its flexibility. The rigid PVC tool 
consisted of a hollow PVC pipe (2.54 cm diameter). The flimsy PVC tool contained five 
PVC links (12.5 cm length, 2.54 cm diameter), attached over firehose, with 3-3.5-cm spaces 
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revealing flimsy firehose between each PVC link. This resulted in a tool that contained rigid 
features but was flexible overall and therefore was non-functional.    
Procedure  
Participants were tested individually in a location containing visual barriers to prevent 
opportunities for social learning by other apes. The experimenter (KW) secured the apparatus 
to the exterior of the apes’ enclosure. The ape was verbally requested to move to the 
experimental location. The experimenter demonstrated prior to the first trial how the 
transparent box opened, pushing the lower door down and up several times by hand. After 
returning the lower door to the closed position, the apparatus was baited with a preferred 
food, a piece of chow (Marion Leaf Eater Biscuit®), through the upper door.  
Ten sessions were conducted, with the order of the tool pairs (wood, hose, or PVC) 
counterbalanced across sessions. The three tool pairs were presented twice per session, with 
one pair presented per trial. Each session therefore consisted of six trials. The result was a 
presentation of 20 trials for each tool pair.  
After baiting the transparent box, the ape was given a pair of tools. The trial began 
when the tools were placed in the enclosure. Tool placement was accomplished by pushing 
the tools through the mesh enclosure. The order in which the rigid or flimsy tools were 
placed closest to the ape was randomized. Success was scored when the ape used the tool to 
open the apparatus. A trial was scored as not successful if the ape was unable to open the 
apparatus to retrieve the food reward. The trial ended at either solution or inattention to the 
task (defined as the ape leaving the research room) for more than 3 minutes. After 
completion of the trial, the orangutan returned the tools to the experimenter after being 
verbally requested to do so.  
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 Data Collection and Analysis 
Data were digitally recorded during sessions and were later coded using the 
application SubTrak Video Coding Program for Observational Research (Takach, Lindtvedt, 
& Ragir, 2008). Table 2-2 contains an ethogram of all behaviors recorded to the nearest 
second.  
Table 2-2. Ethogram of behaviors analyzed 
Behavior Description 
Drop Tool Release tool, either purposeful or accidental 
Engage apparatus with tool Manipulate apparatus with tools towards the reward 
Not engaged No interaction with either tool or apparatus 
Position tool Manipulate the tool through the mesh 
Rotate Tool Remove tool from apparatus and turn so that can probe with the opposite 
end of the tool 
Success Gain food reward through use of tool 
Touch tool Picking up, holding, carrying or playing with the tool, no application of 
tool to apparatus 
Withdraw Tool Remove tool from apparatus 
  
Along with each behavior, the use of the functional or the non-functional tool was 
recorded. Data analyzed included latency to take the functional tool after placement, latency 
to solve after taking the functional tool, tool choice and usage (functional, non-functional, or 
both tools), behavior after tool selection, success rate, and a comparison of tool preference 
across the experimental sessions. Binomial tests were used to compare functional and non-
functional tool use (null: 50%). Kruskal Wallis tests were used to examine individual 
differences in latency to solve and to explore differences in tool types. An alpha level of .05 
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was used in all statistical analyses. Post hoc analyses for Kruskal Wallis tests were calculated 
using the procedure outlined by Siegel and Castellan, Jr. (1988). An independent observer 
scored twenty percent of videos. Cohen’s Kappa inter-observer reliability was calculated at ! 
= .89 (Bakeman & Gottmann, 1997).  
Results 
Success  
Overall, regardless of tool material (wood, hose, or PVC) the apes were highly 
successful in retrieving the food reward. As all research was voluntary with the apes, Allie 
refused to participate in seven trials. Of the 53/60 trials Allie participated in, she was 100% 
successful. Azy participated in all trials. He was 100% successful in wood tool and PVC tool 
types, and 95% successful in hose trials. The success rate in the hose trials was affected by 
his non-completion of trial 1 of session 1 with the hose tool. He did not complete this trial 
despite selecting and positioning the functional tool toward the apparatus. He dropped the 
tool during the attempt (perhaps accidental), but did not attempt to retrieve it. Knobi was 
100% successful in the 59/60 trials in which she chose to participate.  
Functional v. Non-Functional Tool Choice 
The orangutans took the functional tool first significantly more often, 80% of trials, 
than the non-functional tool, 6% of trials (pooling tool pairs and individuals) (p<. 0001). In 
14% of trials, both the nonfunctional tool and functional tool were selected together. 
However, in 87% (n=21) of cases in which both tools were selected, the non-functional tool 
was dropped before a positioning attempt, and the individual proceeded to solve the task 
using only the functional tool.  
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 Individual data and statistical analysis support the preference for the functional tool. 
Of the trials the apes participated in, Allie (n = 53), Azy (n = 60), and Knobi (n = 59) 
overwhelmingly selecting the functional tool first to solve the task. Table 2-3 summarizes 
each subject’s first tool selection across the three experimental conditions. Binomial tests 
used to analyze functional and nonfunctional tool choice reflected a significant preference for 
the functional tool in all test cases (Table 2-3). 
Table 2-3. First tool selection for the functional, non-functional tool, or both tools in the 
experiment 
 Allie Azy Knobi 
 Wood Hose PVC Wood Hose PVC Wood Hose PVC* 
Functional 9 15 16 14 19 18 17 16 14 
          
Non-
Functional 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 4 
Both 9 2 1 6 1 2 2 0 0 
          
Binomial p=.004 p<.0001 p<.0001 p<.0001 p<.0001 p<.0001 p<.0001 p=.012 p=.031 
*Excluded one trial from analysis in which Knobi selected the PVC nonfunctional tool. She was able to solve 
the task with the tool in this trial. See discussion below.  
 
Behavior following initial tool selection supports preference for the functional tool. 
Regardless of tool material, the functional tool was nearly always positioned to solve the task 
after its selection. Azy positioned the functional tool after selection in 100% of trials. Allie 
positioned it in 88%, 83%, and 94% of trials regarding wood, hose, and PVC trials, 
respectively. Knobi positioned the functional tool in 100% of PVC and wood trials, and 90% 
of hose trials. Behaviors other than positioning the tool after tool selection included dropping 
the tool or manipulating the tool in a way unrelated to the study. Dropping the tool was most 
often scored for Allie, who had difficultly grasping the tools because of the lessened fine 
motor skills in her hands.  
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Azy was never observed to position any of the non-functional tools in an attempt to 
solve the problem. Allie was only observed to attempt to position the nonfunctional PVC tool 
once in the study (Trial 3). Knobi demonstrated more interest in using the non-functional 
PVC and hose tools. In trials in which she selected the non-functional tool, she positioned the 
tool in an attempt to solve the task in three of six hose trials, and four of five PVC trials. She 
did not manipulate the wood non-functional tool after selection, dropping it after selection in 
all trials in favor of the functional tool. Despite the manipulation of the non-functional tools 
in some trials, Knobi preferred to select the functional tool first overall, choosing it in 81% of 
trials.  
Analysis of Behavior in Session 1 
The first trial (of Session 1) of the experiment is of importance, as this was the initial 
encounter with the tools. Allie selected the functional tool first in the initial presentation of 
the wood tools, selecting both tools simultaneously in the initial presentation of the hose and 
PVC tools. Azy selected the functional tools first in the initial presentation of the wood, hose 
and PVC tools. Knobi selected the functional tools first in the initial presentation of the wood 
tools, selecting the non-functional tool first in the hose and PVC tool trials (Table 2-4). In the 
second trial of the first session, there was no selection of the non-functional tool by any 
individual, though Azy and Allie selected both tools in the wood trials. They followed this 
selection by dropping the nonfunctional tool without an attempt to solve with it. Overall, for 
Session 1, apes selected the functional tool more frequently (67%, n=12) than the non-
functional tool (11% n= 2) (Table 2-4). Both tools were selected first simultaneously in 22% 
of first session trials (n=4). 
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Table 2-4. Results of the two trials of Session 1 for each tool pair. Data reflect the first 
tool choice made by the subject, the functional tool (F), the nonfunctional tool (NF), or 
both tools (B)  
 Allie Azy Knobi 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 1 Trial 2 
Wood F B F B F F 
Hose B F F F N F 
PVC B F F F N F 
 
Analysis of the behavior following tool selection in the first session (Trials 1 and 2) 
revealed that after selection of the functional tool, the functional tool was always positioned 
to solve the task. In the trials where Allie and Azy selected both the functional and non-
functional tools, the non-functional tool was always dropped before attempting to solve the 
task. In the two trials where Knobi selected the flimsy tool first, an attempt was made to 
solve the task with the tool. In the first of these trials she was able to solve with the flimsy 
PVC tool. Unlike Allie and Azy
24
, Knobi was able to reach her hand and arm outside of the 
enclosure by 35 cm. Due to her longer reach, she extended the reach of the non-functional 
tool, allowing it to make contact between the tool and the apparatus. In the next trial 
involving the PVC tool, she used the functional tool. In the hose trial in which she attempted 
to use the flimsy tool, she dropped the tool after 66 s of attempts to solve, switching to the 
functional tool.  
Allie provided one example during the first session of research that provides further 
support of comprehension from the start of the study. In her first interaction with the PVC 
tools, she played with the non-functional PVC tool (30 s), then dropped it and engaged with 
the functional tool (44 s). She returned to examining and playing with the non-functional tool 
                                                
24
 Azy is unable to reach outside of the mesh due to his large hand size. Allie cannot easily reach outside of the 
mesh due to the lessened flexibility in her hands (see Methods). 
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for 65 s before dropping it. She then explored the apparatus (by looking and touching with 
her mouth) and picked up the functional tool to solve the problem. In this example, she 
explored the properties of both tools, but chose the functional tool when she tried to solve the 
task. 
Latency 
Significant differences in latency to solve were found between individuals for each of 
the tool pairs, wood tools: H (2, N = 59) = 13.4, p =.001, hose tools: H (2, N = 56) = 18.8, p < 
.0001, and PVC tools: H (2, N = 57) = 18.9, p < .0001. Post hoc analyses revealed that in 
each of these pairs, Azy always solved the task significantly faster than Allie and Knobi 
(Figure 2-3) (Siegel & Castellan, Jr., 1988). There were no significant differences found 
between Allie and Knobi. 
 
Figure 2-3. Median latency to solve (seconds) for study subjects in each of the 
conditions. The error bars depict the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles 
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Discussion 
The results of this study support the hypothesis that orangutans have a causal 
understanding of tool properties, and can recognize the functionally relevant features of a 
tool. The participants selected the functional, rigid tool and used that tool to solve the task 
significantly more often than the flimsy tool. Their ability to ascertain the functionally 
relevant properties regardless of perceptual similarities between the rigid and the flimsy tools 
provides support of their appreciation of the properties of rigidity and flexibility. In addition, 
the preference for the functional tool from the first session suggests the orangutans entered 
the task with an already established understanding of these properties. Their ability to 
generalize this concept to three distinctly different pairs of tools suggests that they hold a 
causal understanding of rigidity and flexibility. It also suggests the apes may have used 
mental representation to consider the properties of the tools. If so, they used mental trial and 
error to choose between the flimsy and rigid tools rather than relying on physical trial and 
error manipulations between the tools and the apparatus to choose the correct tool (Piaget, 
1952).  
Recognition of the distinction between the flimsy and rigid tools implies a cognitive 
internalization of the causal properties required in a tool to achieve a desired goal. These 
findings strengthen the hypothesis that when wild orangutans use tools they do so with a 
comprehension of the relevant features of the tool through causal understanding (Fox et al., 
1999; van Schaik et al., 1996). The results of the present study provide evidence that 
orangutans, as chimpanzees (Furlong et al., 2008), comprehend the tool properties of rigidity 
and flimsiness.  
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Our findings are in contrast to those of Povinelli et al. (2000) who reported no 
evidence of tool property comprehension by chimpanzees in the flimsy-tool problem. 
Furlong et al. (2008) discussed the critical difference of rearing history between their study 
apes (enculturated and semi-enculturated) and Povinelli’s apes (nursery reared). Furlong and 
colleagues note in their review of the literature that previous research with chimpanzees 
reared in a non-enculturated, nursery environment, predicted that the chimpanzees of 
Povinelli’s research would fail (Brent et al., 1995; Menzel et al., 1970). Specifically, Bania et 
al. (2008) discuss three variables that were likely detrimental to the apes of Povinelli’s 
research: 1) lack of access to materials for manipulation during early development, 2) limited 
exposure time to a novel tool prior to experimentation, and 3) lack of a long and stable 
history between the apes and the experimenters. Matsuzawa’s (2003) work with wild 
chimpanzees demonstrates that the development of tool use requires opportunities for 
learning about tools from infancy, with the infant able to observe the mother’s tool use 
(Allen, 2002). The unusual rearing style of Povinelli’s chimpanzees (the apes were reared in 
peer groups from infancy) may have been detrimental to the development of their tool-use 
and to their cognitive development overall (Hauser, 2001; Whiten, 2001). These points are 
significant, and support the importance of rearing and laboratory management on ape 
cognitive development. This leads us to question the validity of Povinelli’s (2000) 
conclusions regarding the peer and nursery raised chimpanzees of his research (for similar 
criticisms see Bania et al., 2008; Allen, 2002; Hauser, 2001; Whiten, 2001).  
The orangutans in the present study live in an enriched environment, with access to a 
variety of materials for manipulation. Positive interactions with human researchers and care 
staff are the norm, allowing for mental stimulation through cognitive testing and social 
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interactions. Causal understanding is in part derived through prior knowledge (Bania et al., 
2008). Thus, it is logical that an enriched environment is important to the development of 
comprehension of tool properties as it allows exploration of object properties and discovery 
of means-ends relations. We support that an enriched environment, that provides 
opportunities for psychological and physical well being, characteristic of the present study 
and the work of Furlong et al. (2008), is a critical component in allowing causal 
understanding to emerge.  
Boesch’s (2007) discussion of the distinction between the “developmentalist 
approach” and the “deterministic approach” to comparative studies is particularly relevant to 
this discussion. Following the developmentalist approach it is theorized that cognitive 
development is impacted by living conditions. The latter approach is Cartesian in nature. 
Researchers using the deterministic approach predict that nonhumans follow fixed patterns of 
development and that captive animals can be fully representative of wild counterparts despite 
disparate differences in rearing and environment. The results of the present study, in 
conjunction with those of Furlong et al. (2008), Bania et al. (2008), Brent et al. (1995), 
Menzel et al. (1970), and Povinelli (2000) provide support for the developmentalist 
perspective. In this perspective Povinelli’s research is valuable, as it exemplifies the result to 
tool-using development from a less complex environment. We appreciate Boesch’s emphasis 
that researchers must realize that cognitive variation exists within species, and that 
environmental variation attributable to living conditions is imperative to human and 
nonhuman cognitive comparisons (also see Savage-Rumbaugh, Wamba, Wamba, & Wamba, 
2007). 
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Visalberghi and Tomasello (1998) noted that experimental studies of causality with 
nonhuman animals cannot prove causal understanding is present. This is clearly a limitation 
to the present study. Through experimental study, we can reject the hypothesis that the 
problem was solved through forming a specific association, by examining novel experimental 
variables. However, these authors note the formations of other associations are possible. 
Rigorous experimental studies can demonstrate support for recognition of causal 
understanding when study subjects respond to novel experimental variants without motoric 
trial and error experimentation. We argue that it is the most parsimonious explanation in light 
of the evidence, but an adamant behaviorist can continue to argue that only associative 
processes are at work. For example, it may be argued that the orangutans in the present study 
had learned in their past experiences with rigid and flexible tools, that tools having rigid 
characteristics are linked associatively and without comprehension, with acquiring out-of-
reach food items. Additional experimentation with control trials examining whether there is 
an innate preference for tools with rigid characteristics would be beneficial. However, even if 
this is the case, there is no evidence the apes did not go on to recognize what specifically 
about a rigid type of tool made it functional. In addition, under these assumptions, it is 
unlikely the orangutans would have excelled at the present task from the onset, as the tools 
were novel and some were unusual. Additionally, the task itself was not a simple reaching 
task but a problem that they had not encountered before. Furthermore, the successful 
behavior of all three apes from different backgrounds and institutions makes it even less 
likely that each orangutan had formed the same association, leading them to succeed without 
a comprehension of relevant tool properties. We conclude that the results of the present study 
support the hypothesis that orangutans understand causal relations.  
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Continued debate regarding whether nonhumans, specifically great apes, do or do not 
possess the ability for causal understanding is a hindrance to revealing insight into human 
and nonhuman great ape cognition (see Penn & Povinelli, 2007). Recent research (Bania, 
Harris, Kinsley, & Boysen, 2008; Furlong, Boose, & Boysen, 2008; Herrmann, Wobber, & 
Call, 2008; Mendes, Hanus, & Call, 2007; Mulcahy & Call, 2006; Call, 2006) in conjunction 
with the present study provides ample evidence that great apes are capable of causal 
understanding. We provide strong support that orangutans have comprehension regarding the 
differences in rigid and flimsy tools. Therefore, the question should not be if nonhuman great 
apes show causal understanding, but what level of comprehension they demonstrate and how 
this comprehension is impacted by environmental and developmental factors.   
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CHAPTER 3. TUBE TASK: UNDERSTANDING BY ORANGUTANS 
(PONGO SPP.) OF TOOL AND TUBE PROPERTIES 
A paper submitted to The Journal of Comparative Psychology 
Kristina R. Walkup, Robert W. Shumaker 
Abstract 
The role of causal understanding in tool use is an important aspect of orangutan 
cognition. Captive orangutans (Pongo spp.) (N=3) demonstrated comprehension of tool and 
apparatus properties in an extension of the tube task (Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989). In 
Experiment 1, orangutans were required to manipulate or modify tools for retrieval of a food 
reward from a tube. The tools included a bundle of sticks, an h-shaped stick, short sticks, and 
a bent-stick. The orangutans always disassembled the bundle of sticks prior to use. Contrary 
to previous research, few errors were committed during the h-shaped stick condition 
(Visalberghi, Fragaszy, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995). Errors were present in the short sticks 
and bent-stick conditions, but also present was support for a sophisticated understanding of 
causality. Experiment 2 required sequential modification to the tube before tool insertion. 
Results were not entirely conclusive for Experiment 2. However, all apes succeeded in 
modifying the tube in the first session, and two of the apes performed significantly better in 
the second half of the study. These data provide support for the interpretation that orangutans 
understand causal relations as regards to tool modification and suggests comprehension for 
sequential tool use.   
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Introduction 
The examination of causal understanding is an important area of study in trying to 
understand nonhuman minds, as it has been often assumed and argued this is a uniquely 
human type of cognition (Kummer, 1995; Povinelli, 2000; Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Premack, 
2007; Tomasello, 1998, 2000; Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998). This topic has received much 
attention in nonhuman primates (Bard, Fragaszy, & Visalberghi, 1995; Limongelli, Boysen, 
& Visalberghi, 1995; Povinelli, 2000; Mathieu, Daudelin, Dagenais, & Decarie, 1980; 
Mulcahy & Call, 2006; Spinozzi & Potì, 1989; Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989; Visalberghi, 
Fragaszy, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995; Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994), birds (Seed, 
Tebbich, & Emery, 2006; Weir, Chappell, & Kacelnik, 2002; Weir & Kacelnik, 2006), 
elephants (Nissani, 2006), as well as humans (Piaget, 1936/1974, 1954; Premack, 1994; 
Silva, Page, & Silva, 2005; Silva & Silva, 2006; Silva, Silva, Cover, Leslie, & Rubalcaba, 
2008; Visalberghi & Troise, 1991; Want, 2001).  However, previous studies do not provide a 
comprehensive framework for explaining the level of causal understanding present in 
nonhuman animals. Specifically, more research is required with additional species and 
individuals, and with novel experiments that probe areas yet unexplored.   
The present study examines the paradigm of causal cognition regarding tool use in 
orangutans (Pongo spp.). Captive orangutans were presented with a well-established study in 
the field of causal cognition, the tube task, which has not yet been definitively explored in 
these apes. In tube task studies, the subjects are presented with a horizontally affixed tube 
with a piece of food placed inside out of reach. The subjects are given a stick or similar 
objects as tools to try to retrieve the food. The task was elaborated with novel components, 
specifically allowing for examination of comprehension regarding the tools and the 
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apparatus. Causality was investigated in that the subject must analyze either the tool or the 
tube itself for variable properties, potentially eliciting planning, and evidence for mental 
representation.   
Visalberghi and Trinca (1989) examined this problem with capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
apella) by presenting them with tools that required manipulation or specific modifications to 
solve the task. The tools included a bundle of sticks, three short sticks, and the “h-shaped 
stick.” The bundle of sticks required separation so that one stick could be used as a tool. The 
short sticks were not of sufficient length to retrieve the food, but when two were inserted 
consecutively were long enough to reach the food. The h-shaped stick consisted of a stick 
with an additional transverse piece on both ends that prevented the stick from fitting in the 
tube unless the piece was removed. They found that although the monkeys could solve the 
task, they often did so in a way that reflected a lack of comprehension of the relevant tool 
features. Visalberghi, Fragaszy, and Savage-Rumbaugh (1995) administered the bundle of 
sticks and the h-shaped stick condition to capuchins, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), 
bonobos (Pan paniscus), and an orangutan. They found that the apes committed no errors in 
the bundle of sticks condition, in contrast to capuchin monkeys that struggled with the 
bundle. However, the apes and the monkeys made many errors in the h-shaped stick 
condition. Unlike the monkeys, the number of errors decreased for the apes across the study, 
but not at a significant rate. Povinelli, Reaux, Theall, and Giambrone (2000) studied tool 
modification with chimpanzees. In one condition, a bent tool was presented that required 
unbending to a straight form to solve a task. They found that of the seven subjects, only two 
showed any modification attempts, each doing so just once (Povinelli et al., 2000). Even on 
these trials, they began the trial by trying to obtain the food with the tool bent without a 
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modification attempt. Povinelli et al. concluded that the chimpanzees did not understand how 
the properties of the tool related to the solution. Köhler (1993) came to a similar conclusion 
after presenting a young orangutan a bent wire requiring unbending to obtain a food reward. 
The ape’s response to the wire did not suggest comprehension of how to modify the tool for 
the problem. 
Experiment 1 of the present study replicated and elaborated the tube task designed by 
Visalberghi and Trinca (1989), presenting apes with related types of tools requiring 
modification or manipulation to retrieve a reward. As regards to orangutans, this paradigm 
has only been investigated with one individual using the bundle of sticks and h-shaped stick 
conditions. The current study presented captive orangutans with the bundle of sticks, h-
shaped stick, short sticks, and a novel addition to this paradigm, the bent-stick. In the bent-
stick condition, the apes were given a bendable piece of copper tubing, bent into a C-shape, 
which required modification to solve the task.   
In the second experiment, we examined comprehension regarding modifying the tube, 
rather than the tools. The end(s) of the tube were obstructed with a removable block, held in 
place with a removable pin. Three conditions, east side blocked, west side blocked and both 
sides blocked were presented. In order to push the food from the tube, the subject was first 
required to remove the block(s). The sequence of actions was critical in this experiment, with 
the ape first required to remove the pin followed by removing the block. Sequential behavior 
involves attendance to subgoals through organized stages (Hihara, Obayashi, Tanaka, & Iriki, 
2003). There are examples of sequential tool use by wild and free-ranging apes (Boesch & 
Boesch, 1990; Brewer & McGrew, 1990; Matsuzawa, 1994; Pruetz & Bertolani, 2007). Great 
apes, inside and outside of the context of tool use, use hierarchical organization to organize 
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sequential actions (Byrne, 2004). Hierarchical organization is significant and cognitively 
complex, by allowing behaviors to be flexibly organized. Byrne (2004) described this as a 
branching tree, with individuals able to repeat or omit aspects of the behavioral sequence. 
This is different from adhering to a strict linear sequential model, in which each step is 
adhered to and links in the sequence may be connected via associative learning. Hierarchical 
organization has been observed in all great apes including orangutans (Byrne & Russon, 
1998; Russon, 1998), chimpanzees (Pruetz & Bertolani, 2007), gorillas (Gorilla spp.) (Byrne 
& Byrne, 1993), and bonobos (Savage-Rumbaugh, Fields, & Spircu, 2004). Specifically 
regarding orangutans, apes in rehabilitation sanctuaries have been documented to follow a 
series of steps to wash laundry, and wild orangutans have been observed to systematically 
process palm leaves (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Russon, 1998). As suggestive as these 
examples are of causal understanding of sequential behavior, field observations of wild 
animals alone cannot prove comprehension, as the ontogeny of the skill often has not been 
observed (Visalberghi et al, 1995). In cases in which the origin of such behavior was not 
observed, it is impossible to prove that the tool user was aware of the causal relations without 
experimental manipulation. 
 Regarding captive sequential experiments with orangutans, Miles (1990, 1994) 
documented the ability of Chantek, a male orangutan competent with American Sign 
Language, to complete a tool task involving 22 sequential steps. This provided support that 
he held a mental representation of the situation, planning his actions. The complexity of the 
problem also suggested he understood the causal nature of the task. Lethmate (1978) also 
observed problem solving involving sequential actions involving a lock box with a young 
orangutan. He found support for the conclusion that the subject could use mental 
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manipulation to solve the complex sequential problem. In the present study the sequential 
activities of modifying the tube task apparatus followed by tool use are of interest, as 
sequential behavior may be indicative of forming a mental representation before attempting 
to solve with the tool.  
Experiments 1 and 2 address three topics: 1) Comprehension of the manipulatable 
affordances of the problem, 2) Strategy for success, specifically analyzing whether the apes 
use a representational strategy to solve the problem, and 3) Sequential behavior through tool 
use and tube modifications. These topics provide information to document the presence or 
absence of causal understanding in orangutans. We hypothesized that orangutans are capable 
of causal understanding. Correct manipulation and modification of the tools, a 
representational strategy to solve, and sequential modifications that are appropriate to the 
task will provide support for this hypothesis.  
Methods 
Participants 
Three captive born orangutans, Allie, Azy, and Knobi (Pongo spp.) participated in 
this study (Table 3-1). Research was conducted in the indoor enclosure of the orangutan 
building at the Great Ape Trust in Des Moines, Iowa. The indoor and outdoor enclosures are 
enriched, providing physical well-being and mental stimulation. All participants have been 
observed to use tools spontaneously. The present methodology and the apparatus were novel 
to all participants, however. The apes were not food or water deprived in the study. They 
were allowed to enter and leave the research area voluntarily. 
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Allie did not have complete fine motor control in her hands as a result of a past 
medical condition (Cossaboon, Clay, Antilla, Geurts, & Pietsch, 2008). She did have normal 
gross motor skills. This did not minimize Allie’s ability to participate in the research. She 
was able to fully grasp the tools. Her latency to solve may have been impacted as it often 
took her longer to pick up the tool.  
Table 3-1. Study participants 
Participant Species Sex 
Age 
(years) 
Rearing 
Allie Pongo abelii F 13 Mother (orangutan) 
Azy Pongo pygmaeus X P. abelii 
M 30 
Nursery and Private Home*        
(i.e. humans) 
Knobi Pongo pygmaeus X P. abelii F 28 Nursery  (i.e. humans) 
*Azy was reared in a private home, with a conspecific, by human caregivers for at least one year 
 
Experiment 1: Complex Tube Task 
Design 
In Experiment 1, we examined each ape’s comprehension of tool properties. The 
experimental conditions consisted of the bundle of sticks, h-shaped stick, short-sticks, and 
bent-stick. A control condition was used to ensure familiarization with the apparatus. Details 
for each condition are provided below. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus consisted of a transparent polycarbonate tube, horizontally mounted on 
an A-frame apparatus (Figure 3-1). The apparatus was based on the style designed by 
Limongelli, Boysen, and Visalberghi (1995). The tube was 60 cm long, with an internal 
diameter of 3.5 cm and an outside diameter of 3.8 cm. A steel ring was attached to the ends 
of the tube to prevent damage to the tube by the participants. The design of the tube allowed 
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the participants to push the reward from the tube, out of either the east or west sides of the 
tube. A preferred food reward (grapes, sugarless candy, chow or nuts) was placed in the 
center of the tube. 
 
Figure 3-1. Apparatus used in Experiments 1 and 2. Azy attempting to solve the bent-
stick condition. 
 
Tools  
Tools used in the control, bundle of sticks, h-shaped stick, and short-sticks conditions 
were constructed of PVC pipe, and were capped on each end (Figure 3-2). The tools for the 
control, bundle of sticks, and h-shaped stick were 75 cm in length, with a 2.54 cm diameter. 
The tool for the control condition was an unaltered PVC tool. The bundle of sticks condition 
consisted of three unaltered PVC tools taped together with masking tape. It was necessary for 
the ape to disassemble the bundle to retrieve one stick to use as a tool. The h-shaped stick 
condition involved one PVC tool with two short (25 cm) wooden pieces placed adjacently 
into a hole (1.25 cm diameter) 10 cm from each end of the tool. The subject was required to 
remove at least one adjacent piece to make a functional tool. Both pieces could easily be 
removed with the hands, mouth, or feet, but did not simply fall out of the tool. The short-
sticks condition consisted of three short PVC tools, each 25 cm in length. When two sticks 
were placed directly end-to-end, a longer (though non-fused) tool was created that could be 
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used to solve the task, using one tool to push the other. The design of the control, bundle of 
sticks, short-sticks, and h-shaped stick was a replication of Visalberghi & Trinca (1989). The 
tool for the bent-stick condition was a 75-cm length of soft copper tubing (1.27 cm internal 
diameter) presented in a C-shape, which required straightening to be used as a tool. The bent-
stick concept was based on Povinelli, Reaux, Theall, and Giambrone (2000). During 
experimental and control conditions, the tools were placed next to the apparatus on the north, 
south, east or west sides in a predetermined random order.  
 
Figure 3-2. Tools presented during the experimental conditions: a) unaltered PVC tool, 
b) bundle of sticks, c) short sticks, d) bent-stick, and e) h-shaped stick. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a location containing visual barriers to prevent 
opportunities for social learning by other apes. The experimenter (KW) baited the tube, 
ensuring the ape participant did not see the process, blocking the ape’s view with a sheet. The 
ape was verbally requested to move to the apparatus location. The trial began when the 
subject entered the testing location and continued as long as the ape was actively engaged 
with either the apparatus or the tools. The trial ended at either solution or inattention to the 
task (defined as the ape leaving the research room) for more than 3 minutes. Three sessions 
of the control condition, with only the unaltered PVC tool, were presented first, with sessions 
consisting of eight trials each. Each experimental session contained one trial of each of the 
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complex conditions (bundle of sticks, h-shaped stick, short sticks, bent-stick) plus one trial of 
the control condition, resulting in five trials per session. The order of conditions was 
randomized within trials and counterbalanced across sessions. Ten experimental sessions 
were presented to each ape. Success was recorded when the subject obtained the food reward 
with the tool.  
Data Collection and Analysis 
The dependent variables were modification to the tool; success or failure in retrieving 
the food reward; latency to solution if successful; side of tool insertion into tube; and number 
of insertion attempts. These data were analyzed for errors during tool modification, such as 
attempting to insert a tool without adequate or complete modification. Table 3-2 describes 
the possible errors subjects could make during modification, subdivided by tool type (bundle 
of sticks, h-shaped stick, short sticks, and bent-stick). A full ethogram for the bent-stick 
condition is provided in Table 3-3. Statistical analyses involved Kruskal Wallis and Mann 
Whitney U tests to assess differences in latency between subjects, and binomial tests (null: 
50%) to examine hand and apparatus side preferences. Statistical tests were two-tailed, with 
an alpha level of 0.05. Post hoc analyses for Kruskal Wallis tests were calculated using the 
procedure outlined by Siegel and Castellan, Jr. (1988). Data were digitally recorded during 
experimental sessions and were later coded using the application SubTrak Video Coding 
Program for Observational Research (Takach, Lindtvedt, & Ragir, 2008). An independent 
observer scored 20% of trials, with Cohen’s Kappa interobserver reliability calculated at ! = 
.81 (Bakeman & Gottman, 1997). 
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Table 3-2. Possible errors in tool modification or manipulation. Expanded and modified 
from Visalberghi and Trinca (1989), and Visalberghi et al. (1995)
Error Description 
 
Bundle of Sticks 
Bundle – Type II error Insert full or partial bundle 
Bundle – Type IV error Insert the tape into the tube 
 
Bent – Stick 
Bent – Type II -1 error Insert the tool without any unbending of the tool 
Bent – Type II - 2 error Insert the tool after some attempt at unbending, but 
tool is ineffective 
 
H-shaped stick 
H-shaped stick Type II – H error  Attempt to use the h-shaped stick without removing 
any adjacent pieces 
H-shaped stick Type II - T-error  Remove one adjacent piece, but attempts to insert the 
tool with the tool side containing the remaining 
adjacent piece 
H-shaped stick Type - III error Attempt to retrieve the reward by using an adjacent 
piece 
 
Short Sticks 
Short sticks - Type I error Insert one short stick on one side of the tube, 
followed by inserting a second stick in the opposite, 
with the reward between the sticks.  
Short sticks - Type III error Use of only one short stick, without attempts to insert 
other sticks within the trial. Only scored if user was 
unsuccessful with the one stick 
Short sticks - Insert/Remove error Insert and remove the same stick repetitively. 
Involves insertion and removal of remaining short 
sticks in the trial 
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Table 3-3. Ethogram of behaviors scored during the bent-stick condition 
Behavior Description 
Straighten tool 1 Brace tool on body and unbend 
Bend tool 1 Brace tool on body and bend 
Straighten tool 2 Brace tool through mesh and unbend 
Bend tool 2 Brace tool through mesh and bend 
Straighten tool 3 Brace tool in tube and pull or push to unbend 
Bend tool 3 Brace tool in tube and pull or push to bend 
Unclear modification 1 Modification to tool through bracing tool on body, unclear if 
attempt is to straighten or bend 
Unclear modification 2 Modification to tool without use of another affordance, 
unclear if attempt is to straighten or bend 
Straighten Tool 4 Use hands to pull tool straighter 
Bend Tool 4 Use hands to bend tool 
Force Push or attempt to push tool with physical effort into the tube 
Turn Rotate tool in tube, “organ grinder motion” 
 
Experiment 2: Blocked Tube Task 
Design 
In the blocked tube task experiment, we examined modification to the tube itself 
(Figure 3-3). Removable block(s) obstructed the east, west, or both ends of the tube. 
Experiment 2 followed Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 3-3. Block and pin placed in the end of the tube as presented in Experiment 2. 
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Apparatus  
The A-frame apparatus and tube used in Experiment 1 was used in Experiment 2. A 
preferred food reward (grapes, sugarless candy, chow or nuts) was placed in the center of the 
tube. A 1!-cm hole was drilled through the tube 2 cm from each end. The removable block 
was 8 cm long. It was composed of two parts, an internal component that fit in the tube (11.5 
cm diameter), and an external component for the subject to grip (22 cm diameter, 2 cm 
wide). A 15-cm long white plastic rod (1 cm diameter) was used as the pin (Figure 3-3). The 
pin fit through the hole in the tube and into a matching hole in the block. To remove the 
block from the tube, it was necessary to first remove the pin.   
The tool consisted of the unaltered PVC tool used in the control condition of 
Experiment 1 (Figure 3-2a). The tool was placed next to the apparatus, with placement 
randomized on the north, south, east or west sides. 
Procedure 
The experimental set-up was identical to Experiment 1. Experimental conditions 
consisted of three variations: a) block placed in the west side of the tube, b) block placed in 
the east side of the tube, and c) both ends of the tube blocked. To solve, the participant was 
required to remove the block by first removing the pin holding the block in place, followed 
by pulling the block from the tube. Success was defined as obtaining the food reward. Ten 
trials per experimental condition were conducted across five sessions. Each session contained 
six trials, with two trials of each of the three conditions presented randomly within a session.  
Data Collection and Analysis 
Dependent variables analyzed included removal and attempted removal of pin or 
block, side of tool insertion into tube, success, or failure in retrieving the food reward, and 
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latency to solution if successful. Two types of modification errors were possible in the 
attempt to solve the task: obstruction errors and pin present errors. Obstruction errors were 
defined as attempting to insert the tool with one block and pin still attached to the tube. Pin 
present errors were defined by attempting to remove the block from the tube with a pin still 
present. Latency and errors were analyzed with Kruskal Wallis tests. Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
tests were used to compare the first half of the experiment to the latter. All tests were two-
tailed, with an alpha level of 0.05. Post hoc analyses for Kruskal Wallis tests were calculated 
using the procedure outlined by Siegel and Castellan, Jr. (1988). Data were digitally recorded 
during experimental sessions and were later coded using the application SubTrak Video 
Coding Program for Observational Research (Takach, Lindtvedt, & Ragir, 2008). An 
independent observer scored 20% of trials, with Cohen’s Kappa inter-observer reliability 
calculated at ! = .83 (Bakeman & Gottmann, 1997). 
Results 
Experiment 1 
Control Condition 
Apes were presented with the control condition before (three sessions) and during 
(one trial per session) experimental sessions. These trials allowed analysis of latency with a 
tool that did not require modification, analysis of side preference, and hand preference. All 
apes were successful in the task when they chose to participate. Allie completed 31 trials, 
Azy completed 33 trials, and Knobi completed 34 trials (out of a possible 34 trials per ape). 
A Kruskal Wallis test confirmed latency to solve was significantly different between the 
three apes, H (2, N = 98) = 56.6, p < .0001 (Figure 3-4). Post hoc analysis found that Azy 
  
 
81 
solved the task significantly faster (Mdn: 12 s, IQR: 9.5) than Allie (Mdn: 98 s, IQR: 81) or 
Knobi (Mdn: 21 s, IQR: 23), and Knobi solved significantly faster than Allie (Siegel & 
Castellan, Jr., 1988). No errors were observed when using the unaltered PVC tool. The 
participants always tried to insert the tool into the tube in a horizontal position.  
 
Figure 3-4. Latency to solve the task for Azy, Allie, and Knobi for each of the 
Experiment 1 conditions in which there was success. Values represent median scores of 
the presented trials.  
 
Bundle of Sticks Condition 
Apes were 100% successful in retrieving the food reward in the bundle of sticks 
condition (10 trials per ape). Median latency to solve was 92 s (IQR: 59) for Allie, 19 s (IQR: 
6) for Azy, and 40 s (IQR: 40) for Knobi. A Kruskal Wallis test confirmed latency to solve 
was significantly different between the three apes, H (2, N = 30) = 21.2, p < .0001 (Figure 3-
4). Post hoc analysis revealed significant differences between Azy and Knobi, and Azy and 
Allie, but not between Allie and Knobi (Siegel & Castellan, Jr., 1988). No errors were 
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observed during the study. The participants always extracted one stick from the bundle 
before an insertion attempt in the tube.   
H-shaped stick condition 
Apes were 100% successful in the h-shaped stick condition trials they participated in, 
with Allie refusing to engage in one trial. The median value for latency to solve was 117 s 
(IQR: 188)  for Allie, 42 s (IQR: 54)  for Azy, and 78 s  (IQR: 87) for Knobi. Time to 
success differed significantly between subjects, H (2, N = 29) = 9.4, p = .009 (Figure 3-4). 
Post hoc analysis revealed the only significant difference was between Allie and Azy, with 
Azy solving significantly faster (Siegel & Castellan, Jr., 1988).  
Despite the high level of success at retrieving the food reward, errors were present in 
tool modification for all subjects (Table 3-4). Type II errors, such as a complete lack of 
modification (H error) or partial modification (T error), were observed for all subjects.  
Table 3-4. Errors observed during use of the h-shaped stick 
 
 
 
 
 
For Allie and Azy, only H errors were documented, and only in Trial 1. Allie attempted to 
insert the tool without removal of the transverse pieces twice, and Azy did this once. Knobi 
exhibited eight H errors, committing five in Trial 1, two in the Trial 3, and one in Trial 4. 
She also committed three T errors in Trial 2. In Trial 4, she committed one Type III error, by 
Error Allie Azy Knobi 
H-shaped stick Type II – H error  2 1 8 
H-shaped stick Type II - T-error  0 0 3 
H-shaped stick Type - III error 0 0 1 
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inserting a transverse piece into the tube as a tool. No errors were observed in Knobi’s 
remaining six trials.  
Short-sticks condition 
Azy and Knobi were 100% successful in retrieving the food reward in the 10 trials 
they each participated in during the short sticks condition. Allie refused to participate in 5 of 
the 10 trials, and was never successful at retrieving the food reward. Median latency to solve 
the task was 31 s (IQR: 69) for Azy and 45 s (IQR: 68) for Knobi (Figure 3-4). There was no 
significant difference in latency to solve between Azy and Knobi, U (10,10) =31.5, p = .16. 
 All apes demonstrated some errors in their manipulation of the tools in the short stick 
condition regardless of success in retrieving the reward (Table 3-5). Allie was the only 
individual to display Type III errors, by only attempting to use one stick unsuccessfully. She 
inserted the tool into the tube in the initial two trials, and in each of these trials she inserted 
only one short tool into the tube, preventing success. Type 1 errors (inserting one short stick 
on one side of the tube, inserting a second stick in the opposite, with the reward between the 
sticks) were observed of both Azy and Knobi. Azy demonstrated Type I errors once in Trial 
2, once in Trial 6, and eight times in Trial 8. This error was most pronounced in Trial 8 in 
which he inserted the first short stick in the west side, and the second in the east side, leaving 
the food between the sticks. Rather than solve with the third stick, he repeatedly removed 
either of the tools (from west or east sides). He placed each tool back into the tube in same 
side, resulting in continued Type 1 errors. Knobi also demonstrated three Type 1 errors in 
Trials 2 and 3, and four errors in Trial 7.   
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Table 3-5. Errors observed during the short sticks experiment 
Error Allie Azy Knobi 
Short sticks - Type I error 0 10 10 
Short sticks - Type III error 4 0 0 
Short sticks - Insert/Remove error 0 11 29 
 
Both Azy and Knobi demonstrated numerous instances of inserting and removing the 
same tool from the tube, the Insert/Remove Error (Figure 3-5). This behavior was more 
prevalent in some trials. In particular for Azy, in Trial 8, he demonstrated seven 
insert/removal events. An event was defined as an insertion of a tool followed by its removal 
from the same side of the apparatus. Of the 10 trials conducted, Knobi displayed a similar 
behavior in Trials 2, 3, and 7 with 10, 8, and 5 insert/removal events, respectively.   
 
Figure 3-5. Number of short sticks insert/remove tool events for Azy and Knobi across 
the study. 
 Azy and Knobi were observed to use a “mouth pop” technique, which involved 
placing their mouth on the end of the tube and either through blowing, lip or tongue action 
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propel the tool forward in the tube, sometimes resulting in retrieving the reward with one 
short stick. Azy used this technique in three trials, solving the task in two trials with just one 
short stick. Azy’s use of this technique to retrieve the reward in Trial 7 resulted in a low 
latency to solve, as he retrieved the reward in only 12 s. Knobi used this technique seven 
times, solving the task in two trials with one stick.   
Bent-stick condition 
The bent-stick condition was the most difficult of the conditions for the apes. Allie 
was never successful at retrieving the food reward and refused participation in 4 of the 10 
trials. Azy and Knobi participated in all trials, with Azy successfully retrieving the reward in 
six trials and Knobi retrieving the reward in seven trials. Median latency to solve for Azy 
was 117 s (IQR: 105), and 212 s (IQR: 166) for Knobi (Figure 3-4). There was no significant 
difference in latency to solve between Azy and Knobi, U (N=6,7) = 14, p = .32. 
Across the trials of the bent condition, both possible indicators of comprehension as 
well as errors in tool modification were observed for all subjects (Table 3-6). All apes 
displayed many Type II errors. Allie was the only individual to attempt to alter the tool by 
bracing it against either her body or the mesh. Azy and Knobi braced the tool in the tube 
itself to hold the tool as manipulations were attempted, with efforts observed to both 
straighten and further bend the tool. Attempting to modify the tool with the hands was mainly 
observed by Allie (five instances straightening, one bending), but also of Azy (one instance 
straightening). Azy and Knobi’s main method of attempting to alter the shape of the tool was 
through inserting the tool into the tube and turning it, in combination with attempting to force 
the tool into the tube. It was not clear if their behavior was aimed at straightening the tool. 
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Allie’s behavior in Trial 9 indicated she was attempting to straighten the tool, with 
her modification beginning before an insertion attempt into the tube. Ultimately she was 
unsuccessful in either fully unbending the tool or retrieving the reward. The following 
narrative describes her behavior in Trial 9 in detail. Video clip time is indicated in 
parenthesis.   
Before any tube insertion attempt in Trial 9, Allie attempted to alter the tool. She began by 
holding the tool in her hands, bracing it on her head, following by bracing it above her mouth, in 
attempts to modify. The form of the tool did not appear altered after these attempts. She then 
proceeded to brace the tool under the enclosure mesh (0:26). Her behavior indicated a goal of 
straightening, as she pulled the end held in her hand while the other end was held wedged in the mesh. 
While effective, as the tool was straightened some, it was difficult for her, and her progress was slow. 
She was successful in getting much of the tool straightened; however, the end of the tool was still bent 
(1:51). Through continued manipulation in which she again used the mesh to hold the tool, the tool 
bent further rather then unbending. At this point, the tool appeared caught in the mesh frame and 
several weak areas had developed in the tubing (4:00). A weak area in copper tubing is indicated by a 
collapsed area in the tube, resulting in the tube easily bending at the weak spot. This makes it more 
difficult to straighten other areas as the tubing too easily bends in the weakened area. As the tool was 
trapped in the mesh, and Allie was unable to extricate it, the experimenter intervened and pushed the 
tool back into the enclosure (4:43). Allie then braced the highly bent portion of the tool directly on her 
head, in what appeared to be an attempt to straighten (5:08). After this attempt she seemed frustrated, 
and hit the tool on the floor, eventually throwing (unclear if intentional) the tool behind her out of her 
reach.   
The experimenter provided Allie with a fresh tool, bent into the C-shape (5:29). Allie 
immediately took the tool and attempted to brace it in the mesh. She pushed up on the tubing (using her 
face, bracing the tool above her mouth) while the opposite end was wedged in the mesh. This may have 
been effective in unbending the tool some. She also pulled the tool with her hand to straighten while 
the opposite end was wedged in the mesh. She next removed the tool from the mesh (6:38). It was still 
visibly in a C-shape. She banged the tool on the floor in what may have been frustration. Then she 
moved to the apparatus, which was in the adjacent holding room, and attempted to insert the tool into 
the tube. She was unsuccessful in fully inserting the tool, and in gaining the reward. She again placed 
the tool on her head in what looked like an attempt to modify, following by banging the tool on the 
floor. She tried several more times to insert the tool into the tube, trying both the west and east sides of 
the tube. She placed the tool under the mesh of the enclosure and again looked as though she was 
trying to unbend the tool (9:52). After removing it from the mesh, she again braced it on her head. She 
braced it with the C-shape facing upward (in a U) and pulled downward (11:29). This was effective in 
altering the shape of the tool; however, too much force was applied and the tool bent further in the 
opposite direction. A weak spot developed at the site of the bend, and with her continued attempts to 
manipulate eventually the tool shape bent into a triangular form. With her continued manipulations, 
the tool broke at the weak spot. She attempted once more to put the tool in the tube, but the end was 
still bent. As the tool was broken from its original form, the session was ended.  
 
In Trial 10, after two attempts to use the tool unmodified, she also attempted to straighten the 
tool via bracing it on her head, and on her mouth. This behavior was less prolonged than in 
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Trial 9. She repeated the behavior of Trial 9 of placing the tool on head with the C-shape 
facing upward. The same result as in Trial 9 occurred, with the tool bending too far in the 
opposite direction, resulting in a weakened tool that eventually broke in half.   
Experiment 2 
 Blocked Tube Condition 
 Allie and Knobi were ultimately successful at retrieving the food reward in all trials. 
Azy was ultimately successful in 29/30 trials, refusing to continue participation in one trial. 
Figure 3-6 shows the median latency to solve the task per condition (east, west or both sides 
of the apparatus blocked). Regardless of the condition, a significant individual difference was 
found in solving the task, H (2, N = 90) = 49.9, p < .0001. Post hoc analysis revealed Azy 
solved the task significantly faster (Mdn 18) than Allie (Mdn 99 s) and Knobi (Mdn 79 s). 
There was no significant difference between Allie and Knobi  (Siegel & Castellan, Jr., 1988).   
 
Figure 3-6. Median latency to solve (seconds) for the study subjects for each of the 
conditions. The error bars depict the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles. 
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Errors 
Despite the high level of success at retrieving the food reward, all subjects 
demonstrated errors in solving the task across the conditions (Table 3-7). There were 
significant differences in the number of errors between subjects regarding obstruction errors 
(block still present) but not pin present errors (pin still present) (obstruction errors: H (2, N = 
90) = 7.6, p = .022; pin present errors: H (2, N = 90) = 5.1, p = .077). Post hoc tests revealed 
Knobi had significantly more obstruction errors than Allie or Azy. There was not a 
significant difference in the number of obstruction errors between Azy and Allie (Siegel & 
Castellan, Jr., 1988). Pin present errors were more common than obstruction errors, with 75 
pin present errors documented over the study compared to 43 obstruction errors. Errors were 
observed in all three conditions. There was not a significant difference in the number of 
obstruction errors compared by condition, H (2, N = 90) = 2.67, p= .263. However, there was 
a significant difference in pin present errors compared by condition, with more errors 
committed when both sides of the tube were blocked, H (2, N = 90) = 7.22, p = .027. 
Table 3-7. Number of errors observed per subject across the three conditions 
Condition Subject Obstruction Error Pin Present Error 
Allie 3 6 
Azy 4 8 
East    
Knobi 4 7 
Allie 0 3 
Azy 3 10 
West  
Knobi 11 6 
Allie 4 10 
Azy 3 13 
East and West  
Knobi 11 12 
 
The apes behaved differently regarding the number and type of errors committed between the 
first half of the experiment compared to the latter half (Table 3-8). Allie and Azy 
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demonstrated no difference in obstruction errors between the first half of the experiment to 
the latter (Allie U (N = 15,15) = 105, p = .78; Azy U (N = 15,15) = 98, p = .54). However, 
Knobi committed significantly more obstruction errors during the first half of the experiment 
compared to the later half, U (N = 15,15) = 50, p = .009. As regards to pin present errors, 
Allie demonstrated a significant decrease in pin present errors between the first half of the 
experiment and the latter, U (N = 15,15) = 33 p = .001. Azy and Knobi demonstrated no 
significant change in pin present errors between the first and latter portions of the 
experiment, Azy: U (N = 15,15) = 87, p = .28, Knobi: U (N = 15, 15) = 108, p = .84. 
Table 3-8. Number of errors observed in the first half of the experiment (Block 1) 
compared to the latter half of the experiment (Block 2) 
 Block Obstruction Error Pin Present Error 
1 3 16 
Allie 
2 4 3 
1 6 18 
Azy 
2 4 13 
1 21 13 
Knobi 
2 5 12 
 
Discussion 
The orangutans in this study demonstrated comprehension in many of the conditions 
by solving with no errors or few errors in comparison to what has been reported in previous 
research (Visalberghi, Fragaszy, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995). Comprehension was apparent 
across conditions but varied among individuals. Overall, however, support for either initial 
causal understanding or an emergence of causal understanding (dependent on condition) is 
supported. Orangutans demonstrated comprehension of the manipulatable affordances of the 
problem by altering tools from an unusable form (bundle of sticks, h-shaped stick, bent-stick) 
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to a usable form. Support was found for use of a representational strategy to solve as 
manipulations occurred before any insertion attempt in the bundle of sticks condition, the 
majority of the h-shaped stick trials (Azy and Allie: Trial 2-10, Knobi: Trials 6-10), and in 
Allie’s manipulation in Trial 9 of the bent-stick condition. Finally, suggestions for 
comprehension for sequential behavior through tool use and tube modifications were seen in 
the second experiment, with apes committing far fewer errors as the experiment progressed. 
These results provide support for our hypothesis that orangutans are capable of causal 
understanding, suggesting that this is a cognitive trait shared between orangutans and 
humans. 
In the control condition of the experiment, all apes solved the task within the initial 
trial. Their continued success with the tool in the control condition emphasized the 
orangutans’ comprehension of how to use a tool that required no modification. Visalberghi 
and Limongelli (1996) report that children under two years and chimpanzees under five years 
do not behave with an understanding of simple causal relations involving the control 
condition. For example, when presented with the control condition, the subjects often 
positioned the stick vertically to the tube rather than inserting it in the correct horizontal 
position. Eventually, these young human and chimpanzee subjects found the solution, but 
through trial and error means. Older children (over 2 years) and older chimpanzees (over 5 
years) are capable of solving the control condition during the initial presentation, in contrast 
to capuchin monkeys whose performance does not improve with age (Visalberghi & 
Limongelli, 1996). The present study found that adult orangutans also solve the control 
condition within the first presentation without error. These results confirm Visalberghi et 
al.’s (1995) report that found that adult apes (including one orangutan) solve the task within 
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the first presentation. These results are not surprising, as the apes have spontaneously used 
tools in the past to achieve goals.  
During the bundle of sticks condition the orangutans committed no errors. These 
results are consistent with those reported by Visalberghi et al. (1995); when given a bundle of 
sticks all apes always disassembled the bundle before attempting to place a tool in the tube. 
This suggests that they were using a representational strategy to solve the task, planning their 
actions before an insertion attempt, removing the tape from the tool without attempt at using 
the tool in its bundled form. The orangutans’ behavior is dissimilar to the performance of 
capuchin monkeys, who often attempted to place the entire bundle in the tube. Visalberghi et 
al. (1995) postulated that the lack of errors in the condition for the apes might be a result of it 
being easily apparent when holding the bundle that it is too big to insert in the tube. Further 
research with bundles of sticks of various sizes (in width) is necessary to support their 
assertion. However, the orangutans also demonstrated comprehension of tool properties 
(related to rigidity and flexibility) in previous research (Chapter 2: Walkup, Shumaker & 
Pruetz, in prep). The orangutans’ comprehension of tool properties in this previous research, 
in conjunction with their correct manipulation of the bundle of sticks (to obtain a tool with 
the correct properties), suggests a generalized concept of causal understanding of tool 
properties.  
Errors were present in the h-shaped stick condition but at a much lower rate than 
reported by Visalberghi et al. (1995). Allie and Azy committed few H errors (attempt to 
insert without any modification) in the first trial (two errors recorded for Allie and one 
recorded for Azy). Knobi committed more errors (12 total), but she committed no errors in 
the last six trials of the experiment. The rate of occurrence of errors is much lower than has 
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been reported for either capuchin monkeys, or apes in previous work (Visalberghi & Trinca, 
1989; Visalberghi et al, 1995). Capuchin monkeys often attempted to use the h-shaped stick 
in a way that demonstrated they had little understanding of how the tool should be used. 
Visalberghi and Trinca (1989) noted that errors did not decrease significantly over time, 
leading them to conclude that the monkeys did not appear to use mental planning to solve the 
task. The apes Visalberghi et al. (1995) studied had fewer errors than the capuchin monkeys, 
but all apes had more difficulty solving the task than in the bundle of sticks condition. The 
most common error was attempting to insert the stick with no modification, the H error. 
Visalberghi et al. (1995) suggested this indicated the subjects did not visually perceive the 
transverse pieces as wider than the tube. While this is possible, it also should be considered 
that apes perceived the obstruction, but chose to try the previously successful method of 
inserting the tool regardless of the obstruction’s presence. These authors found the T error 
was rarely committed, as subjects usually removed both transverse pieces at the same time 
(Visalberghi et al., 1995). However, it was committed by five (of 10) of the apes in the first 
block of their research. The occurrence of this error in the present study was very different 
from that reported by Visalberghi et al. (1995), as it was only observed for one of the apes 
during one trial. The final type of error Visalberghi et al. (1995) observed was a Type III 
error that involved insertion of a transverse stick into the tube. They noted the Type III error 
was rare expect in the case of one subject. This type of error was also rare in the present 
study, with only one ape making the Type III error once. Visalberghi et al (1995) noted that 
the average number of errors in the h-shaped stick condition per subject did decline across 
blocks (average 10.9 per subject to 1.4 per subject). However, the difference was not 
statistically significant, nor was the difference between monkeys and apes significant in this 
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task. The results of the present study are dramatically different; few h-shaped stick errors 
were observed. Three errors on average per subject were documented in the first half of the 
study, with no errors present in the last half of the study.   
The results of the short sticks condition are also of significance. Errors were apparent 
for all subjects. For Allie, Type III errors were consistent across the study, resulting in no 
successful trials. Azy and Knobi were successful in retrieving the reward in all trials, 
however, both committed many Type I errors (10 each). In addition, both Azy and Knobi 
demonstrated numerous instances of inserting and removing the same tool from the same 
side of the apparatus. This insert/remove error may indicate a lack of comprehension. Azy 
and Knobi each also developed an unforeseen technique for success, the “mouth-pop,” 
solving the task with just one tool. Of the 10 trials, Azy and Knobi each solved the short 
sticks condition twice using the one stick technique. The mouth-pop behavior indicates 
comprehension, as it was the most efficient method for solving the task. In comparison to 
previous research, Visalberghi and Limongelli (1996) reported all chimpanzees and capuchin 
monkeys older than 3 to 4 years found a solution in the first session with the short sticks 
(though making many errors). Human children were not successful until later sessions. Most 
children were able to overcome errors in the bundle of sticks and h-shaped stick conditions if 
they were older than 30-32 months. Errors continued for most children, with the short stick 
condition (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1996). The results of the present study, suggest that 
orangutans may perform similar to human children on this condition, with errors persistent 
for both groups.   
The bent-stick condition, as the tool was difficult to manipulate, presented many 
challenges to the apes and to analysis. The bent condition was the only variation in which 
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Azy and Knobi did not achieve 100% success in the trials they participated in, and Allie was 
never successful. Despite this, the orangutans demonstrated many modification attempts. 
This is in contrast to previous research with a bent tool, in which chimpanzees made very 
few modification attempts (Povinelli, Reaux, Theall, & Giambrone, 2000). Povinelli et al. 
(2000) concluded that the chimpanzees did not understand how the properties of the tool 
related to the solution. Weir and Kacelnik (2006) conducted a similar experiment with a New 
Caledonian crow (Corvus moneduloides), enlisting the subject to unbend aluminum strips to 
retrieve a goal item. The study subject developed novel methods to unbend the tool, but the 
behaviors observed did not indicate planning was involved. Weir and Kacelnik (2006) 
concluded that the bird’s behavior suggested an “intermediate” level of understanding of the 
causal relations of the task. They argue that the “all-or-none” approach to causal 
understanding taken by Povinelli and colleagues (2000) is a false dichotomy, as levels of 
partial comprehension may be important as well.  
In many instances in which the orangutans attempted modifications during the bent-
stick condition, the apes’ intent was difficult to interpret. As such, it was unclear whether the 
lack of success was attributable to a lack of comprehension, or a lack of manipulatable skills 
with the copper tubing. Despite this uncertainty, as Azy was 60% successful and Knobi was 
70% successful, they were able to unbend the tool to some degree. Of particular importance, 
at the end of the study, Allie demonstrated clearly planned attempts to unbend the tool by 
wedging the tool against the mesh and by bracing it on her head. She was ultimately 
unsuccessful, which we conclude was likely due to her lack of fine motor control rather than 
her lack of comprehension. These results support an intermediate level of causal 
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understanding for Azy and Knobi, with a more sophisticated level developing for Allie 
towards the end of the study.   
The results of Experiment 2 do not conclusively support or discount causal 
understanding in orangutans. All apes committed errors in Experiment 2. However, it is 
unclear if these errors were attributable to a lack of comprehension by the apes, ape 
individual preferences for solving a task, or poor experimental design. The pin present error 
was more frequently (n=75) observed than the obstruction error (n=43). The difficulty in 
analyzing the pin present error relates to the method in which the apes chose to remove the 
pin. Rather than pulling the pin from the block at a perpendicular angle, which removed it 
easily, they often pulled forcefully down or up on the pin, which prevented easy removal. In 
the analysis, it was not counted as an error if an attempt to remove the block was preceded by 
an attempt to remove the pin. However, the difficulty in removing the pin may have added 
unnecessary confusion to the task that affected the apes’ behavior. In addition, Azy in 
particular, approached the trials by first touching and gently tugging on the block followed 
by removal of the pin. Unlike Knobi, he did not proceed in trying to forcefully remove the 
block with the pin present, but his style of approaching the problem was to check the block 
prior to pulling the pin. Therefore, it is unclear if he lacked comprehension. Allie was the 
only ape to show a significant decrease in pin present errors between the first half of the 
experiment and the latter. Analyses of obstruction errors were also inconclusive for Azy and 
Allie. Both apes showed no decrease in the number of obstruction errors between the first 
and latter halves of the experiment. However, they did not behave as though they were 
attempting to force the block from the tube with the pin present. Rather they put the tool in 
the tube, removed the pin, then removed the block with their hand or mouth, and pushed the 
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tool in the tube to push the food from the tube. These observations plus the lack of a 
significant difference in the number of obstruction errors between the first and latter halves 
of the experiment for Azy and Allie, suggests that style of solving the task was important. 
Results are clearer with Knobi, supporting a lack of comprehension in the first half of the 
experiment. She was observed to insert the tool and forcefully try to push the block and pin 
from the tube, often pulverizing the food reward in the process. A significant decrease in the 
number of obstruction errors between the first and latter portions of the study suggests she 
acquired comprehension that this method was not productive. These results support the 
interpretation that Allie showed a clear increase in comprehension across the experiment as 
regards to pin errors, Knobi did not show evidence of comprehension in pin errors but did 
regarding obstruction errors, with results inconclusive for Azy. If these results indicate causal 
understanding, they provide support for comprehension of sequential action by orangutans. 
Given this interpretation, in conjunction with captive and wild research demonstrating 
sequential problem solving, and hierarchical planning involving tool use and foraging in 
great apes, it would provide support for the conclusion that great apes use causal 
understanding for problem solving and tool use (Byrne, 2004; Hirhara et al., 2003, Lethmate, 
1978, 1982; Matsuzawa, 1991, 1994; Miles, 1990, 1994). However, interpretation is limited, 
as it is impossible to determine if the decrease in errors across the study was due to an 
emergence of causal understanding or due to associative learning. 
The present study adds significantly to the previous literature on causal 
understanding. Visalberghi and Limongelli (1996) explained three options that indicate 
various levels of comprehension: 1) comprehension – demonstrated by correctly modifying 
the tool before use, 2) perform errors mostly in first trials, and improve performance in later 
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trials, and 3) perform errors at any time, with no significant improvements. Under these 
definitions, comprehension was found in the control and bundle of sticks conditions, as has 
been reported in previous research. Regarding the short sticks condition, the apes in the study 
performed more similar to human children, making many possible errors with one subject not 
solving. However, solving the task with only one stick places Azy and Knobi conservatively 
in the second category as listed by Visalberghi and Limongelli (1996). The same 
classification applies to the bent-stick condition, as successful performance did increase 
across trials, in particular with all apes attempting to modify the tool by bracing it against a 
substrate such as the tube or mesh. In particular, Allie’s modifications indicated sophisticated 
comprehension in later trials for straightening the tool. The results of Experiment 2 also 
support a development of comprehension as the study progressed, in particular with Allie 
demonstrating fewer pin present errors and Knobi committing fewer obstruction errors in the 
second half of the study. 
The results of the h-shaped stick condition significantly alter previous conclusions 
reported on the topic of causal understanding. Allie and Azy’s behavior indicates 
comprehension in the h-shaped stick condition. The lack of errors in most of the study leads 
to a different conclusion than that of Visalberghi et al. (1995), as they recoded many h-
shaped stick errors across their study, though it decreased in later trials. They noted that 
associative processes could explain the improvement in the h-shaped stick condition in the 
later trials. Overall, they concluded that either the apes comprehended the causal relations 
involved, or they found it easier to learn the appropriate associations than monkeys. 
The present study provides support for the presence of causal understanding in 
orangutans. Apes approached several of the conditions (control, bundle of sticks, h-shaped 
 99 
 
stick) with causal understanding from the start of the study. Moreover, representational 
planning was observed in the bundle of sticks and h-shaped stick conditions, with 
modifications occurring before insertion attempts. Style of solving made the short sticks and 
blocked tube conditions more difficult to analyze. However, solving with only one stick in 
the short sticks condition demonstrates flexible problem solving supported by causal 
understanding. The decrease in errors in the blocked condition suggests that comprehension 
emerged with the presentation of additional trials for two subjects. Several examples of 
attempted tool modification within the bent-stick condition also indicate that the apes 
understood the necessity of straightening the tool. These results contrast with Visalberghi and 
colleagues (1995), who concluded that causal understanding was limited in apes. Orangutan 
problem solving ranged from outright causal understanding in the initial trials of the many 
conditions to a development of a sophisticated causal understanding in other conditions.   
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CHAPTER 4. ORANGUTAN (PONGO SPP.) COMPREHENSION OF 
THE TRAP-TUBE TASK 
A paper submitted to Animal Cognition 
Kristina R. Walkup, Robert W. Shumaker 
Abstract 
Causal understanding was examined in captive orangutans (Pongo spp.) (N=3) 
through experiments presenting a trap-tube apparatus, including horizontal and vertical tubes. 
In the first experiment, subjects were required to avoid a trap located in a horizontal tube to 
retrieve a food reward. Tube diameter varied with a small and a large tube to explore tool-
using preferences, such as the allowance for either raking or pushing with a tool, on causal 
understanding. Two of the three study subjects achieved success in the task, differentially 
depending on tube diameter. When the tube was inverted, resulting in a non-functional trap, 
one subject avoided the trap in only the small tube condition; the other avoided it in only the 
large tube condition. In the final control condition of the horizontal tube, a combination trap 
was presented that contained two traps, one inverted and one functional. One of the apes was 
successful at avoiding the functional traps in both the large and small tube conditions, with 
the other ape successful in the large tube condition only. The results of vertical tube task did 
not provide support for causal understanding. However, the complexities of the apparatus 
design may have prevented the apes from fully appreciating the causal relations. The results 
of the horizontal trap-tube support the conclusion that causal understanding is a capacity 
present in orangutans, with individual variation an important factor in its detection.  
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Introduction 
 The study of tool use is an important method for examining cognition in great apes, as 
it may assist in indicating the level of cognitive complexity of the user. A tool can allow a 
user to act on its environment in ways that would be impossible otherwise. For example, 
orangutans (Pongo spp.), the focal species of the present research, use tools in their natural 
habitat for extractive foraging, enabling them to consume resources such as Neesia fruits, 
honey, and insects (van Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul, 1996). The question that arises from these 
observations is what is involved in such tool use cognitively. This is an important question, 
as complex cognitive processes are not always involved in tool use (Beck, 1980). 
Specifically of interest to the present study is whether tool-using orangutans have an 
appreciation of the causal relations between their actions and the tool, and how the tool can 
be used to alter other objects in the environment. By having a more complete understanding 
of great ape tool use, we hope to have a better understanding of what is unique in human tool 
related behaviors (Boesch-Achermann & Boesch, 1993). 
The tube task has been used to investigate causal understanding in relation to tools. 
Visalberghi and Trinca (1989) presented the tube task problem to capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
apella), placing a food reward inside a horizontal transparent tube. When given a series of 
complex tools that required modification, the monkeys did not behave as though they 
understood the causal features of the task. Instead, they tried all possible solutions to retrieve 
the food reward, apparently lacking the ability to mentally represent the valid physical 
characteristics of the tools (Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989). Visalberghi, Fragaszy, and Savage-
Rumbaugh (1995) presented the tube task to chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan 
paniscus), an orangutan, and capuchins. They found that the apes performed better than the 
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monkeys (Visalberghi et al., 1995; Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989). However, they concluded 
the level of causal understanding was limited, as errors in using the tools were present. 
In the trap-tube task, Visalberghi and Limongelli (1994) altered the tube by adding a 
trap in the center of the tube that could catch the food. The task examined whether subjects 
could foresee the results of their actions (Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998). In addition, the 
trap-tube task was of value in that it could help distinguish whether the problem was solved 
by acquiring a rule regarding what action to take through an associative process, or whether 
the subject understood the function of the trap through causal understanding (Limongelli et 
al., 1995). It was assumed the use of such rules is without causal understanding, allowing for 
behavior without complex understanding of the situation. Visalberghi and Limongelli (1994) 
found that one of four capuchin monkeys learned to avoid the trap to retrieve the food 
reward. However, they argued that the one successful subject did not solve the task with 
comprehension. In half of the trials, she placed the stick in the wrong side of the tube before 
realizing her error. Furthermore, when the tube was inverted 180°, so that the food could no 
longer fall into the trap, the monkey behaved as though the food could be lost. Visalberghi 
and Limongelli (1994, p. 19) concluded the capuchin was using a distance-based strategy 
such as “insert the stick into the opening of the tube farthest from the reward” to solve the 
task. Through these studies, it was concluded that capuchin monkeys did not possess a causal 
understanding of the problem, and they did not learn the causal relations as they gained 
experience.  
Limongelli, Boysen, and Visalberghi (1995) conducted the trap-tube task with 
chimpanzees, attempting to delineate strategies for solving and the underlying cognitive 
capacities involved. Limongelli et al. (1995) explained the strategies subjects may use to 
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successfully solve the task above chance levels: 1) by an anticipatory strategy – observing 
the relations of an action to the food reward, followed by continuation of the action or 
behavioral modification, or 2) by a representational strategy - forming a solution mentally 
prior to a physical action. Of five chimpanzees, only two subjects learned how to avoid 
pushing the food into the trap. The researchers concluded, based on the success of single-tool 
insertions, that these two chimpanzees were most often using a representational strategy to 
solve the task. However, as with the capuchins, it was possible that the successful 
chimpanzees solved the task through use of a distance-based rule acquired through an 
associative process, rather than actually understanding the causality of the trap and the tool. 
To test if the subjects were using a rule to solve the task, researchers moved the placement of 
the trap so that it was not always in the center of the tube. The food reward was placed to 
either the left or the right of the trap. If the subjects were using the position of the food to 
determine in which side to insert the tool, they would have a lower success rate, pushing the 
food into the trap in half of the trials. The two subjects solved the new condition at above 
chance levels. The researchers concluded that these two chimpanzees were not using a 
distance-based rule regarding the position of the food to solve the task but were considering 
the position of the trap, indicating a level of causal understanding.  
Other researchers have questioned the causal understanding of the two successful 
chimpanzees, however, as moving the trap on the tube did not eliminate another rule-based 
strategy, “always push the food away from the trap” (Tomasello & Call, 1997; Povinelli, 
2000; Mulcahy & Call, 2006). They criticized Limongelli et al. for not presenting the 
chimpanzees with the inverted trap-tube task (Tomasello & Call, 1997; Povinelli, 2000). The 
inverted trap-tube further tests an individual’s understanding of the trap, as once they see the 
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tube is inverted and the reward cannot fall into the trap, they can push the food out either 
side. Povinelli, Reaux, & Theall (2000) presented the trap-tube problem, including the 
inverted variant, to seven chimpanzees. They found that only one of the apes was able to 
solve the trap-tube at significant levels. The other apes did not learn to avoid the trap after 
100 trials. When the inverted trap was presented to the one successful ape, she behaved as 
though the trap was a threat to the reward, cautiously avoiding the inverted trap.  
Mulcahy and Call (2006) also investigated the trap-tube task with a few important 
modifications. They believed the nature of the task, pushing food away, might be problematic 
for the subjects. To make the problem more species-specific they modified the tube, basing it 
on Tebbich and Bshary’s (2004) modified trap-tube for woodpecker finches (Cactospiza 
pallida). This modified tube allowed the subject to either rake or push the food. The majority 
of the birds preferred to rake the food towards them, although only one bird was consistent in 
avoiding the trap. Tebbich and Bshary concluded on analysis of the successful subject’s 
behavior, that the finch did not demonstrate the ability to represent a strategy in advance. 
Mulcahy and Call investigated the modified trap-tube with five orangutans, two 
chimpanzees, one gorilla (Gorilla gorilla), and two bonobos. They placed the food reward in 
the center of the tube, with the trap to the left or the right, to help prevent the formation of a 
procedure regarding the shortest distance to push the food. However, the researchers failed to 
note that placing the food in the center of the tube created a new distance-based rule that the 
apes may have used to solve the trap-tube condition, “always insert the tool on the side 
nearest the trap.” Mulcahy and Call found that 89% of subjects preferred to rake (preference 
for raking was also supported by Martin-Ordas, Call, & Colmenares, 2008). Despite the 
option for either raking or pushing, 70% failed to avoid the trap. This was likely a result of 
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individual variation in causal understanding, with some individuals grasping causal relations 
easier than others. The three successful subjects, two orangutans and one chimpanzee, solved 
the task faster than other individuals in previous studies did. Additionally, when presented 
with the inverted trap they did not take avoidance precautions. However, when they were 
presented with the inverted variation of the original trap-tube (the tube with the smaller 
diameter, with no modification to allow for raking as presented by Visalberghi & Limongelli, 
1994) they proceeded to avoid the non-functional trap. The behavior of the successful 
individuals during the trap-tube task indicated they were using a representational strategy. 
Mulcahy and Call concluded that causal understanding was possible in some individual great 
apes and that allowing them to choose their mode of tool use helped them to succeed.  
Martin-Ordas et al (2008) also conducted trap-tube studies with the modified tube. 
They have published the most successful results with apes thus far, with eight of the twenty 
apes performing at above chance levels after 36 trials. To explain why the apes performed 
better in their study than in the study conducted by Mulcahy and Call, the authors analyzed 
the experimental set-up, noting that in Mulcahy and Call’s study the tubes were placed in two 
cages (one end in each cage) (Martin-Ordas et al., 2008). The set-up may have confounded 
the results, as subjects might have been reluctant to shift between cages. Tool length and 
presentation of the two trap-tubes (left and right conditions) simultaneously might also have 
affected results. These findings support that in the detection of causality, experimental design 
is critical. 
The present study expanded on research with the trap-tube task by presenting the 
inverted trap-tube and two novel conditions, the combination trap-tube and the vertical trap-
tube (Figure 4-1). The trap-tube experiment was conducted to explore each ape subject’s 
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ability to learn about the causal relation between their actions and acquiring the food reward. 
Experimental variables consisted of: 1) varying the location of the trap (center, left, right), 
and 2) varying the size of the tube (large diameter tube, small diameter tube). The aim of 
varying the trap-location was to prevent the formation of a distance-based rule for solution. 
Varying the size of the tube allowed for analysis of different modes of tool use for solving 
the problem, specifically allowing for raking or pushing the food reward from the large tube. 
In Experiment 2, the inverted tube task was presented to determine if those individuals who 
learned to avoid the trap in Experiment 1 had a causal understanding of the function of the 
trap or had learned to use a procedural rule to avoid the trap. As there was no penalty for 
avoiding the inverted trap in Experiment 2, the subject might avoid pushing the food toward 
the trap even when inverted. Silva, Page, & Silva (2005) argued there was a conceptual flaw 
in the inverted condition design, as it provided no incentive to alter previously successful 
behavior. Study with adult humans has found that they also avoid the nonfunctional trap 
(Silva et al., 2005). It was also possible the subject continued to avoid the inverted trap 
owing to a lack of experience with the inverted trap, not understanding how the inverted trap 
functioned. To examine these possibilities, Experiment 3 presented a combination trap-tube 
that included both the inverted and functional traps. The combination tube required that the 
subject choose which trap to avoid, the functional trap or the inverted trap. In Experiment 4, 
the vertical trap-tube task was presented to determine if subjects could transfer the 
knowledge gained regarding the causal properties of the task from a horizontally presented 
tube to a vertical apparatus. Based on previous research, it was expected that there would be 
various levels of causal understanding demonstrated by the apes across the four experiments. 
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However, we hypothesized that orangutans have the capacity for causal cognition and that 
this would be expressed during the study.  
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 3 orangutans living at Great Ape Trust in Des Moines, Iowa 
(Table 4-1). All three individuals, Allie, Azy and Knobi were born in captivity. The apes 
were socially housed in an enriched environment with indoor and outdoor access. Research 
was conducted in the apes’ home enclosure. The apes were involved in cognitive research 
unrelated to the present study, including joint attention, memory capability, symbol 
acquisition, and quantity judgment. All participants have been observed to use tools 
spontaneously. The apes were not food or water deprived and were allowed to enter and 
leave the research area voluntarily. 
Table 4-1. Study participants 
Participant Species Sex 
Age 
(years) 
Rearing 
Allie Pongo abelii F 13 Mother (orangutan) 
Azy Pongo pygmaeus X P. abelii 
M 30 
Nursery and Private Home*        
(i.e. humans) 
Knobi Pongo pygmaeus X P. abelii F 28 Nursery  (i.e. humans) 
*Azy was reared in a private home, with a conspecific, by human caregivers for at least one year 
Owing to a past medical condition, Allie did not have complete fine motor control in 
her hands, though she did have normal gross motor skills (Cossaboon, Clay, Antilla, Geurts, 
& Pietsch, 2008). This did not minimize Allie’s ability to participate in the research, as she 
was able to fully grasp the tool. Her latency to solve may have been impacted as it often took 
her longer to pick up the tool.  
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Experiment 1: Trap-Tube  
Apparatus  
The apparatus consisted of a polycarbonate tube (60 cm) mounted on an A-frame 
(Figure 4-2), based on the style designed by Limongelli, Boysen, and Visalberghi (1995). 
The tool in all conditions consisted of a straight PVC pipe (diameter: 2.54 cm, length: 75 
cm). The pipe was capped on each end. The apes were familiar with the A-frame apparatus 
and the tool, as they had used it in a previous study involving the tube task, without a trap, 
involving complex forms of tools (Chapter 3, Walkup & Shumaker, in prep).   
Figure 4-1. Trap-tubes presented in Experiments 1-3, a) Experiment 1: Center and off-
center trap-tube conditions, b) Experiment 2: Inverted trap-tube condition, c) 
Experiment 3: Combination trap-tube condition.   
 
In the present study, the tube held in the A-frame apparatus contained a trap (Figure 
4-1). The trap was 8 cm in diameter. The trap was attached to the tube via bright blue glue, 
this glue also served to highlight the trap’s location. The trap was placed centrally in the 
center trap condition and 10 cm from center, to the left or the right, in the off-center 
conditions. The small tube condition presented a tube with a diameter of 4 cm, which 
allowed subjects to push the reward from the tube with the tool, out of either the east or west 
sides of the apparatus. For the large tube condition, Azy and Allie were presented with a tube 
with an 8.5-cm diameter. Knobi was also initially presented with the same tube, but 
eventually developed a method of achieving the reward without a tool by compressing her 
hand and reaching into the tube. Sessions were restarted with Knobi with a smaller large 
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tube, with a diameter of 6 cm. The large tube condition allowed subjects to either push or 
rake the food reward from either the east or west sides of the apparatus. 
a)  b)  c)  
   d)   e)  
Figure 4-2. Apparatus used in Experiments 1-3, a) Small trap-tube condition with Allie, 
b) Large trap-tube condition with Knobi, c) Large trap-tube condition with Azy, d) 
Small inverted trap-tube condition e) Large combination trap-tube condition with Azy 
Procedure 
 The experimenter (KW) baited the tube, ensuring the ape participant did not see the 
process. For all conditions, the food reward was placed to the left (east) or right (west) of the 
trap. The tool was placed in the enclosure, next to the apparatus, on the north, south, east, or 
west sides in a random order. In some trials the ape chose to keep the tool between sessions. 
The trial began when the subject entered the testing location and continued as long as the ape 
was actively engaged with the problem. The trial ended at either solution or inattention to the 
task that involved the ape leaving the research room for longer than 3 minutes.  
Experiments began with the goal of completing 12 sessions with 120 total trials per 
individual, acknowledging that additional trials might be added if comprehension of the task 
was not achieved. The conditions (small tube: A / large tube: B) were presented in an ABBA 
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(Azy and Knobi) or BAAB (Allie) format, with each cycle presenting the center, left and right 
trap conditions (Table 4-2).   
Table 4-2. Order of experiments in Block 1 
ABBA                                                             BAAB 
Session Tube Trap Session Tube Trap 
1 Large Tube Center 1 Small Tube Center 
2 Large Tube Left 2 Small Tube Left 
3 Large Tube Right 3 Small Tube Right 
4 Small Tube Center 4 Large Tube Center 
5 Small Tube Left 5 Large Tube Left 
6 Small Tube Right 6 Large Tube Right 
7 Small Tube Center 7 Large Tube Center 
8 Small Tube Left 8 Large Tube Left 
9 Small Tube Right 9 Large Tube Right 
10 Large Tube Center 10 Small Tube Center 
11 Large Tube Left 11 Small Tube Left 
12 Large Tube Right 
 
12 Small Tube Right 
  
After completion of the initial 12 sessions, termed Block 1, trap avoidance was 
demonstrated with the large tube condition but not with the small tube condition. Owing to 
the lack of success, additional sessions, termed Block 2, with the small center tube were 
presented to each ape until either comprehension or refusal to continue occurred. Additional 
trials were deemed necessary, as comprehension of the trap tube was necessary to move on to 
the control conditions (inverted and combination tubes). 
Experiment 2: Inverted Trap-Tube 
Apparatus 
Subjects were presented with both the small and large center condition tubes from 
Experiment 1. The tube was inverted by rotating the tube 180°, resulting in a non-functional 
trap (Figure 4-1, 4-2).  
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Procedure 
The procedure as conducted in Experiment 1 was replicated in Experiment 2. The 
food reward was placed to the left or right of the inverted trap. Participants were presented 
with 40 trials of the large tube condition and 40 trials of the small tube condition, with 10 
trials per session. Azy completed the large tube condition first followed by the small tube 
condition. To examine order effects, Allie was presented the inverse, completing the small 
tube condition before the large tube condition. Knobi did not proceed to Experiments 2 or 3 
as she did not demonstrate comprehension in the trap-tube task, even with additional trials in 
Block 2. 
Experiment 3: Combination Trap-Tube 
Apparatus 
Subjects were presented with both the small and large tubes (see Experiment 1 for 
tube and trap size). The tubes contained two traps, one inverted and one functional. The 
center of the traps was 20 cm apart and 20 cm from the ends of the tube (Figure 4-1, 4-2).  
Procedure 
The procedure conducted in Experiments 1 and 2 was replicated in Experiment 3. The 
food reward was placed in the center of the tube. The position of the inverted and non-
inverted traps was balanced to appear on both the left and right sides of the apparatus. 
Sessions began with an aim of presenting 40 trials of the large tube condition and 40 trials of 
the small tube condition, with 10 trials per session. Allie was presented with a fifth session 
during the small tube condition for clarification of the results from Sessions 1-4. This was 
necessary, as at the end of Session 4, her behavior indicated possible comprehension. To 
examine order effects, Azy completed the large tube condition followed by the small tube 
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condition. Allie was presented the inverse, completing the small tube condition before the 
large tube condition. 
Data Collection and Analysis (Experiments 1-3) 
Data were digitally recorded during experimental sessions and were later coded using 
the application SubTrak Video Coding Program for Observational Research (Takach, 
Lindtvedt, & Ragir, 2008). Dependent variables included success rate, side of tool insertion 
into tube, number of insertion attempts, tool use preference (raking or pushing), and latency 
to solve if successful. Statistical analyses consisted of binomial tests (null: 50%) to analyze 
hand and tube side preferences, and how each individual differed from chance regarding the 
dependent value of success/failure. Latency to solve between individuals was compared 
using Kruskal Wallis tests. Post hoc analyses for Kruskal Wallis tests were calculated using 
the procedure outlined by Siegel and Castellan, Jr. (1988). An independent observer scored 
20% of trials, with Cohen’s Kappa interobserver reliability calculated at ! =  .88  (Bakeman 
& Gottmann, 1997).  
Experiment 4: Vertical Trap-Tube 
 Apparatus 
The apparatus consisted of two tubes (50 cm long, 4.5 cm diameter) leading to a 
transparent box (14 x 21 x 44 cm), which housed a ramp and a food reward (Figure 4-3). The 
tubes were secured 23 cm apart. Each vertical tube was connected to a PVC pipe expansion 
(30 cm long, 4.5 cm diameter) that allowed the subject access to the entrance of the tube to 
drop a tool down either of the tubes. This tool consisted of a small stone (2.8 cm diameter). 
Once the tool was dropped through either of the tubes, it passed into the transparent box that 
contained a ramp that in turn led to a platform on which a food reward was placed. Contact 
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between the tool and the food reward pushed the food reward down an adjacent ramp (70 cm 
long) that deposited the food in the ape enclosure. The entire apparatus was assembled in a 
60 x 60 x 104 cm frame. During each experimental trial, a stop block was placed in 1 of 6 
possible locations, in the top, middle, or bottom of each tube. The stop block consisted of a 
bolt (6 cm long, 0.63 cm diameter), painted red for emphasis. The presence of the stop block 
was altered so that it was not always on the same path, with the six possible block locations 
presented every session in a random order. In the control trials, the stop block was not 
present. 
a)  b)  
Figure 4-3. Vertical tube apparatus: a) full apparatus, b) close-up. A stop block was 
placed in the tube on the right (Tube 2).  
Procedure 
Study participants were tested individually in a location containing visual barriers to 
prevent social learning opportunities by other apes. The experimenter (KW) prepared the 
apparatus, placing the stop block in the appropriate location during the experimental trials. 
Before experimental trials, each ape participated in training sessions consisting of eight trials 
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each, which did not contain a stop block. The purpose of the training sessions was to ensure 
the ape understood the complexities of the apparatus. In the first two trials of the first training 
session, the experimenter demonstrated dropping the tool down the tube, using both the left 
and right tubes. No more demonstrations were necessary for the remaining sessions only 
verbal requests to encourage the ape to take the tool and retrieve the reward. Each of the apes 
demonstrated initial biases to use only one of the two tubes. To encourage use of both tubes, 
the experimenter removed the biased tube during two of the training trials. The apes 
immediately used the other tube. Training was deemed complete after two sessions per ape 
(16 trials total), as each subject demonstrated comprehension of how to use the stone tool to 
retrieve the food reward. 
 During experimental trials, the ape was prevented from observing the placement of  
the pin. The apparatus was baited with a nut. Following baiting, the ape was verbally 
encouraged to attend to the apparatus. The tool was passed to the ape. The ape was then 
allowed to choose the tube in which to drop the stone. Forty trials were conducted per 
subject, in five, eight-trial sessions. Each session contained six experimental trials and two 
control trials. If the orangutan chose the correct path in which to drop the tool, the food 
reward was retrieved. Choice of incorrect path did not result in retrieving the food, with the 
experimenter removing the food reward from the platform.  
Data Collection and Analysis (Experiment 4) 
The dependent variable of tube choice resulting in success or failure was analyzed. 
Tube choice was documented, as was success or failure during the sessions. Video data were 
also collected for verification purposes. Statistical analysis consisted of binomial tests (null: 
50%) to analyze how each individual differed from chance.   
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Results 
Experiment 1: Trap-Tube Task 
Table 4-3 summarizes success per individual in Blocks 1 and 2 by condition. Azy and 
Allie avoided the trap at a significant rate in the large tube condition in Block 1. Allie was 
78% successful overall in the large tube condition (binomial: p < .0001). Azy was 90% 
successful overall in this condition (binomial: p < .0001). Knobi did not solve the large tube 
condition and was significantly more likely to lose the food reward, irrespective of the trap 
placement (binomial, p=.04). With additional sessions in Block 2, both Allie and Azy were 
able to solve the small tube condition. Allie achieved 65% success in Block 2 overall and in 
particular showed a significant rate of solving the task in the last three sessions presented, 
solving 81% of trials (binomial: p < .0001). Azy was 88% successful in Block 2, solving the 
task at a significant rate (binomial: p= .004). Allie required more trials than Azy to learn to 
avoid the trap. Comprehension did not emerge for Allie until the 65
th
 trial of Block 2 when 
she self-corrected her behavior by removing the tool from the wrong side and inserting in the 
opposite side of the apparatus. Azy was only presented 16 trials in Block 2. Comprehension 
emerged in the fifth trial of Block 2 for Azy, who paused before any tool insertion and 
purposely moved to insert the tool in the opposite side of the tube (east side). Additional 
trials were not possible (more than 16), as Azy had developed a preference for destroying the 
tube after solving a limited number of trials in a session. Knobi did not achieve competency 
in the small tube condition by the end of the experimental sessions and refused continued 
participation. As with the large tube, she was significantly more likely to lose the reward (p < 
.0001).   
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Table 4-3. Trap-tube results, percent correct of attempted trials 
 Allie Azy Knobi 
Block 1: 
Alter Tube Order 
Success 
(%) 
 
Success 
(%) 
 
Success 
(%) 
 
Large Center 68 N=19 75 N=20 33 N= 18 
Large Left 80 N=20 95 N=20 40 N=20 
Large Right 85 N=20 100 N=20 31 N=16 
Small Center 57 N=14 50 N=16 25 N=16 
Small Left 50 N=20 61 N=18 5 N=20 
Small Right 56 N=16 43 N=14 20 N=20 
Small Tube Overall 54 N=50 52 N=48 16 N=56 
Large Tube Overall 78 N=59 90 N=60 35 N=54 
Block 2: 
Small Center Tube 
      
Small Center 65* N=95 88 N=16 33 N=9 
  *Percent correct was greater than 80% in the last three sessions of Block 2   
Latency to Solve 
Differences were found in latency to solve the tasks between apes. In the small tube 
condition, a Kruskal Wallis test revealed significant differences (H (2, N = 140) = 51.617, p 
< .0001) between apes in latency to success. Post hoc analysis revealed Azy solved the task 
significantly faster (Mdn: 14 s, IQR: 6) than Allie (Mdn: 36 s, IQR: 34) or Knobi (Mdn: 56 s, 
IQR: 57). There was no significant difference between Allie and Knobi (Siegel & Castellan, 
Jr., 1988). 
Analysis of latency to solve with the large tube condition also revealed significant 
differences between the apes, H (2, N = 117) = 51, p < .0001. Post hoc tests showed that Azy 
solved significantly faster (Mdn: 14 s, IQR: 5) than Allie (Mdn: 29 s, IQR: 24) or Knobi 
(Mdn: 32 s, IQR: 23). There was no significant difference between Allie and Knobi (Siegel 
& Castellan, Jr., 1988). 
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Side Preferences 
To analyze side and hand preferences, all tube type conditions (small and large) were 
pooled, irrespective of whether the ape was successful. Azy and Allie preferred to insert the 
tool significantly more often into the west side of the apparatus, which was typically their 
right side upon entering the enclosure (binomial: Azy p < .0001; Allie p < .0001). Azy, in 
particular, nearly always chose to insert the tool in the west side, with 117 west versus 7 east 
side insertions. Fifty-seven percent of all east insertions occurred during the 16 trials of the 
small tube condition in Block 2. Knobi did not have a side preference (binomial: p= .14). 
Side preference may have been influenced by hand preference. All apes significantly 
preferred to use their right hand to hold and insert the tool (binomial: Allie p < .0001; Azy p< 
.0001; Knobi p= .032). Once Allie began to consistently solve the task, deviation from this 
trend was evident for her. For example, she was observed to switch hands, picking up the 
tool with her right and transferring it to her left to insert in the side nearest her left hand.   
 Tool Mode Preference 
Table 4-4. Mode of solving the trap-tube task 
Subject Condition 
Tool Mode 
Rake (%) 
Success 
Tool Mode 
Push (%) 
Success 
Tool Mode 
Rake (%) 
Loss 
Tool Mode 
Push (%) 
Loss 
Tool Mode 
Rake (%) 
Overall 
Tool Mode        
Push (%) 
Overall 
Large Center 38 31 13 19 50 50 
Large Left 35 45 10 10 45 55 
Large Right 45 40 0 15 45 55 
Allie 
Overall  39 39 7 14 46 54 
Large Center 43 30 9 17 52 48 
Large Left 47 47 0 5 47 53 
Large Right 59 41 0 0 59 41 
Azy 
Overall  50 39 3 8 53 47 
Large Center 0 33 6 61 6 94 
Large Left 0 40 0 60 0 100 
Large Right 13 19 6 63 19 81 
Knobi 
Overall 4 31 4 61 7 93 
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Table 4-4 summarizes the mode of tool use, either pushing or raking the reward from 
the large trap-tube. Azy and Allie did not show a significant preference overall for raking or 
pushing (binomial: Allie p= .69; Azy p=.68). Knobi preferred to use a pushing method 
overall (binomial: p< .0001). 
Experiment 2: Inverted Trap-Tube Task 
 Allie and Azy advanced to Experiments 2 and 3, as they were successful in learning 
to avoid the trap in Experiment 1. An analysis was conducted to determine if the apes were 
taking avoidance precautions regarding the inverted trap. The data were divided into two 
methods: 1) ape inserts the tool on side furthest from reward; 2) ape inserts the tool on side 
nearest to the reward. The former was the method for success in Experiment 1 if using a 
pushing tool-using mode. No significant difference was found to indicate either method 1 or 
2 was preferred for Allie (p=1.00) or Azy in the inverted large tube condition (p= .362). 
However, a significant preference for method 1 or method 2 was not found in the large tube 
trap condition in Experiment 1 (Allie: p=1.00; Azy: p= .90). Table 4-5 summarizes results of 
the inverted large tube condition. Allie was observed to take trap avoidance precautions 
during the initial session, by not raking under the trap. However, trap avoidance did not 
persist into the remaining sessions, with instances of her raking or pushing the reward under 
the inverted trap outnumbering observations of trap avoidance. Azy’s behavior was 
consistent across the study, he avoided the trap more than he raked or pushed under the trap. 
Regarding tube side preferences, Azy preferred to insert the tool in the west side of the 
apparatus, with 37 west versus 3 east side insertions. Allie inserted the tool in only the west 
side in Sessions 1 and 2, and only the east side in Sessions 3 and 4.  
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Table 4-5. Results for the inverted trap-tube, large tube condition 
Subject Session Push 
 not under trap 
Rake 
not under trap 
Push or Rake 
under trap 
Large 1 4 5 1 
Large 2 2 4 4* 
Large 3 1 5 4 
Allie 
Large 4 1 2 7* 
Large 1 3 5 2 
Large 2 5 5 0 
Large 3 4 4 2 
Azy 
Large 4 3 6 1 
*In Session 2 (Trial 5) and in Session 4 (Trial 2), Allie pushed the food reward under the 
trap, and then raked it back to her. 
 
Regarding the inverted small tube condition, no significant difference was found to 
indicate Azy was taking avoidance precautions in this condition (p= .73). Azy only 
completed eight trials before destroying the tube. However, he inserted the tool in the same 
side (the east) during all trials. A significant preference for inserting the tool in the side 
furthest from the food reward was found for Allie in the inverted small tube condition (p= 
.002). In Sessions 1-3, Allie took avoidance precautions towards the inverted trap. However, 
her behavior was different in Session 4. She inserted the tool on the west side the entire 
session, not taking any avoidance precautions.   
Experiment 3:  Combination trap-tube task 
 Allie completed 49 trials of the small combination condition and 40 trials of the large 
combination condition. Participation in the small combination condition was refused in one 
trial. A fifth session of the small condition was added for clarification of the results, as in 
Session 4 it appeared Allie understood which trap to avoid. However, Allie’s success rate 
with the small combination condition was low, retrieving the food reward in 45% of trials 
(binomial: p= .78). Examining Table 4-6, Allie was successful with the small combination 
condition when the trap placement was on the west. The presentation of the fifth small 
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session, in which the trap was on the east side for the first five trials and the west side for the 
last five trials, clearly demonstrated this strategy. She was successful 88% in retrieving the 
food reward in the large combination condition (p < .0001). She used a raking or pushing 
technique to avoid the trap, ignoring the inverted trap. In two trials, she raked the reward 
over the trap, either on the ceiling of the tube (large condition, Session 2, Trial 1) or on the 
side of the tube (large condition, Session 4, Trial 2). 
Table 4-6. Results for the combination trap-tube 
Insert Side (#) Mode 
Subject Session Success (%) Trap Side 
East West Rake Push 
Small 1 78 (n=9) West 3 7 
Small 2 0 East 0 10 
Small 3 0 East 0 10 
Small 4 100 West 1* 10 
Small 5a 0 (n=5) East 0 5 
Small 5b 100 (n=5) West 0 5 
 
Large 1 100 West 10 0 10 0 
Large 2 70 East 7** 3 7 5 
Large 3 100 East 2 8 10 2 
Allie 
Large 4 80 West 0 10*** 3 8 
Large 1 90 East 0 10 9 1 
Large 2 100 East 0 10 10 0 
Large 3 90 West 0 10 1 9 
Large 4 100 West 0 10 0 10 
Small 1 100 (n=1) West 0 1 
Azy 
Small 2 100 (n=1) East 1 0 
 
*Allie inserted the tool in the east side, but withdraw it and inserted in the west side (T1).  
**Allie inserted the tool in the east side, and pulled food up and over the trap (T1) 
*** Allie raked carefully up onto the side of the tube and over the trap thereby avoiding the trap (T2).  
 
Azy completed 40 trials of the large combination condition and two trials of the small 
combination condition. He received sessions with the large tube first. He retrieved the food 
reward from the large combination tube at a significant rate, with success in 95% of trials (p 
< .0001). He was presented with two trials total of the small combination condition, with one 
trial each with the trap on the east and on the west sides (on separate days). He successfully 
 121 
 
solved each of these trials. Further trials were impossible as Azy removed the traps (by force) 
from the tube after successfully retrieving the reward after each trial.  
Experiment 4: Vertical Trap-Tube  
 Allie, Azy, and Knobi participated in all presented trials. By the end of the first 
training session, each ape demonstrated comprehension of how to drop the stone down either 
of the tubes to retrieve the food reward. Each of the apes demonstrated an initial tube 
preference (Allie: Tube 1, Azy: Tube 2; Knobi: Tube 1). However, when the preferred tube 
was removed during two of the training trials, with only the non-preferred tube remaining, 
each ape immediately used the non-preferred tube instead.  
 During the experimental trials, none of the subjects demonstrated comprehension of 
how to avoid the blocked tube. Of the 30 experimental trials, Allie obtained the reward in 13 
trials, Azy in 14 trials and Knobi in 16 trials. Binomial tests revealed these results did not 
differ from chance (Allie: p = .60, Azy: p = .86, Knobi: p= 1.0). Each ape had a different 
approach to solving the task. Allie preferred to use Tube 1. Azy preferred to use Tube 2. 
Knobi used both tubes, without a clear choice strategy. Regarding Azy and Allie’s behavior, 
their tube choices reflected their tube preferences in the training sessions. In the final 
experimental session, the preferred tube was removed in a control trial for Azy and Allie. 
Both apes did not hesitate to use the non-preferred tube. It was possible that the apes were 
failing to solve the problem above chance levels because of the appearance of the pin 
blocking the tube. Possibly, it may have not been obvious enough for them to observe its 
presence. As a preliminary test of this possibility, in one trial during the final session, after 
the subject had dropped the tool and it had become lodged on the pin, the ape was provided 
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with a second, and a then third stone. Each subject dropped the stone down the same tube as 
the first stone, resulting in a pile of three stones lodged on the pin.  
Discussion 
The data in this study support the hypothesis that orangutans are capable of 
understanding causal relations in the trap-tube task. Individual variation was apparent, with 
one individual not proceeding past the initial trap-tube task. The two successful apes 
performed differently in the large and small tube conditions when presented with the inverted 
and combination tubes. Orangutans did not show comprehension of the task in the vertical 
tube task. Owing to these results, we suggest that methodological variables, such as tube size 
and apparatus complexity are critical to the detection of causal cognition in this task. 
Apparatus designs that include too many distractions (such as in the vertical tube task) or 
prevent preferred uses of a tool (such a not allowing for raking and pushing in the small trap 
tube) make learning the causal relations of the task more difficult than other designs.   
Trap-Tube 
The small trap-tube task was solved by two of the apes. Allie required 125 trials 
before comprehension emerged, while comprehension emerged for Azy after 65 trials. Two 
of the three ape participants (Allie and Azy) solved the large trap task quickly, with each ape 
demonstrating competence, avoiding the trap by the second session. Trap placement (center, 
left, or right) did not influence success. Rather, successful performance increased as 
additional sessions were presented, regardless of the changing trap location. The result that 
not all study subjects could find the solution to the task is not unusual (Limongelli, Boysen, 
& Visalberghi, 1995; Povinelli et al., 2000; Mulcahy & Call, 2006; Martin-Ordas et al., 
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2008). This trend has been found in previous studies, with certain subjects unable to find a 
solution within the allotted trials of the experiment or, as here, becoming too frustrated to 
continue. We agree with Martin-Ordas and colleagues’ (2008) argument that experimental 
design is critical to the trap-tube study, with tool and tube size, and apparatus design 
important factors. The challenges presented by the different apparatus designs on this 
problem are important, as it allows us to make hypotheses regarding the level of complexity 
involved in each task. We argue that the small tube task required a greater degree of causal 
understanding to solve than the large tube task, based on the control over the tool that the 
large tube task allowed. Caution must be employed when using this apparatus, as failure with 
the small tube task alone should not be interpreted as a complete lack of causal 
understanding, as additional research with a large tube may indicate its present. Rather than 
using this apparatus to examine whether the ability to understand causal relations is present 
or absent, researchers should use this apparatus and the many valuable variations it can offer 
to delineate specific levels of causal understanding present in an individual. 
It is important to note that the one unsuccessful ape (Knobi) attempted various 
strategies to solve the task. The most common technique was a tendency to insert the tool on 
the side of the tube in which no trap lay between the tube end and the reward. The result of 
this strategy was that the reward was always lost. Knobi also inserted the tool in the correct 
side in some trials, pushing the food and the tool slowly from the tube. Limongelli et al. 
(1995) discussed the unsuccessful behavior of chimpanzees in their research, noting that two 
of the unsuccessful subjects were not inserting the tool randomly into the tube but instead 
tried different strategies to approach the problem. The development of strategies was not 
observed in previous research with unsuccessful capuchin monkeys, whose successful 
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behavior did not deviate from chance (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994). Limongelli et al. 
(1995) believed the distinction is important, noting strategy production was important to 
developing an understanding of causal relations. Their point is significant. It signifies that 
causal understanding is not an innate cognitive ability but a result of interactions with the 
environment that can lead to comprehension. With additional trials, allowing for more 
opportunities for Knobi to explore different strategies, she may have learned to solve the 
task, which would have then allowed her to move to the control conditions for exploration of 
whether she had acquired causal understanding. However, this was not possible as she was 
not motivated to continue with the research. 
We documented several instances of insight in the course of the present research, 
providing support for causal cognition. An insightful solution is defined by numerous 
unsuccessful attempts to solve a problem, followed by a respite in which the individual is not 
engaged in the problem, and ending with a sudden solution to the task (Beck, 1980). Beck 
postulated that it is a period of non-problem directed behavior that is critical to insight 
learning. It is during this time that mental manipulation of the task may be occurring, leading 
to a solution. Allie provided two examples that may indicate an insightful solution. In the 
first, while inserting the tool into the tube during the small trap condition, she paused before 
the tool pushed the food into the trap and withdrew it to insert on the opposite side. Allie 
demonstrated self-corrective behavior twice, first in the second session of the experiment. 
However, after self-correcting in the second session she did not solve the task at a high rate 
of success until Block 2. This self-corrective behavior may be indicative of insight, as each 
case was preceded by unsuccessful trials, followed by a pause mid-trial (non-problem 
directed behavior), ending with solution. Azy had a similar moment that suggested insightful 
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problem solving. After numerous unsuccessful trials, he paused before tool insertion and 
proceeded to insert the tool into the correct side of the apparatus to successfully retrieve the 
reward. After these possibly insightful moments for Allie and Azy in Block 2, both apes 
demonstrated a high level of success with the task. In these situations, they engaged in some 
form of mental manipulation of the problem to realize the solution and followed with the 
correct behavior. Following these moments, they solved the task using a representational 
strategy, planning on which side to insert the tool before any insert attempt. These 
observations suggest the apes were able to mentally manipulate the experimental variables to 
arrive at the solution. If interpreted as insight, it suggests they understood how the variables 
related, providing support for causal understanding.   
Side preference may have affected the emergence of comprehension, as both Azy and 
Allie significantly preferred the right side of the apparatus, likely due to their right hand 
preference. With the large trap condition, they could always solve by pushing or raking from 
their right side. The small trap condition required movement to the other end of the apparatus 
in half of the trials. Allie’s lessened mobility may have been a significant factor, as she was 
often reluctant to move to the other side of the apparatus. Once comprehension emerged, she 
was observed to sit facing the apparatus, switching left and right hands to solve the task. 
After comprehension emerged for Azy, he continued to use his right hand but moved to the 
opposite end of the apparatus to insert the tool when necessary. Azy also demonstrated this 
right side preference, prior to comprehension of the task features, in a study of quantity 
judgment and ordinal competence (Shumaker, Palkovich, Beck, Guagnano, & Morowitz, 
2001). In both this study and the present study, once Azy understood how to solve the task, 
he was able to overcome his right side bias. 
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A preference was not found for the two successful apes as regards to pushing or 
raking. They used both methods, sometimes combining pushing and raking in a single trial. 
The observations of the apes pushing or raking the food reward up the side of the tube or 
onto the ceiling of the tube are particularly convincing of their understanding that they must 
avoid the trap. Mulcahy and Call (2006) found that 89% of subjects preferred to rake (also 
see Martin-Ordas, Call, & Colmenares, 2008). These authors also found that for the three 
successful individuals, the option to either rake or push the food from the tube was important. 
These results led them to conclude that the mode of tool use may help the apes to succeed. 
They argued that watching the food go in the opposite direction, as was the only option with 
the small tube, might inhibit understanding the causal relations. However, the successful apes 
in the present study demonstrated no preference between the two techniques and achieved 
success in many cases by pushing the food reward away from them in the large tube 
condition. We suggest it may not specifically be the option to rake that leads to higher 
success, but a greater degree of control over the tool, which allows the ape to push or rake to 
avoid then trap when needed. In the small tube condition, once the tool is inserted in the tube, 
it can only be pushed or removed. Whereas in the large tube, the apes could choose how to 
avoid the trap, even after they have placed the tool in the tube, by watching their actions and 
the resulting effect on the tool. We postulate that the large tube allows for the apes to visually 
inspect the relations between the food, tool and trap throughout the trial, moving the tool and 
food as needed away from the trap, leading to a higher level of success. The small tube 
requires that the sequence for solving is determined before inserting the tool. Once Allie and 
Azy made this discovery in the second block, they solved consistently, planning their tool use 
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before insertion. These results suggest that the smaller tube was more challenging to solve, 
requiring a greater degree of causal understanding than required by the large tube.   
Control Conditions: Inverted, Combination and Vertical Tube Tasks 
The control conditions were presented to determine if the apes had developed an 
associative rule to solve the task rather than using causal understanding. In the inverted tube 
condition Allie took avoidance precautions in the first session of the large tube condition. 
However, trap avoidance behavior did not persist across the remaining sessions. This does 
not imply she was solving the task via a rule in the large trap-tube condition, such as “insert 
the tool in the side furthest from the reward,” as she inserted in either side, using raking or 
pushing to retrieve the reward. Rather, she avoided pushing the reward under the inverted 
trap, indicating she may not have understood how the trap functioned. However, as she did 
not persist in this behavior past the first large trap session, she quickly learned that the 
inverted trap was not the same as the non-inverted trap. Azy avoided the inverted large trap 
in the majority of trials. However, the presence of raking/pushing under the trap in several of 
the trials (5 out of the total 40) does not rule out the possibility of comprehension. Azy raked 
and pushed from both sides of the tube, which suggests he was avoiding the inverted trap, 
rather than using a specific distance rule. In the inverted small tube condition, Azy did not 
take any avoidance precautions, inserting the tool in the same side of the tube. Allie took 
avoidance precautions in sessions 1-3 but not in the final session, inserting the tool in the 
same side the entire session. To specifically examine order effects, Allie received the small 
tube condition first and large tube condition second; Azy received the opposite order. We 
suggest that Azy and Allie, when first presented with the inverted tube (large tube for Azy, 
small tube for Allie) chose to behave conservatively, avoiding the inverted trap. However, by 
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the next condition (small tube for Azy, large tube for Allie), they had learned the inverted 
trap was actually very different from the regular trap and stopped avoiding it. This avoidance 
behavior is not unusual, as even humans avoid the inverted trap (Silva, Page, & Silva, 2005). 
Kacelnik, Chappell, Kenward, and Weir (2006) noted that an individual who avoids the 
inverted trap may not fail to understand how the trap functions but may simply lack an 
incentive to change their previous method, as it led to 100% success previously (Kacelnik et 
al., 2006).  
The results presented here are interesting as they do not conform to those documented 
by Mulcahy and Call (2006). The apes in their research failed to take avoidance precautions 
when the large tube was inverted but began to avoid the inverted trap when the small trap-
tube was presented. Owing to these results, it was important to proceed with the combination 
tube to determine if the orangutans had learned the distinction between a functional trap and 
the inverted trap.  
When presented with the combination trap-tube each ape performed differently.   
Allie did not have a high rate of success with the small tube condition. She nearly always 
inserted the tool in the right side, resulting in receiving the food reward in nearly half (45%) 
the trials. Her behavior suggested that she did not recognize the distinction between the 
inverted and non-inverted traps in the small tube condition. However, results were different 
with the large combination tube. She had a high rate of success (88%) and pushed or raked to 
avoid the functional trap. Azy also had a high rate of success (95%) with the large 
combination tube, avoiding the functional trap at a high rate. His avoidance of the functional 
trap in both trials of the small trap condition (despite the changing location of the trap) 
provided support that he was aware of which trap was functional. As the food reward was 
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placed in the center of the tube between two traps, strategies such as insert the tool in the side 
furthest from the food or push the food away from the trap would not be beneficial. These 
results suggest that Azy had a strong causal understanding of the problem involving both 
types of tubes, and Allie had a causal understanding of the large tube but not of the small 
tube. It is unclear why this should be; however, their behavior suggests that Azy had a fuller 
causal understanding of the situation than Allie. 
 The results of the vertical tube task did not provide support for the conclusions of 
causal understanding found in the horizontal tube task. However, we believe it possible the 
apparatus design may have negatively influenced the apes’ ability for comprehension. There 
are several reasons to support this assertion. Namely, though the apes learned in the training 
trials to insert the stone tool in the apparatus to retrieve the reward, it is possible that they 
were not attending or processing the motions of the tool once it passed into the tube. The 
process of the tool falling into the tube, pushing the food reward down the ramp, and the food 
rolling into the enclosure, happened very fast. Thus, is may be that the apes were never able 
to fully comprehend the mediating force between the cause (dropping the stone) and the 
effect (retrieving the reward). Without basic comprehension of the mediating force, 
variations to the apparatus such as a blocked tube would not be recognized as important. A 
second problem associated with the experimental design is the method in which the food was 
lost. When the stone became lodged in the pin, the food reward remained on the platform. 
Before moving to the next trial, the experimenter removed the food from the platform. In the 
horizontal tube tasks, the food was lost directly by the ape’s actions. In the vertical tube task 
the experimenter removed the food if the ape was unsuccessful. As such, it may have been 
perceived by the apes that the experimenter was also at fault in the loss of the reward. 
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Because of these questions regarding experimental design, we conclude that the present 
design for the vertical tube task was not an appropriate control task to the horizontal 
condition. As such, it is inappropriate to attempt to compare the behaviors observed in the 
horizontal conditions to the vertical condition. With more experience with the task, the 
orangutans may have learned to solve the problem. However, learning to solve the task was 
not the question of this study, as we would not have been able to disentangle whether 
successful behavior emerged via associative learning or from causal understanding.  
In conclusion, the results of the horizontal trap-tube task provide support for 
orangutan understanding of cause and effect relations. Individual variation and experimental 
design were important factors in its detection. Captive studies of nonhumans can indicate the 
capacities of nonhuman cognition. However, we must be careful when interpreting the 
cognitive capacities of captive individuals, as results do no necessarily fully represent the 
cognitive capacities of wild individuals (Boesch, 2007). For example, negative results in a 
captive situation may be reflective of rearing conditions or environmental deficits, rather than 
being an accurate representation of cognitive ability (Furlong et al., 2008; Brent et al., 1995; 
Menzel et al., 1970). The results of the present study suggest that when orangutans in the 
wild, captivity, and in rehabilitation centers use tools, they have the cognitive capacity to do 
so with an appreciation of causal relations. This conclusion does not imply all instances of 
tool related behaviors in orangutans involve causal understanding. However, it helps to 
explain the origin of complex behaviors, such as orangutan tool manufacture in their natural 
habitat specific to complex foraging problems, as such behavior would be more effective 
with causal understanding (van Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul, 1996; Fox, Sitompul, & van 
Schaik, 1999). 
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The results of the present study do not support assertions such as those made by 
Povinelli and Dunphy-Lelii (2001) arguing the human mind may be uniquely biologically 
adapted to explain events, such as those involved in causal relations. The human mind may 
have developed more advanced skills to explain events, but the present study suggests that 
the root of this skill evolved in great apes at least 11-18 mya, when the African great apes 
and orangutan lineages last shared a common ancestor (Goodman et al., 1998; Steiper & 
Young, 2006). These results also do not support claims such as those made by Tomasello 
(1998, 2000), that the comprehension of causal relations is a uniquely human ability. We are 
in agreement with Mulcahy and Call (2006) that causal understanding is possible for some 
apes.  
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CHAPTER 5. MANUFACTURE OF TOOLS BY ORANGUTANS 
(PONGO SPP.): VARIATIONS IN TOOL MATERIAL AND TASKS 
A paper to be submitted to Animal Behavior 
 
Kristina R. Walkup, Robert W. Shumaker, Jill D. Pruetz 
Abstract 
Tool manufacture was explored in captive orangutans (Pongo spp.) in order to 
investigate the level of causal understanding involved in this behavior. Captive orangutans 
(N=3) were presented with a series of problems requiring construction of tools allowing for 
absorption, stabbing, raking, and probing. Branches from five tree species were given as tool 
material. Modifications to the tools were recorded in all experiments, with differences 
between tools for a given experiment supporting the presence of an orangutan “tool kit.” 
Observations of modification before attempts at retrieving the reward suggest that the apes 
were using representation to plan their modifications. These observations, along with 
innovative and flexible problem solving, and one example of metatool use, provide support 
for the conclusion that causal understanding is present in orangutans.   
Introduction 
The study of tool manufacture in great apes allows for analysis of flexibility in 
behavior, specifically regarding the ability to make a tool specific to a given context. The 
present study provided opportunities for tool manufacture to captive orangutans (Pongo 
spp.), exploring the ability of these apes to construct a tool specific to a given experimental 
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problem. The aim was to explore the process by which orangutans manufacture a tool, 
whether through trial and error experimentation or selective manufacture of a tool specific to 
the situation. To explore this issue, four experiments were conducted focusing on tool length, 
absorption, sharpness, and flexibility. Five different species of tree branches were provided 
as tool material, with the apes required to manufacture a tool to solve presented foraging 
challenges. We sought to investigate if the apes would manufacture tools that were specific 
to the problem. Documentation of manufacturing tools for specific problems would provide 
support for the hypothesis that orangutans manufacture and use tools with causal 
understanding. 
Orangutans manufacture tools in their natural habitat and in captive situations (van 
Schaik et al., 1996; Lethmate, 1982). This behavior is distinguished as “any modification of 
an object by the user or a conspecific so that the object serves more effectively as a tool” 
(Beck, 1980, p.11-12). Beck (1980) cataloged four types of tool modification in animals, 1) 
Detach, 2) Subtract, 3) Add or combine, and 4) Reshape.  
Detach, is defined by an individual removing a tool from a substrate (Beck, 1980). 
Tool modification through detach has been documented in both non-primates and primates 
(See Beck, 1980 for a review). Many observations of this behavior have been recorded in 
wild orangutans (Fox, Sitompul, & van Schaik, 1999; Galdikas, 1982b; Peters, 2001; van 
Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul, 1996). For example, wild orangutans have been documented to 
detach braches from trees for display behavior, sometimes throwing or dropping branches at 
human observers (Wallace, 1869; Peters, 2001, Galdikas, 1983). Orangutans also have been 
observed to detach leaves, using the leaves for sun or rain protection, constructing overhead 
shelters, or placing the vegetation directly on their head (MacKinnon, 1971,1974; Wallace, 
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1869; Galdikas, 1982b). Researchers have also documented orangutans detaching vegetation 
for protective purposes (Rijksen, 1978; Fox and bin’Muhammad, 2002). Rijksen (1978) 
observed wild orangutans using leaves to protect the hand during inspection of an ant nest 
(Rijksen, 1978). Fox and bin’Muhammad (2002) described a wild orangutan using a “leaf 
pad” while foraging in a thorny tree. The orangutan gathered leaves into a stack, forming a 
pad. The ape then placed the stack either under his feet or hands, transferring it to whichever 
location supported his body weight on the thorn-covered tree.   
Removing objects from potential tools is classified as subtractive tool modification 
(Beck, 1980). Van Schaik and colleagues documented wild, Sumatran orangutans 
constructing tools for insect, honey, and seed extractive foraging (van Schaik et al., 1996; 
Fox et al., 1999). For insect extraction, branches are initially modified through subtractive 
modification by removing leaves, twigs and sometimes bark, followed with reshaping by the 
fraying of the ends of the branch (Fox, Sitompul, & van Schaik, 1999). After modification, 
the tool is held in the hand and used to prod bees and ants from nests, hammer at nests, or 
extract honey or insects from nests. Tools are also used to extract seeds from Neesia spp. 
fruits, as the fruit is protected with irritating hairs (Fox et al., 1999). Documented tools 
consist of thin, short twigs, altered through subtracting the bark. Researchers have observed 
orangutans holding the tool in the mouth, pushing the seeds to the top of the fruit where they 
can be licked or picked out, thereby avoiding the stinging hairs (Fox et al., 1999; van Schaik 
et al., 1996).  
Visalberghi, Fragaszy, and Savage-Rumbaugh (1995) studied tool modification 
experimentally with chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and one 
orangutan. They found the orangutan (in addition to other ape subjects) was capable of 
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subtractive tool modification during tube task investigations, with the orangutan successfully 
disassembling a bundle of sticks in order to acquire a single stick to use as a tool. The 
orangutan, and the other apes tested, struggled more with the “h-shaped stick” variant. This 
tool required the subjects modify it prior to use, by subtracting adjacently attached pieces that 
prevented its use in the apparatus. All apes, including the orangutan, had more difficulty 
solving this task, with many errors in tool use behavior documented. These errors led the 
authors to conclude there was limited evidence of understanding the causal relations involved 
in the task (Visalberghi et al., 1995). From their experiment, one may conclude that 
orangutans do not necessarily have causal understanding for tool manufacture involving 
subtraction. However, Walkup and Shumaker (Chapter 3) found dramatically different 
results in a study of orangutans (N=3) in the same problem. Support was found for causal 
understanding of subtractive modification, with the orangutans making few errors when 
using and modifying the h-shaped stick. 
Captive studies involving apes joining sticks to make a longer stick (Lethmate, 1982; 
Köhler, 1925) are examples of tool manufacture through add or combine. Combining 
multiple objects together to form one tool has been observed in orangutans in captivity. In 
particular regarding orangutans, Lethmate (1977, 1982) found them able to split sticks, 
tapering the ends and joining them with tubes to make a five sectioned tool, and even able to 
search for the components of the sticks, which included the different sections. Wild 
orangutans have not been documented to use add or combine to manufacture tools. This 
behavior has been documented in wild chimpanzees through metatool use (Matsuzawa, 1991, 
1994). Metatool use is defined as tool use involving a tool that improves the functioning of 
another tool (Matsuzawa, 1991). Matsuzawa (1991,1994) documented multiple examples of 
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metatool use by nut cracking chimpanzees at Bossou. This behavior occurs when an anvil is 
uneven; leading the chimpanzees to place a stone under it to create a horizontal surface 
before nut cracking.   
The final form of tool manufacture, reshape, involves a fundamental structure 
modification to an object to create a tool. Documentation of orangutans crumpling leaves to 
make a sponge is an example of manufacture through reshape (Galdikas, 1982b). Köhler 
(1993) investigated reshaping with a young orangutan, requiring her to unbend a wire to use 
as a reaching device to obtain a food reward. However, it was not clear from her behavior 
that she understood how to reshape the tool. Köhler (1993) called her behavior 
“disorganized.” Wright (1972) studied the ability of a young orangutan to manufacture a 
stone tool through flint knapping. Though Wright’s (1972) work was successful, in that the 
orangutan made a stone tool, he did not document mental manipulation in the tool reshaping, 
as this was not one of the study goals. Nakamichi (2004) observed a captive orangutan 
making a sponge through reshaping, chewing on the end of the stick, and crumpling it into a 
sponge before inserting it into an artificial termite mound (containing syrup or honey). He 
noted their tools had two distinct parts, a dipping end and a grasping end. The dipping end 
contained leaves, from which the apes licked the food reward. The author suggested it was 
possible that their lack of biting and thus removing, the leaves or spongy end from the stick 
supported an understanding of the functional significance between the modified tool and the 
function. However, he also noted that it is just as probable that they learned to associate the 
leaves on the end of the stick with obtaining more food. Unfortunately, the termite mound 
and the behaviors were in place before his observations began and the origin of how such a 
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skill developed was unknown. This resulted in only allowing Nakamichi (2004) to speculate 
as to whether the behaviors were associatively learned or involved causal understanding. 
As orangutans can use detach, subtract, add or combine and reshape for tool 
modification, the next question regards what they comprehend of the process. The great 
difficulty with problems investigating tool manufacture is that it is difficult to distinguish 
whether the toolmaker understands the properties required in a tool or if they have learned 
the required properties through associative learning. The present study will focus on the four 
types of tool manufacture: detach, subtract, add or combine, and reshape, specifically to 
address the presence or absence of causal understanding in the behavior. We hypothesized 
that orangutans manufacture tools with a causal understanding of how to create a tool 
relevant and appropriate to specific problems. 
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 3 orangutans, Allie, Azy, and Knobi (Pongo spp.), housed at 
Great Ape Trust in Des Moines, Iowa (Table 5-1). All three individuals were born in 
captivity. The apes were socially housed in an enriched environment with indoor and outdoor 
access that provided for physical well-being and mental stimulation. Owing to a past medical 
condition, Allie did not have complete fine motor control in her hands, though she did have 
normal gross motor skills (Cossaboon, Clay, Antilla, Geurts, & Pietsch, 2008). This did not 
minimize Allie’s ability to participate in the research. She was able to fully grasp and 
manipulate the branches.  
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Table 5-1. Study participants 
Participant Species Sex 
Age 
(years) 
Rearing 
Allie Pongo abelii F 13  Mother (orangutan) 
Azy Pongo pygmaeus X P. abelii M 30 Nursery and Private Home*        
(i.e. humans) 
Knobi Pongo pygmaeus X P. abelii F 28 Nursery  (i.e. humans) 
*Azy was reared in a private home, with a conspecific, by human caregivers for at least one year 
The apes were involved in cognitive research unrelated to the present study, including joint 
attention, memory capability, symbol acquisition, and quantity judgment. All participants 
have been observed to use tools spontaneously. The present methodology and the apparatuses 
were novel to all participants however. Research was conducted in the apes’ home enclosure. 
The apes were not food or water deprived and were allowed to enter and leave the research 
area voluntarily.  
Experiments 1-4 
Tools 
Branches cut from five species of trees were provided as materials for tool 
manufacture. The species included mulberry (Morus spp.), silver maple (Acer saccharinum), 
willow (Salix spp.), cottonwood (Populus deltoids), and hackberry (Celtis occidentalis) 
(Table 5-2). Only branches with leaves were selected. Before experimentation, the following 
measurements were taken on each branch: proximal diameter
25
, presence or absence of side 
branches, and description of leaf coverage. The proximal end of the branch was clipped at a 
90º angle, creating a flat end to the branch. For the absorbance, sharpness, and flexibility 
experiments, one branch was provided from each species, cut at a length of 115 cm. The 
                                                
25
 The proximal end is that nearest to the trunk of the tree. The distal end is the opposite, the terminal end of the 
branch. 
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length experiment required two branches from each species, with one cut at a length of 115 
cm and the other cut at 60 cm. In each experiment, the experimental design required 
positioning the tools through the 5 x 10 cm mesh of the enclosure to retrieve the food reward. 
Table 5-2. General description of each tree species 
Species Leaf Description Branch Description Branch flexibility  
Cottonwood Large leaves, largest 
surface area of the five 
species 
Straight  Main branch was generally not 
flexible. Smaller side branches 
were very flexible 
Hackberry Abundant large leaves Not straight Least flexible, tended to break 
rather than bend 
Mulberry Abundant large leaves Usually straight  Similar to cottonwood 
Silver Maple Abundant large leaves Straight  Similar to cottonwood 
Willow Abundant leaves that 
were small and narrow  
Straight  The most flexible of the five 
species 
 
Experiment 1. Absorbance 
Design 
In Experiment 1, an apparatus was presented with a liquid food reward (syrup) placed 
out of reach from the apes. The goal was to stimulate the creation of a reaching tool 
containing properties that aided in the absorption of the reward. Success was defined as 
retrieval of any of the syrup. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus consisted of a steel tray (43 cm x 27 cm) attached to a heavy anchoring 
tray (12 cm x 12 cm), that preventing the apparatus from sliding toward the enclosure
26
. In 
the center of the tray was placed approximately 1 oz of a liquid food reward, either sugarless 
maple or chocolate syrup. The tray was placed 35 cm from the mesh enclosure for trials 
                                                
26
 In Trial 1 with Knobi, stone bricks were placed on the tray to prevent the tray from being raked in. Once 
Knobi had successful retrieved some of the reward, she focused on trying to obtain the bricks. Due to this, the 
apparatus was modified with the anchoring tray described above.   
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involving Azy and Allie. The tray was placed 50 cm from the enclosure for trials with Knobi, 
because of her ability to reach outside of the mesh enclosure by 35 cm, which was not 
possible for Azy or Allie. 
Experiment 2: Length 
Design 
In Experiment 2, the orangutans were required to manufacture a tool to acquire an 
out-of-reach food item in a raking task. The food reward consisted of popcorn placed in a 
brown paper bag. In some trials, dependent on the ape’s motivation to retrieve the reward, a 
sugarless candy or nut was added to the bag, supplementing the popcorn. The apes were 
always shown the contents of the bag before commencing the experiment. Success was 
defined by retrieval of the bag.  
In half of the trials, termed the short distance condition, the apes were presented with 
the food reward placed 35 cm from Allie and Azy and 50 cm for Knobi. This distance was 
greater for Knobi, as she could reach outside of the enclosure 35 cm, which was not possible 
for Azy or Allie. In the remaining trials, apes were presented with trials in which the reward 
was placed at a longer distance, 80 cm for Allie and Azy, and 95 cm for Knobi, termed the 
long distance condition. The optimal tool in the long condition was any of the long length 
branches (115 cm). In the short experiment, either the long or the short branches (60 cm) 
would be sufficient to retrieve the reward.   
Experiment 3: Sharpness 
Design 
In Experiment 3, the manufacture of a sharp tool was encouraged to acquire an out-
of-reach food item that could best be retrieved through impaling or “stabbing” the food item 
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with the tool. The optimal tool was a sharpened, rigid stick, allowing for stabbing the apple. 
Success was defined as retrieval of the apple.  
Apparatus 
The apparatus consisted of a transparent polycarbonate tube (diameter 6 cm, length 
28 cm) (Figure 5-1). The tube was affixed to the mesh exterior of the orangutan enclosure at 
a 45° angle. A steel frame (9 cm x 58 cm) supported the tube. The frame was attached to the 
exterior of the apes’ enclosure, with the entrance to the tube placed 30 cm from the floor. The 
opposite end of the tube, not facing the enclosure, was sealed to restrict the food to the tube. 
The food reward was half of an apple, placed in the tube with the skin side facing the tube 
entrance. The fruit fit tightly in the tube, preventing raking. In order to retrieve the apple, the 
subject had to impale the fruit with the tool. 
 
Figure 5-1. Apparatus used in the sharpness experiment. An apple was placed in the 
tube. 
 
Experiment 4: Flexibility 
Design 
In Experiment 4, manufacture of a flexible tool was required to acquire a food reward 
placed out of reach in a C-shaped tube. Success was defined as any retrieval of the syrup 
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from the end of the tube. The optimal tool was flexible and at least 40 cm long to reach the 
syrup in the end of the tube.   
Apparatus 
The apparatus consisted of a transparent and flexible vinyl tube (3.8 cm diameter, 45 
cm length) presented in a C-shape (Figure 5-2). The tube was attached to a wooden frame (35 
cm x 35 cm) that prevented manipulation of the tube by the apes. The apparatus was affixed 
to the mesh exterior of the orangutan enclosure. One end of the tube faced the enclosure 
allowing tool insertion; the opposite end was sealed with a removable cap to restrict the 
reward to the tube. The food reward consisted of either sugarless maple or chocolate syrup. 
The reward was placed in the removable cap and was secured in place on the apparatus 
before experimentation.  
 
Figure 5-2. Apparatus used in the flexibility experiment.   
 
Experiment 1-4 
Procedure 
The study participants were tested individually with opportunities for social learning 
prevented. The order of the four experiments was randomized, with 10 trials of each 
experiment. A trial began after the ape had entered the research room and after the tool 
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materials were placed in the enclosure. A trial ended when either: a) the food reward had 
been retrieved, or b) 20 minutes had passed and the ape was no longer attending to the 
problem. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Data were digitally recorded during experimental sessions and were later coded using 
the application SubTrak Video Coding Program for Observational Research (Takach, 
Lindtvedt, & Ragir, 2008). An independent observer scored 20% of trials, with Cohen’s 
Kappa interobserver reliability calculated at ! =  .70 (Bakeman & Gottmann, 1997). 
Dependent variables included: 1) tree species preference, 2) tool modifications (subtract, 
detach, add or combine, and reshape), 3) specific area of modification (leaves, bark, side 
branches, and proximal or distal end of tool), 4) temporal occurrence of tool modification 
(prior to or after probing attempt), 5) tool-using behaviors (probing with the distal or 
proximal ends, rotating, dropping, or withdrawing the tool from the apparatus), and 6) 
preference for retrieving reward (via leaves or stick, raking or stabbing). In the length 
experiment, choice of either the short or the long tool was also documented. In each 
experiment, bouts of tool use were documented, as was whether the bout with the tool was 
successful or not. A bout was defined by use of the same tool repetitively, and was 
considered discontinued if the subject changed behavior (Lehner, 1996). Changes in behavior 
included making a new tool, foraging, resting, and traveling. Chi-square analyses of the 
number of bouts, with successful and non-successful tools, from the five tree species were 
conducted.  
 144 
 
Results 
Experiment 1: Absorbance 
Allie participated in 6 of the 10 trials and received the food reward in all trials. Knobi 
participated in all 10 trials and was successful in all trials at retrieving the food reward. Azy 
participated in eight trials, and retrieved the food reward in five trials.  
Absorbance: Tool Species Preference 
Table 5-3 summarizes the use of the five species of tree browse for each ape. 
Significant differences were found for Allie’s tool preferences, !
2
 (4, N = 9) = 10.4, p = .034. 
Allie preferred to use the willow branches as tools. No significant preference for a tree 
species was found in Azy or Knobi’s tool selections (Azy: !
2
 (4, N =9) = 6.0, p = .199; 
Knobi: !
2
 (4, N = 14) = 6.71, p = .151). 
Table 5-3. Bouts of successful versus unsuccessful tool use in the absorbance experiment 
Subject Behavior Cottonwood Hackberry Mulberry Silver Maple Willow 
Success 3   1 4 
No Success     1 
Allie 
Total Use 3 0 0 1 5 
 
Success 1   4 2 
No Success   1  1 
Azy 
Total Use 1 0 1 4 3 
 
Success 2 2 4 5  
No Success   1   
Knobi 
Total Use 2 2 5 5 0 
 
 Total 6 2 6 10 8 
 
Absorbance: Tool Modification 
 The apes made few modifications to the branches in this task, as described in Table 5-
4. Each ape only modified one tool in one session. The tool modifications by Azy and Allie 
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consisted of subtracting either leaves or side branches from the tool, with the modifications 
done before any probing attempt. Knobi detached a side branch from a mulberry branch and 
used it to probe for the reward.   
Table 5-4. Tool modifications observed during the absorbance experiment 
Subject Session Observation Occurrence Species 
Allie 5 Removes side branch from proximal end of tool Prior Willow 
Removes leaves and side branches from proximal end 
of silver maple. Removes all bark 
Prior Silver Maple Azy 9 
Removes remaining leaves from distal end After Silver Maple 
Knobi 1 Break off a side branch and uses it to probe After Mulberry 
 
Absorbance: Tool Use Behavior  
Table 5-5. Number of occurrences of each behavior during the absorbance experiment 
Behavior Allie Azy Knobi 
Probe with Proximal End 29 25 23 
Probe with Distal End 0 0 34 
Rotate Tool 0 0 16 
Retrieve Reward via Leaves 29 15 35 
Retrieve Reward via Stick 0 0 8 
 
 Allie and Azy probed with only the proximal end of the tool (Table 5-5). The result of 
probing with the proximal end was that the syrup was retrieved onto the stick portion of the 
tool, rather than the leaf covered distal end. Knobi probed with both the distal and the 
proximal ends of the tool. She also withdrew the tool and rotated it so she was probing with 
the distal end, holding with the proximal end. Her preference was to retrieve the reward via 
the leaves, followed by either licking the reward off the leaves (observed for cottonwood and 
silver maple), or eating the syrup-covered leaves (observed for hackberry and mulberry). 
Through this method Knobi was the only ape to retrieve all of the syrup from the tray. All 
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apes also probed for the tray itself, focusing the tool on trying to rake the tray closer rather 
than retrieve the reward. 
Absorbance: Metatool Use 
 
 Knobi demonstrated metatool use during the first trial. A paper towel, unrelated to the 
study, was present in the enclosure during the trial. Knobi initially attempted to probe with 
the paper towards the apparatus before attempting with the branches. She was unable to reach 
the tray with the paper, however. She traveled to the location in the room where the branches 
were located, and carried a branch to the apparatus. She then took a branch (mulberry) and 
pushed the towel to the tray, which she proceeded to push into the syrup. She then pulled the 
paper to her and licked the syrup from the paper.  
Experiment 2: Length 
In the length experiment, apes were required to use a raking tool in order to retrieve 
an out-of-reach reward. Allie retrieved the food reward in all trials in which she chose to 
participate. She refused to attempt to retrieve the reward in one long distance condition trial. 
Knobi participated in all trials and retrieved the reward in all cases. Azy refused participation 
in two long distance condition trials. He was successful in the eight trials he attempted. 
Median latency to solve the task for Allie was 247 s, 569 s for Azy, and 179 s for Knobi. 
Length: Tool Species Preference 
Table 5-6 summarizes the use of the five species of tree browse for each ape. A 
significant difference was found in Azy’s tool selections, with mulberry preferred, !
2
 (4, N = 
12) = 11.33, p = .023. No significant preference for a specific tree species was found for 
Allie or Knobi (Allie: !
2
 (4, N = 12) = 8.83, p = .065; Knobi: !
2
 (4, N = 22) = 8.45, p = 
.076). 
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Table 5-6. Bouts of successful versus unsuccessful tool use in the length experiment 
Subject Behavior Cottonwood Hackberry Mulberry Silver Maple Willow 
Success 4   2 2 
No Success 2 1   1 Allie 
   Total Use 6 1 0 2 3 
 
Success 1  5 2  
No Success 3  1   Azy 
   Total Use 4 0 6 2 0 
 
Success 2 4 1 2  
No Success 5 4 1 2 1 Knobi 
  Total Use 7 8 2 4 1 
 
 Total 17 9 8 8 4 
 
Length: Tool Choice: Short or Long Tool  
 Allie and Azy always selected the long tool to probe for the food reward, regardless 
of whether the food reward was placed at the short or long distance. Knobi selected a short 
tool in 10 instances in the long distance condition, dropping the tool without any probing 
attempt in four cases. In three of these situations, she dropped the short tool immediately to 
pick up a long tool. In contrast, of the 12 probes with the long tool she only dropped the long 
tool twice without a probe attempt, followed by picking up another long tool. During the 
short distance condition Knobi used a long tool three times and a short tool two times, with 
successful probes in all cases. 
Length: Tool Modification 
 Table 5-7 describes all tool modifications during the length experiment. Allie and 
Azy each modified tools in six trials. Knobi only modified a tool in one trial. Allie’s 
modifications can be characterized by removal of side branches that hindered probing, 
especially from the proximal side of the tool. Modifications were made prior, during and 
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after the initial probing attempt. Azy’s modifications were characterized by removal of all 
leaves and side branches from the tool, or minimally, the proximal end of the tool before any 
probing attempt. He also modified the tool after the first probing attempts, removing 
additional leaves and side branches from the distal end. In Session 9, he modified a tool to 
make the tool shorter. The modification resulted in a tool that was easier to handle, as he had 
already raked the reward close. Knobi only altered one tool, removing side branches from the 
tool after her initial probing attempts.  
Table 5-7. Tool modifications observed during the length experiment 
Subject Session Observation Occurrence Species 
1 
Modifies branch by removing leaves, some bark, and one 
side branch that were obstructing probing 
During Silver Maple 
4 
Modifies main branch by breaking the bent end with a side 
branch off the branch. It would not have fit through the 
mesh 
Prior Willow 
6 
Removes side branch that is at the base of the proximal 
end 
Prior Willow 
Removes side branch  Prior Cottonwood 
8 
 
Withdraws tool and removes side branch and leaves from 
proximal half of tool. The side branches were hindering 
probing 
After Cottonwood 
9 
Removes all side branches from proximal end. The 
branches were getting caught in the mesh 
After Cottonwood 
Removes side branch and leaves, breaks off the distal half 
of the tool 
After Cottonwood 
Allie 
10 
 
Removes leaves from proximal end of tool After Silver Maple 
2 
Removes leaves from proximal half After Silver Maple 
5 Removes all side branches, leaves, and bark Prior Mulberry 
6 Removes all leaves and side branches Prior Silver Maple 
Removes leaves from proximal half Prior Mulberry 
Removes all leaves and bark  After Mulberry 
7 
 
Removes all leaves and side branches on proximal half Prior Silver Maple 
Remove all leaves and side branches on proximal end  Prior Cottonwood 9 
Remove leaves on distal end during probing During Cottonwood 
Removes all leaves and side branches from proximal end Prior Silver Maple 
Azy 
10 
Breaks off distal half of branch, result is smaller stick that 
may be easier to handle as food is closer 
After Silver Maple 
Knobi 9 Removes side branch, uses the side branch as a tool After Hackberry 
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Length: Tool Use Behavior 
 As in the absorbance experiment, Knobi was the only ape to probe for the food 
reward with both the distal and proximal ends of the tool (Table 5-8). She also was observed 
to rotate the tool within a trial to switch her probing technique between the proximal and 
distal ends. Azy and Allie preferred to probe with only the proximal end of the tool. 
Table 5-8. Number of occurrences of each behavior scored during the length 
experiment 
Behavior Allie Azy Knobi 
Probe with Proximal End 40 23 25 
Probe with Distal End 0 0 26 
Rotate Tool 0 0 16 
 
Experiment 3: Sharpness 
 
 In the sharpness experiment, the apes were presented with an apple placed out of 
reach in a tube, which could only successfully be retrieved with a tool. Allie participated in 
all trials that were presented. The 10
th
 trial could not be presented due to an abrasion on her 
hand, which eventually healed but not in time to complete the study. She was successful in 
retrieving the apple in seven of the nine trials conducted. Azy participated in eight of the 
trials and was successful in retrieving the reward in five of the trials. Knobi chose to 
participate in eight trials but was only successful in two of the trials. Median latency to solve 
the task for Allie was 794 s, 144 s for Azy, and 741 s for Knobi. 
Sharpness: Tool Species Preference 
Table 5-9 summarizes the use of the five species of tree browse for each ape. Chi-
square analyses did not reveal any significant differences between tool species (Allie: !
2
 (4, 
N =33) = 7.75, p = .101; Azy: !
2
 (4, N = 15) = 3.33, p = .504; Knobi: !
2
 (4, N = 22) = 3.01, p 
=. 418). 
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Table 5-9. Occurrence of successful versus unsuccessful tool use in the sharpness 
experiment 
Subject Behavior Cottonwood Hackberry Mulberry Silver Maple Willow 
Success 2  3  1 
No Success 10 2 4 6 5 Allie 
   Total Use 12 2 7 6 6 
 
Success  1 1 1 1 
No Success 2  3 4 2 Azy 
   Total Use 2 1 4 5 3 
 
Success 1   1  
No Success 6 6 4 1 3 Knobi 
   Total Use 7 6 4 2 3 
 
 Total 21 9 15 13 12 
 
Sharpness: Tool Modification 
 Table 5-10 describes all tool modifications during the sharpness experiment. Allie 
modified tools in seven trials. Azy modified tools in six trials. Knobi modified tools in five 
trials. A number of different modifications were observed for all apes. All apes were 
observed to remove obstructing leaves and side branches prior, during and after probing. 
Allie was the only ape to clearly modify the proximal end (in Trial 6); however, her 
modifications did not indicate the branch was sharper as a result. Allie and Azy often 
shortened the tool by breaking it, with Allie doing so in six of the seven trials in which she 
modified tools, and Azy doing so in all six trials in which he modified tools. Table 5-11 
contains measurements of all tools that were retrievable. Not all tools created were available 
for collection, as apes may have consumed, further altered, destroyed, or removed tools from 
the research area. On average, Azy shortened the tools to 43 cm (SD: 8.4), and Allie 
shortened her tools to 48 cm (SD: 4.0). These tools were greatly reduced from the original 
length of the branches of 115 cm, with Azy reducing his tools an average of 72 cm (SD: 8) 
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and Allie reducing her tools an average of 67 cm (SD: 4) (Table 5-11). This amounts to an 
average 62% reduction in tool length for Azy, and a 58% reduction for Allie. After reduction, 
the tool was held in either the hand or the mouth. 
Table 5-11. Final length of tools collected during the sharpness experiment, and total 
reduction (cm) from the original branch length (115 cm)  
Subject Session Length (cm) Reduction (cm) 
6 38 77 
7 53 62 
8 30 85 
8 32 83 
8 43 72 
8 33 82 
8 44 71 
8 45 70 
9 54 61 
9 55 60 
10 44 71 
10 47 68 
Azy 
10 36 79 
1 44 71 
8 52 63 Allie 
8 47 68 
 
 
Sharpness: Tool Use Behavior 
 All apes engaged in many tool probes into the tube, followed by withdrawal from the 
tube, and resuming to probe. All apes preferred to probe with the proximal end of the tool, 
with ratios of proximal to distal probing 132:5 for Allie, 32:1 for Azy, and 70:0 for Knobi 
(Table 5-12). The two techniques distinguished for acquiring the apple reward were: 1) 
attempt to rake the apple from the tube, and 2) attempt to puncture the apple and pull the 
food from the tube. Attempting to rake the apple was generally unsuccessful, as the steep 
angle of the tube and the size of the apple prevented the action from being successful. 
However, apes could attempt to rake after repeated probes had misshaped the apple’s form. 
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Puncturing the apple was a successful mode of solving the task. However, it was difficult to 
puncture the apple without initially sharpening the tool. However, Azy demonstrated mastery 
with this technique without the need to sharpen the tool. Of the five trials in which he was 
successful, he aligned the tool with the apple, forcefully pushed until the tool impaled the 
apple, and then carefully removed the tool and the apple from the tube. It was unclear from 
the video data if the puncture technique was a chosen method for Allie and Knobi, or if it 
was a by-product of their rapid and forceful probes into the tube. In the trials in which Allie 
and Knobi were successful, a clear technique for solving was not distinguishable. 
Table 5-12. Occurrences of each behavior scored during the sharpness experiment 
Behavior Allie Azy Knobi 
Probe with Proximal End 132 32 70 
Probe with Distal End 5 1 0 
Rake Apple 15 5 2 
Puncture Apple 3 36 2 
 
Experiment 4: Flexibility 
Allie was successful at retrieving the reward from the opposite end of the tube in 8 of 
the 10 trials presented, refusing participation in 2 trials. Azy only engaged in four trials, and 
of these only retrieved the reward in one trial. Knobi participated in six of the presented trials 
but was never successful at retrieving the reward.  
Flexibility: Tool Species Preference 
Table 5-13 summarizes the use of the five species of tree browse for each ape. Chi-
square analyses did not reveal any significant differences between tool species (Allie: !
2
 (4, 
N = 14) = 3.85, p =. 426; Azy: !
2
 (4, N = 3) = 6.0, p =. 199; Knobi: !
2
 (4, N = 26) = 0.44, p 
=. 979) 
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Table 5-13. Occurrences of successful versus unsuccessful tool use in the flexibility 
experiment 
Subject Behavior Cottonwood Hackberry Mulberry Silver Maple Willow 
Success 3  2 4 2 
No Success 2 1    Allie 
    Total Use 5 1 2 4 2 
 
Success   1   
No Success  1 2 1  Azy 
    Total Use 0 1 3 1 0 
 
Success      
No Success 2 2 1 2 2 Knobi 
    Total Use 2 2 1 2 2 
 
 Total 7 4 6 7 4 
 
Flexibility: Tool Modification 
 Table 5-14 describes all tool modifications during the flexibility experiment. Allie 
modified tools in four trials. Azy modified a tool in one trial. Knobi did not modify any tools. 
Allie and Azy were observed during the experiment to remove side branches before probing, 
with Allie continuing to remove obstructions after the first probe attempt. Allie also made 
tools shorter in two sessions. In the first session, she shortened it to 49 cm.  
Table 5-14. Tool modifications observed during the flexibility experiment 
Subject Session Observation Occurrence Species 
Breaks branch so it is much shorter After Cottonwood 
1 Removes side branch; would have prevented insertion 
into tube 
Prior Cottonwood 
2 Removes distal half, all leaves and side branches Prior Willow 
Modifies main branch, breaks so is shorter After Cottonwood 
Removes leaves After Cottonwood 4 
Removes side branch Prior Cottonwood 
Removes side branch After Silver Maple 
Allie 
6 
Removes leaves from proximal end Prior Silver Maple 
Azy 6 Removes side branch Prior Silver Maple 
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Flexibility: Tool Use Behavior 
 All apes preferred to probe with the proximal end of the tool. Allie and Azy both 
achieved success by pushing the tool past the curve in the tube, with Allie pushing the tool 
past the bend in the tube 36 times, compared to 2 times for Azy, and never for Knobi  (Table 
5-15).   
Table 5-15. Number of occurrences of each behavior scored during the flexibility 
experiment 
Behavior Allie Azy Knobi 
Probe with proximal end 121 5 14 
Probe with distal end 0 0 0 
Tool bends curve 36 2 0 
Tool does not bend curve 1 2 2 
Discussion 
This research provides support for the hypothesis that causal understanding is present 
in orangutans regarding tool modification. Orangutans modified tools specific to a task, 
modified tools by removing obstructions, such as leaves and side branches before probing, 
and developed efficient methods for solving the tasks. In addition, metatool use was 
observed, and the creation of an orangutan tool kit was documented. The example of 
metatool use supports the presence of causal understanding as Knobi recognized the towel 
was too short and understood how to combine materials to make a tool of effective length 
without trial and error behavior. The presence of a tool kit supports the interpretation that 
orangutans can recognize differences between tools and the task, the need to adjust their 
manufacture when the tool is not appropriate to the task, and the properties that are needed in 
a tool for a given task. These observations support the presence of causal understanding in 
orangutans.  
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Species Preference 
 There was no clear indication that the apes preferred using specific tree species for 
any of the tasks presented. Analyzing species of tree branch used per experiment only 
revealed a few significant preferences. Specifically, in the absorbance experiment, Allie 
preferred to use the willow branches as tools. In the length experiment, Azy preferred to use 
the mulberry branches as tools. However, as the sample size of tools used was low and these 
preferences were only found in two experiments, we will not over-interpret these data. The 
preferences may simply be reflective of preferred food sources. In several trials, for Azy in 
particular, consuming the leaves and bark from the tree branches took priority over 
participating in the study. This was a consistent methodological issue throughout the 
experiment, as all apes at times demonstrated more interest in the food reward the branches 
offered than what was offered via the apparatus. 
Absorbance 
 Apes did not make many modifications to the tool in the absorbance experiment. 
Because of the low number of modifications, one tool total per ape, we conclude the apes did 
not perceive a need to modify the tool to retrieve the reward. Trends were observed regarding 
the mode of using tools. In the absorbance experiment, Allie and Azy held the tool on the 
distal end of the branch (i.e., terminal end of the branch), using the proximal end (i.e., the end 
of the branch that was nearest to the trunk of the tree) of the tool to probe for the reward, 
resulting in the food reward being retrieved onto the branch itself. Knobi used both proximal 
and distal ends and preferred retrieving the food via the leaves of the tool on the distal end. 
This resulted in more efficient and effective behavior, with Knobi being the only ape to 
retrieve all of the syrup from the tray in a session. Nakamichi (2004) also recorded this 
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behavior in captive orangutans, with apes using the distal end of the tool to retrieve the 
reward on the leaves. All apes also probed for the tray itself, focusing the tool on trying to 
rake in the tray rather than retrieve only the syrup. This suggests either the apes were 
interested in the tray itself (perhaps as it was a novel item), or they viewed raking in the tray 
as the most effective way to retrieve the syrup as each ape had prior experience 
spontaneously raking in items.  
Length 
In the length experiment, Allie and Azy always selected the long tool to probe for the 
food reward, regardless of whether the food reward was placed at the short or long distance. 
This was an effective strategy, as there was no obvious benefit to using the shorter stick, 
thought it may have been easier to manipulate. Knobi used both the short and the long tools 
in this experiment. However, her behavior before a probing attempt was of most interest, as 
in three situations she dropped the short tool in favor of a longer tool. The opposite, dropping 
a longer tool in favor of a shorter tool, was not observed.  
The same probing tool preference as documented for the absorbance experiment was 
observed during the length experiment. Allie and Azy used the proximal end of the tool to 
probe for the reward. Knobi preferred to probe with the distal end. However, in this case 
probing with the proximal end may have been valuable, as the proximal end of the branch 
had a greater diameter than the distal end, providing a more rigid tool end to rake in the 
reward. However, the tool may have been easier to manipulate by holding the proximal end. 
In the length experiment, Allie and Azy each modified a tool in six trials. Knobi only 
modified a tool in one trial. The removal of side branches that hindered probing, especially 
from the proximal side of the tool, characterized Allie’s modifications. She made such 
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modifications prior, during and after the initial probing attempt. Azy often removed all leaves 
and side branches from the tool, before any probing attempt. Knobi only altered one tool, 
removing side branches from the tool after her initial probing attempts. These observations 
suggest the apes may have had different strategies for solving the task, with Allie removing 
obstructions as needed prior and during probing, and Azy removing all possible obstructions 
before probing attempts. These different strategies may be related to the ease of modification 
for the individual, with Allie being more selective of modifications due to the lessened fine 
motor skills in her hands.   
Sharpness 
The sharpness experiment resulted in the most tool modifications. Allie and Azy were 
observed to remove obstructing leaves and side branches before probing in many trials (total 
modifications prior to probing: Allie, n=9; Azy, n=9; Knobi, n=1). These modifications are 
similar to those observed of wild orangutans, supporting the presence of foresight in planning 
tool modification (van Schaik et al., 1996). In addition, Allie and Azy shortened the tool by 
removing the distal end from their tools. On average, collected tools were reduced 62% for 
Azy, and 58% for Allie, suggesting the apes recognized a need to reduce the tool length. We 
suggest that reducing the tool length created a stronger tool that was easier to manipulate. 
Pruetz and Bertolani (2007) noted that trimming the distal end from a tool during 
modification for creation of stabbing tools seemed to serve to strengthen the tool, as the weak 
end was removed. In the present study, the distal end was also removed, leaving only the 
proximal end, which was less flimsy. It also appeared that shortening the tool made it easier 
to manipulate, as the subjects could then easily hold it in their mouth. Orangutans have a high 
level of control when manipulating objects with their mouth (O’Malley & McGrew, 2000). 
 160 
 
By holding the tool in their mouth, the orangutans in the present study could hold the mesh of 
their enclosure with their hands to support their body while attempting to solve the problem. 
This was particularly important for Allie, as in her sitting position on the floor of the 
enclosure the opening of the tube was above her.  
The successful technique for removing the apple from the tube was to puncture the 
apple and pull the food from the tube, which was difficult without initially sharpening the 
tool. However, Azy was able to puncture the apple without sharpening the tool by aligning 
the tool with the apple and forcefully pushing until the tool impaled the apple, followed by 
pulling the tool and the apple from the tube. This technique allowed Azy to solve the task 
much faster (Mdn: 144 s), than Allie (Mdn: 794 s) or Knobi (Mdn: 741 s). The method of 
solving was not clear for Allie and Knobi, with their success likely coming through a 
perseverance of rapid and forceful probes into the tube, some of which impaled the apple. 
Flexibility 
In the flexibility experiment, fewer modifications were observed than in the length 
and sharpness experiments, with Allie modifying four tools, Azy modifying one, and Knobi 
not altering any. Five of the nine modifications observed in the experiments occurred before 
an insertion attempt into the tube after the apes had approached the apparatus. These 
modifications included removing obstructing branches, leaves, and in two instances for Allie, 
shortening the length of the tool. Only Allie demonstrated a high level of success, acquiring 
the food reward in all trials she participated in, though Azy was also successful in one of the 
four trials he engaged. 
Tool Modification 
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All four modes of tool modification were observed within the present research. The 
most common mode observed, subtractive modification, was seen when apes removed side 
branches, bark, and leaves from the tool. Of significance, apes often performed subtractive 
modifications before attempting to use the tool, suggesting an understanding of which objects 
on the tools would be obstructions. The second most common type of tool modification was 
through reshaping. Reshaping was only observed in the context of making the tools shorter, 
particularly for the sharpness experiment. Reshaping was performed both before and after 
first probing attempts. This may have resulted in a tool that was easier to manage, especially 
as the orangutans often held the end of the tool in their mouth while probing. The goal of the 
sharpness experiment was to create a situation that enticed the orangutans to create a tool that 
could be used to stab the food reward, as has been observed in wild chimpanzees hunting 
bushbabies (Galago senegalensis) (Pruetz & Bertolani, 2007). The steps involved in the 
chimpanzee tool manufacture (by some individuals) included modifying sticks to a sharp 
point, then using the sharp stick to stab at bushbabies in their nesting tree holes. The 
orangutans in the present study did not create sharp tools, although they were often able to 
successfully complete the task. Given that two of the study participants were successful in 
gaining the food reward at a high rate, this suggests that the experimental design was not 
rigorous enough to enforce the creation of a stabbing tool. Future research is critical to 
understanding the process by which some wild chimpanzees discovered the need to create a 
sharp tool. The role of captive studies will remain highly valuable in this regard, allowing for 
experimental variations and exploration that would not be possible with wild apes.  
The final two forms of tool modification detach and add or combine, were only 
documented for Knobi, each happening in the first session of the absorbance experiment. 
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Knobi was observed to detach a side branch from a mulberry branch and use it to probe at a 
paper towel, pushing the paper towel into the reward. Both the paper towel and the side 
branch were too short to reach the food reward, but by combining the tools, she made a tool 
of effective length. The observation of metatool use by Knobi is important. By pushing the 
stick and the paper towel, Knobi was able to make the paper towel into an effective tool. 
Before her pushing it with the stick, it was too short for use as a tool. Metatool use relies on a 
number of sequential steps, suggesting the ability for planning. Knobi’s behavior indicated 
metatool use of Level 3 hierarchical organization, which is defined by involving three 
relations between objects, in this situation involving the towel, branch, and food (Matsuzawa, 
2001). Level 3, Metatool use is the most complex type of tool use observed in nonhuman 
primates. West African chimpanzees using a wedge to stabilize an anvil during nut cracking 
is an example of metatool use (Matsuzawa, 1991, 1994). In metatool use, subgoals must be 
implemented to reach the final goal. A similar incidence of metatool use to that reported in 
the present study was observed of an orangutan, Indah, at the National Zoo (Washington, 
DC). Indah had been provided branches to retrieve juice that had been placed outside of her 
enclosure. Rather than raking directly for the juice, she raked in a roll of paper towels that 
was outside of her enclosure, raking the towels into the juice before raking the towels to her 
(B.B. Beck & R.W. Shumaker, personal communication, 1997). In addition, metatool use has 
been observed in captivity in New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) (Taylor et al., 
2007). The results of the present study suggest that the cognitive capacity for metatool use is 
present in orangutans. It suggests that the origin of metatool use in hominids may trace to the 
last common ancestor shared by orangutans and the African apes 11-18 mya (Goodman et al., 
1998; Steiper & Young, 2006). However, further research is critical to supporting this 
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hypothesis, as the present study only provides one example of this behavior. In addition, 
future research on this topic should include control trials, which account for innate tool 
modifications, as it may be possible the apes prefer to modify the tools via branch and leaf 
removal that has little to do with causality.  
Tool modifications, varying by experiment, support the presence of an orangutan tool 
kit in this captive population, as has been documented in wild orangutans at Suaq Balimbing 
(Fox et al., 1999). In a “tool kit,” tools are manufactured differently depending on the context 
(Fox et al., 1999; van Schaik et al., 1996). The Suaq Balimbing tool kit consists of two types 
of tools, those for insect extraction (characterized as long and wide), and those for seed 
extraction (characterized as short and thin). Van Schaik, Fox and Sitompul (1996) conclude 
that the orangutan tool kit, with significant differences between tools and the task at hand, 
and the orangutans’ quick adjustments to their manufacture when the tool is not appropriate 
to the task, is an indicator of intelligent tool use. Byrne (1995) notes that a tool kit indicates 
cognitive complexity by the ability to recognize the properties that are needed in a tool for a 
given task, the ability to modify a raw material for the task, and an ability to relate tool types 
to one another in order to manufacture the appropriate type for the task. The tool kit of the 
Great Ape Trust orangutans consists of: 1) unmodified long tools for retrieval of the reward 
in the absorption experiment, 2) long tools with obstructing leaves and branches removed in 
the length and flexibility experiments, 3) shorter tools, with side branches, leaves, and 
sometimes bark removed in the sharpness experiment.   
The manufacture of tools in the present research supports an understanding of causal 
relations. Tools were created that allowed success in the various experiments, supporting the 
presence of an orangutan tool kit. A tool kit, with different tools used in different contexts 
 164 
 
supports the ability to represent multiple types of objects (Fox et al., 1999). Through subtract, 
detach, add or combine, and reshape, apes altered the tools, often removing hindering objects 
or shortening the tool to make it more usable. The presence of such behaviors occurring 
before probing attempts suggests the apes used mental manipulation to decide which features 
of the tool to alter. In addition, objects were not randomly subtracted from the tools. Rather 
leaves and side branches were usually removed from either the probing end of the tool, or the 
entire tool. The reshaping of the tool in the sharpness experiment was again not random, with 
the tool shortened so it was easier to manipulate. The results of the length experiment also 
support a comprehension of the relevant length of a tool to a problem. These observations of 
captive orangutans support what is documented in wild orangutans as these apes exhibit 
flexible understanding of the tasks at hand (van Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul, 1996). The present 
study suggests manufacture by orangutans is the result of causal understanding between the 
nature of the tools and the presented problems, allowing orangutans to create tools of specific 
size and shape to solve specific foraging problems.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 165 
 
CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Discussion 
These studies of tool use and manufacture by captive orangutans demonstrate a 
degree of cognitive complexity involving an understanding of causal relations in tool use. 
Suggestions that the understanding of causal relations is a uniquely human ability and that 
great apes lack this ability are not supported (e.g., Kummer, 1995; Visalberghi & Tomasello, 
1998; Povinelli, 2000; Premack, 2007; Tomasello 1998, 2000). Orangutans can comprehend 
the ‘mediating force’ involved in cause and effect relations, using tools effectively to control 
the outcome of experiments, and thus supporting the idea of the multifaceted nature of causal 
understanding, as comprehension occurred at different levels between individuals and tasks. 
Causal understanding occurs on a continuum, ranging from weak causal knowledge 
(associative learning) to strong causal knowledge (Kummer, 1995). An understanding of how 
and why a connection exists between cause and effect is evidence of strong causal 
knowledge. Orangutans demonstrate this in the following ways: 1) by distinguishing between 
functional and nonfunctional tool properties, 2) by correctly modifying tools (bundle of 
sticks, h-shaped stick), 3) by creating efficient and novel ways to solve tasks (short sticks, 
sharpness experiment), 4) by distinguishing between functional and nonfunctional traps, and 
5) by using and manufacturing tools, resulting in observations of metatool use and a tool kit. 
Based on the accumulated data of the four studies presented in this dissertation, the 
hypothesis is supported that orangutans comprehend relevant tool properties and have or can 
develop an understanding of causal relations.  
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To study orangutan causal understanding, I designed four multi-part studies that 
included novel methodologies, apparatuses, and tools, framed around tool use and 
manufacture. These studies provide an unprecedented thorough examination of this topic in 
orangutans. In Chapter 2, causal understanding was explored through the concepts of rigidity 
and flexibility. Unlike the chimpanzees of Povinelli, Reaux, & Theall’s (2000) research, 
orangutans can distinguish rigid and flimsy tools, with a preference for the functional tools. 
Moreover, the preference for the functional tool from the first session provides support of 
causal understanding from the onset of the study. The ability of the apes to generalize the 
concepts of rigidity and flexibility to three novel and visually different tool pairs supports 
their use of mental manipulation, using mental trial and error to analyze tool properties, as 
opposed to motoric trial and error. For this reason, causal understanding rather than 
associative learning is likely the cause of the successful behavior. If the orangutans were only 
using associative processes to solve, it is unlikely they would have excelled at the present 
task from the onset, as the tools were novel and some were unusual. These results support the 
work of Furlong et al. (2008) who found that chimpanzees recognized the distinction 
between rigid and flimsy tools. The presence of this skill in both orangutans and 
chimpanzees provides solid evidence that the cognitive capacity for causal understanding 
was present in the last common ancestor shared between the African and Asian great apes.   
As documented in Chapter 3, orangutans also show behavior consistent with 
expectations regarding causal understanding of tool modification and manipulation, and 
possibly for causal understanding regarding sequential modifications. The fact that 
appropriate modifications were made in disassembling the bundle of sticks before any 
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attempt to solve supports a basic ability to understand the effect of tool size in relation to the 
problem.  
The h-shaped stick problem presented a more complex challenge to the orangutans, in 
that it was only the ends of the tool that were larger than the tube. However, the occurrence 
of only a few errors in the first trial for two of the subjects and a discontinuation of errors for 
the third ape supports the presence of causal understanding. This conclusion stands in 
contrast to the research of Visalberghi et al. (1995) who found the apes had difficulty with 
this tool. Differences in laboratories, relations between subjects, and minor differences in 
apparatus design may explain this discrepancy. Visalberghi and Limongelli (1996) noted that 
a species’ understanding of causality is multifaceted, for example with comprehension 
varying regarding different domains (physical or social) or physical principles (such as 
gravity, weight, size) (also see Piaget, 1952, 1954). Based on the amount of conflicting data 
on this topic, such as that found in the h-shaped stick condition, it may be appropriate to 
amend Visalberghi and Limongelli’s (1996) statement to include variation within species 
(see Boesch, 2007).  
The remaining tool problems, the short sticks and the bent-stick, provide support for 
causal understanding overall by orangutans, with individual variation again important. 
Although Azy and Knobi were always successful with the short sticks, errors were present. 
These errors, in combination with an efficient solution to solve the task with only one stick, 
suggest a level of causal understanding was present, as the apes had a specific understanding 
of how to use one stick to retrieve the reward. The absence of any success in the short sticks 
task by Allie provides support that the short sticks task was more challenging and required a 
higher degree of cognitive skill to solve. The bent-stick condition was the most challenging 
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of the conditions. Attempts to modify the tool were apparent from the onset of the study, 
although clear attempts to straighten the tool were not always evident. However, Allie’s 
behavior by the end of the study suggests a high level of causal understanding, as she 
engaged in a long and clear attempt to unbend the tool. Allie’s behavior demonstrated 
planned attempts to unbend the tool by wedging the tool against the mesh and by bracing it 
on her head, pulling the tool to straighten. Though she was ultimately unsuccessful, I believe 
it likely due to her lack of fine motor control rather than her lack of comprehension. Such 
observations were not documented for Azy or Knobi, who were often successful with the 
bent stick by persistence in forcing the tool into the tube, a method unavailable to Allie. 
The blocked tube task results are difficult to disentangle from associative learning, as 
the apes did not respond immediately to the novel situation imposed by the blocks. It is 
important to note, however, that causal understanding does not necessarily have to be 
expressed immediately; it may be acquired with experience. However, without an immediate 
correct response in this experiment, it was impossible to determine if the behavior was a 
result of understanding or associationism. Shanks (2007) described associationism as a 
simple connection between events, with events automatically linked together. I hypothesize 
there is more than simple association involved in the orangutans’ solution to the blocked tube 
task, as is supported by the many examples of causal understanding documented throughout 
the present research. However, further research is required. Overall, support for causal 
understanding was found through the tube task study presented in the third Chapter. As 
causal understanding can vary regarding different domains or challenges (Visalberghi & 
Limongelli, 1996), it is not surprising that variation between individuals and tasks were 
present.  
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Support was found for the interpretation that some orangutans used causal 
understanding to solve the trap-tube task, as documented in Chapter 4. Two of the study 
subjects achieved success with the trap-tube. Comprehension emerged much faster in the 
large tube condition than in the small tube condition. Individual variation was clear, with 
Knobi never achieving success, and Azy solving the small tube condition faster than Allie. 
When the successful apes were presented with the inverted tube, results indicated they did 
not immediately perceive the task as an inversion of the previous problem. The orangutans 
avoided the trap in their first encounters with the inverted tube, with Azy being presented the 
large inverted trap tube and Allie the small inverted trap tube first. However, by the 
presentation of the small trap for Azy and the large trap for Allie, both apes ceased to avoid 
the nonfunctional trap. As causal understanding depends on experiences, including 
opportunities to manipulate objects allowing knowledge to be gained, it may be that causal 
understanding did not emerge until the later trials (Visalberghi, 1997). It also may be that the 
apes initially chose to act conservatively, avoiding any configuration of the trap. This is not 
unlikely, as study with adult humans has found that they also avoid the nonfunctional trap, 
suggesting a lack of motivation to change previously successful strategies (Silva et al., 2005).  
The results of the combination tube clarified these data, as this task presented one 
functional and one non-functional trap in the same apparatus. Avoidance of the functional 
trap in both the large and small conditions for Azy suggests he had a strong causal 
understanding of the problem, understanding what trap to avoid. Allie’s avoidance of the trap 
in the large condition but not the small condition supports minimally an intermediate level of 
causal understanding. These differences in comprehension between the large and small tube 
conditions suggest the apes perceived the tubes as distinctly different. As no preference was 
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found for a tool-using mode (pushing or raking to solve), these results do not support 
previous arguments that it is the allowance of choice for pushing or raking that makes the 
large tube condition easier to solve (Mulcahy & Call, 2006), but instead suggests that control 
over the tool may be most important. Further research is required to delineate the critical 
factor in preventing or allowing the emergence of causal understanding. Such research 
should include analysis of rearing history, including details regarding access to adult 
conspecifics and manipulatable objects during formative years.   
These results provide further support for individual variation in causal understanding 
and indicate it emerges with experience. This is in contrast to those researchers, such as 
Povinelli and colleagues (2000) who neglect the value of learning gained by experience, 
viewing causal understanding as an inherent ability that develops naturally and 
spontaneously. While this may be true in normal development situations, in which 
experiences and opportunities for object manipulation are available; it is not likely to be true 
in impoverished environments, such as the laboratory where Povinelli and colleagues (2000) 
conducted research. As Machado and Silva (2003, p. 278) summarized, Povinelli (2000) 
“misconstrued the concept of understanding,” by devaluing the importance of experiences 
allowing for concept learning. For example, in the present research, Azy and Allie did not 
immediately understand the concept of how to solve the trap tube. Eventually they learned 
how to solve it. After this experience of learning, they then demonstrated they understood the 
causal features of the task through the control trials, with Azy showing a greater degree of 
comprehension than Allie. 
In Chapter 5, the tool manufacture study, research was presented that supports the 
presence of causal understanding in that the apes modified tools to fit specific problems. In 
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the absorbance experiment, the orangutans did not often alter the tools, with leaves and side 
branches intact on the tool. One individual preferred to retrieve the reward on the leaves, 
using the proximal end of the branch to grip. This method allowed her the most success of 
any of the subjects. Her behavior suggests she recognized how different properties of the tool 
can have different uses (Nakamichi, 2004). In the length experiment, Azy and Allie always 
chose the long branches. This was ideal as a long branch could retrieve the food reward in 
either the short or long distance conditions. Azy was observed in one instance to shorten the 
long tool once he had raked the reward close. Knobi attempted to use both long and short 
tools. However, the three instances of her selecting and rejecting a short tool in favor of a 
longer tool suggested she held a mental concept of what length was required in a tool. This 
appreciation of length was also supported in the sharpness experiment. Azy and Allie 
shortened their tools, making a tool that I hypothesize was stronger (due to the removal of the 
distal end) and easier to manipulate. Azy’s successful strategy of puncturing the apple and 
Allie’s persistence led to success in the experiment. The removal of leaves and side branches 
from the proximal end of the tools, before and during probing attempts in the flexibility, 
sharpness and length experiments indicated that modifications were not random. This 
suggests modifications were planned and specific to each task, with a goal of removing 
obstacles from the tool. The creation of different tools for different problems supports the 
presence of an orangutan tool kit. The tool kit of orangutans at Great Ape Trust consists of: 
1) unmodified long tools for retrieval of the reward in the absorption experiment, 2) long 
tools with obstructing leaves and branches removed in the length and flexibility experiments, 
3) shorter tools, with side branches, leaves, and sometimes bark removed in the sharpness 
experiment. The results of the present study support the hypothesis that when wild 
 172 
 
orangutans make such tools in their natural habitat they do so with causal understanding of 
the problem (van Schaik et al., 1996). A tool kit supports the presence of causal 
understanding, indicating the ability of the orangutans to flexibly interact with their 
environment. These results strengthen support for the hypothesis that the orangutans 
distinguished between the properties of the tools and the desired outcome.    
Through my research, I found orangutans could understand causal relations. 
However, it was clear that the level of causal understanding was not equivalent across apes or 
tasks. Individual variation in causal understanding was apparent across all studies. This 
variation was most clear in the trap tube experiments, as Azy demonstrated a fuller causal 
understanding of the situation than Allie, and both excelled over Knobi. My research 
suggests that causal understanding exists on a continuum, with a range of levels of 
comprehension. The ability to understand causal relation should not be considered as 
dichotomous, as comprehension was not either fully present or fully absent regarding a given 
task (Kummer, 1995; Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1996). This is at odds with how some 
researchers have pursued this topic, specifically the research conducted by Povinelli and 
colleagues (Povinelli, 2000; Povinelli & Dunphy-Lelii, 2007).                                              
6.2 Significance of Study 
Hominid Evolution 
Understanding the tool-using behavior of great apes is of importance in attempting to 
reconstruct the cognitive ability of extinct tool-using hominids (Byrne, 2004). Great apes are 
an important taxa to study on this topic due to their close genetic relation to humans due to 
shared ancestry, resulting in many shared physical, behavioral and cognitive similarities 
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between nonhuman great apes and humans. Tool use and manufacture has and continues to 
have a significant role in shaping humanity, as tools have allowed us to exploit ecological 
resources and habitats that would be otherwise inaccessible  (Washburn, 1960; Napier, 1960; 
Byrne, 2004). Reconstruction of hominan evolution is difficult because of the lack of direct 
observations of extinct hominans and an incomplete fossil record (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). 
The research presented in this dissertation makes a significant contribution to this 
reconstruction, presenting behavioral data from living apes in order to propose hypotheses 
regarding extinct ones. Behavior involved in tool use and manufacture is an important aspect 
of hominan behavior, in which the study of living apes can contribute. As all great apes use 
and make tools, we can argue that the last common ancestor shared by these apes also used 
and made tools, which allows us to infer that tool use and manufacture would also have been 
significant to other ape taxa, including the first hominans. Analysis of behaviors important in 
the development and use of tools, such as causal understanding, is critical in determining if 
this level of cognition was involved in the development of tool industries by early hominans.    
 I argued in the introduction that orangutans play an important role in elucidating our 
evolutionary knowledge of hominid abilities, as their ancestral line was the first to diverge 
from the lineage that eventually led to the other great apes, including humans, 11-18 mya 
(Goodman et al., 1998; Steiper & Young, 2006). The support for causal understanding of tool 
using and manufacture from the present study suggests that the last common ancestor (LCA) 
shared by great apes, including humans, had the capacity for causal understanding. As van 
Schaik (2004) noted, a trait found in common between chimpanzees and orangutans suggests 
the trait is common to all great apes based on the most parsimonious cladistic model. This is 
critical, as there is no archaeological record dating back to the split from the LCA to inform 
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our understanding of causal cognition. The present research, along with findings from recent 
studies that provide support for chimpanzee causal understanding (Call, 2006; Mulcahy & 
Call, 2006; Furlong et al., 2008; Bania et al., 2008), suggests causal understanding is present 
in both orangutans and chimpanzees, thereby supporting its presence in the LCA and 
suggesting that this level of cognition is a shared trait between all hominids.  
Research with the lesser apes is critical in determining if this cognitive capacity is 
available to all hominoids. In general, cognitive research with the lesser apes is sparse, which 
makes it difficult to compare their cognitive abilities to the other apes. However, 
Cunningham, Anderson, & Mootnick (2006) in a study of tool use involving causal 
understanding, suggested that hoolock gibbons (Bunopithecus hoolock), performed at least as 
well as some chimpanzees (in comparison to Povinelli, 2000 and Limongelli et al., 1995). 
However, they noted that associative learning might explain the gibbons’ behavior, and 
called for further research.    
The level of causal understanding in monkeys is also unclear. Some research with 
monkeys suggests a lack of causal understanding (Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989; Visalberghi & 
Limongelli, 1994), suggesting it may be a derived trait of only the hominids, or perhaps 
hominoids. However, other research such as studies conducted by Hauser and colleagues 
(Hauser, 1997; Santos, Miller, & Hauser, 2003; Hauser et al, 1999; Hauser et al., 2002), 
Evans & Westergaard (2004), and Fujita, Kuroshima, & Asai (2003) suggests that monkeys 
have some understanding of causal relations, more so than expected from only associative 
learning. These findings however, are not necessarily contradictory, as causal understanding 
exists on a continuum and can vary by domains and tasks (Kummer, 1995; Visalberghi & 
Limongelli, 1994). It may be that some level of causal understanding is shared among all 
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anthropoids, and that more complex levels of causal understanding are derived only in 
hominids. Additional research with monkeys and lesser apes is required to determine if 
causal understanding is shared or derived among anthropoids. At present, I suggest we can 
minimally argue that the LCA of the African and Asian ape lineages had causal 
understanding regarding how tools’ function and interact, allowing us to infer that those 
species emerging after the split, such as early hominans, also had such skills. 
 The results of this study have important ecological implications, as causal 
understanding allows for greater problem solving, including increased abilities for accessing 
embedded foods. Comprehension of how to use a tool increases the effectiveness of tool use 
(Visalberghi, 2002). It allows the user to deal with variations in their environment with 
flexibility rather than motoric trial and error, which may be costly in terms of time and effort. 
Such comprehension can allow foraging niche expansion, allowing for greater access to 
resources. This expansion has been seen in Sumatra, as tool use and manufacture has led to 
an increased foraging niche, with orangutans accessing fruits, seeds and honey that would be 
otherwise inaccessible (van Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul, 1996). As regards to early hominans, 
the presence of causal cognition would have eased adapting to a new foraging niche. 
Yamakoshi (2001) hypothesized that innovation would have been important to such an 
expansion, with innovations for hunting or digging critical. Hunting or digging tools may 
have been pivotal in the evolution of hominans from a chimpanzee-like ancestor, allowing 
hominans to exploit a previously empty niche (Yamakoshi, 2001). Documentation of 
chimpanzee hunting tools (Pruetz & Bertolani, 2007) and digging tools (Hernandez-Aquilar 
et al., 2007) is important, as these types of tools may be similar to those used by early 
hominans. These types of tools in conjunction with environmental pressures favoring hunting 
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and digging, and expansion across a savanna landscape may have contributed to leading 
humans down a different path from chimpanzees. Advanced technological innovations would 
only have been possible with causal understanding (Wolpert, 2003). The importance of 
causal cognition to hominid evolution is paramount; as it has been argued that technological 
innovations allowed for by causal understanding had an important role in driving human 
biological and cultural evolution (Wolpert, 2003). 
In addition, the results of the present research assist in the behavioral reconstruction 
of extinct hominans such as Australopithecus. Australopithecine (Australopithecus 
aethiopicus, A. boisei, A. garhi, A. robustus) remains are contemporaneous with tools at 
some sites (such as at Gona, Olduvai, and Swartkrans); however, many researchers attribute 
these tools to early Homo, as such technology continued in this lineage after the demise of 
the Australopithecines (for a review, see Schick & Toth, 2006). This is still unclear, with 
some researchers suggesting A. garhi may have used tools at Gona, and may be ancestral to 
Homo (Asfaw et al., 1999). The cranial capacity of Australopithecines (approximately 410-
530 cc) was limited in comparison to modern H. sapiens (Leakey, 1959; Leakey & Lewin, 
1992); this has led to a presumption that their cognitive skills were also limited. However, 
some researchers have argued that based on research with chimpanzees, the cognitive 
capabilities of Australopithecus have been underestimated (Byrne, 2005; Panger et al., 2002; 
Pruetz & Bertolani, 2007). Stone tool manufacture experiments with bonobos, whose cranial 
capacity is similar to that of Australopithecines, supports these arguments by providing 
evidence that bonobos have the cognitive skill and manipulative abilities to create a stone 
tool (Schick et al., 1999; Toth, Schick, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1993; Toth, Schick, & Semaw, 
2006). The results of the present research support such arguments, and even suggest 
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capabilities such as causal understanding were present earlier, in other hominids, in our 
evolutionary history. These results require us to rethink our assumptions regarding what can 
be achieved with a smaller and less complex brain. As my research supports, causal 
understanding is present in an ape with a smaller brain size relative to humans. The 
distinction in causal understanding between humans and the other great apes is one of degree 
and not of kind. Under this argument, a level of causal understanding is present in great apes, 
with the large brain of Homo sapiens allowing for more a complex appreciation of causal 
relations, and thus the creation of more complex tools.  
Evolution of Cognition in Great Apes 
In my introductory chapter, I discussed the evolution of cognition and causal 
understanding in great apes. The results of the present study contribute both to the discussion 
of the historical and causative factors that favored the evolution of great ape cognition 
(Byrne, 2000). Regarding historical factors, the results presented in this dissertation support 
the hypothesis that causal cognition was present in the LCA shared by great ape hominids 
11-18 mya (Goodman et al., 1998; Steiper & Young, 2006). Although the present research 
does not explain the causative factors favoring causal cognition and the evolution of great 
ape cognition in general, it does contribute to the discussion as the presence of causal 
understanding in the LCA may have dramatically shaped cognitive evolution in hominids. A 
number of hypotheses have been proposed to explain cognitive evolution in primates, with 
many specific to great apes (Milton, 1981; Rodman, 1973; Parker & Gibson, 1977; Parker, 
1996; Byrne, 1996, 1997; Povinelli & Cant, 1995; Chevalier-Skolnikoff, Galdikas, & 
Skolnikoff, 1982; Humphrey, 1976; Russon, 2004). The importance of the role of diet, social 
factors, and extractive foraging are still unclear as regards to the reconstruction of cognitive 
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evolution. Also unclear is the interaction between causal understanding in the social and 
physical domains (Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998). However, the present study assists in 
explaining the causative factors, specifically the features of the physical and social 
environment that may have shaped great ape cognitive evolution. Causal understanding is 
another variable that those reconstructing hominid cognitive evolution must consider. With 
causal understanding, extractive foraging, spatial navigation, diet selectivity, and even social 
relations can be mentally manipulated, allowing for more complex decision-making. This 
suggests that aspects from many of the above hypotheses are important, with perhaps causal 
understanding underlying them all.  
Causal understanding is important to both the Machiavellian and the technical 
hypotheses (Byrne & Whiten, 1998; Byrne, 1997, 2000; Humphrey, 1976). The 
Machiavellian hypothesis attempts to differentiate cognitive evolution of anthropoid primates 
from other animals, with advocates arguing that social knowledge was pivotal in the 
evolution of primate cognition (Byrne & Whiten, 1988). Causal understanding in primates 
may have evolved in response to the complex social world of primates, playing an important 
role in Machiavellian manipulations and social maneuvering. As Tomasello (1998, 2000) 
noted, understanding and manipulation of third party relations involves a sophisticated level 
of cognition, and serves to distinguish primates from non-primates. He argued that this level 
of social understanding was an evolutionary precursor to understanding relations between 
inanimate objects, which he believes is only found in humans. However, a level of causal 
understanding is involved in monkey and great apes social interactions (Byrne, 1995; 
Cheney, Seyfarth, & Silk, 1995). Even orangutans, whose social structure is extended or 
sometimes referred to as “semi-solitary,” benefit from and require the ability to understand 
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causal relations between individuals in their environment. This level of comprehension in 
monkeys and apes is minimally equivalent to that characterized by Piaget’s (1954) fifth stage 
in the development of causality. I agree with Tomasello (1998, 2000) that this level of 
comprehension was an evolutionary precursor to later, more sophisticated levels of 
comprehension involved in understanding relations between objects.  
Byrne’s (1997) technical hypothesis, differentiating cognitive evolution of great apes 
over monkeys, provides a way to integrate the evolution of causal understanding to other 
complex cognitive skills only found in great apes. He argued that while the complexities of 
social life serves to differentiate primates from non-primates, it was the technical challenges 
faced by great apes that led to their elevation in complex cognition (Byrne, 1997). 
Specifically, selective pressures for more efficient feeding in a large bodied ancestral great 
ape would have advanced planning abilities. Notably, planning requires mental 
representation and allows one to use hierarchical programs. Causal understanding is an 
integral part of planning for more effective foraging, as it requires an individual to 
understand the relation between objects in order to make an effective plan. Byrne (1997) 
argued that with advancements in planning, allowing for mental representation of physical 
objects, tool use and extractive foraging techniques would have advanced, allowing great 
apes to interact more efficiently in their environment to support their large bodies and brains.  
Through the Machiavellian and technical hypotheses, I can hypothesize regarding the 
relation and evolution of causal understanding in the physical and social domains. It is 
misleading to consider the social and physical aspects of cognition as separate, as there are 
complex interchanges between thinking about social problems and thinking about physical 
problems. Causal understanding may have evolved, to some degree, in response to social 
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pressures in anthropoids (Dunbar, 1998; Whiten & Byrne, 1988). In apes, selective pressures 
favored planning abilities, which require a more sophisticated level of causal understanding 
allowing for mental representation in the physical domain. Byrne (1997) argued that these 
skills in the physical domain would have then allowed for more sophisticated 
representational abilities in the social domain, contributing to the emergence of theory of 
mind and symbolic thought in the great apes.   
Causality and Tool Use in Human Origins 
 Tool use may have been the driving force in the continued evolution of complexity 
regarding causal understanding in hominins, with tool use and causal understanding both 
contributing to the evolution of language and symbolic thought. This is anthropologically 
significant, as language and advanced tool manufacture are defining aspects of human 
behavior (Davidson & Noble, 1993). Gibson and Ingold (1993) argued for a positive 
feedback between language, tool use, and causality. Hominan tool manufacture is 
differentiated from that found in nonhuman great apes by the presence of secondary tool use. 
With the exception of several captive studies (Kitahara-Frisch, 1993; Schick et al., 1999; 
Toth, Schick, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1993; Wright, 1972), great apes do not use tools to make 
other tools. However, captive studies with apes creating secondary tools (Kitahara-Frisch, 
1993; Schick et al., 1999; Toth, Schick, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1993; Wright, 1972), and apes 
combining tools to make a more effective tool through metatool use (Lethmate 1982; Kohler, 
1925; Matsuzawa, 1991, 1994; Chapter 5: Walkup, Shumaker, & Pruetz) suggest that this 
capacity is present in the great apes. Based on this and the present support for causal 
understanding in great apes, I argue that it was not the need for stone tools that initiated the 
ability for causal understanding in our lineage, but it was causal understanding that allowed 
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stone tool use to originate and flourish. Stone tool use may have been invented in the 
hominan lineage during a mistaken attempt to crack open a nut with a stone, with the stone 
missing the nut, and breaking against the impact with the anvil, resulting in a sharpened stone 
(Wolpert, 2003). With the presence of causal understanding, an individual making such a 
“mistake” may have recognized the important property of sharpness that resulted, and then 
may have mentally represented a situation in which such a tool may be useful, such as in 
scavenging meat from a carcass. Such an important innovation could have quickly spread 
through the individual’s social group, allowing for easier access to an important food supply.  
Van Schaik (2004) discussed the complex interplay between innovation, culture, 
sociality, and ecology in the emergence of humankind. He noted that culture requires both 
private innovation and social diffusion. However, as we see in great apes, most innovations 
in nonhumans do not lead to additional innovations that build cumulatively on previous ones. 
In short, material culture can remain at a modest level of complexity for a long period as is 
the case in chimpanzees, orangutans, and Homo erectus (Foley & Lahr, 2003; van Schaik, 
2004). Unlike H. sapiens, we do not see an explosion of cultural artifacts from H. erectus 
despite their mastery over Acheulian type tools (Klein, 1999). Van Schaik (2004) argued for 
an inherent conservatism regarding innovation, with individuals exploring for novelties up to 
a point, but mainly using known behaviors rather than innovating new ones. He suggested 
that culture might change via punctuations, which may be induced by an environmental 
change that forces individuals to behaviorally adapt to their situation, or go extinct. An 
accidental innovation allowing a creation of a stone tool may have occurred at a similar point 
in hominan history, when such an innovation played a significant role in the survival and 
success of the taxon as they spread across the landscape into new niches. With causal 
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understanding, hominan creation of stone tools would not remain accidental; rather they 
would have been enabled to seek out better materials for knapping and experiment with 
techniques to reach Oldowan type tools. Such advancements in tool technology would have 
favored access to resources and would have selected for and provided fuel for brain 
enlargement.  
It has been argued that at some point in hominan history, cultural changes through 
punctuations were replaced by gradual and cumulative changes (van Schaik, 2004; 
Carbonell, Mosquera, & Rodriguez, 2007). This allowed for a ratchet effect, with later 
technologies and designs building on previous ones (Tomasello, 1999). With the introduction 
of more complex technologies, such as Acheulian tools, additional sophistication of causal 
understanding supported by an enlarged brain would have been required. I argue this 
continued ratcheting of cognitive complexly, based in causal understanding of the 
environment and social situation, would have led to a feedback loop between niche and 
resource expansion, brain enlargement, and increased causal understanding, in concert with 
advancements in other cognitive arenas as well such as the emergence of language.  
6.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
 The study of causal understanding is a complex and rich field of study. The present 
research has demonstrated the existence of causal understanding in orangutans. However, 
many questions regarding causal cognition remain unanswered. Our understanding of the 
depth of causal understanding in apes is still limited. I will conclude the dissertation by 
highlighting a few of the most persistent problems remaining in this field of study.   
 183 
 
  The present research conflicts with previous studies that have deemed apes unable to 
understand causal relations (Povinelli, 2000). Silva, Silva, Cover, Leslie, & Rubalcaba 
(2008) describe how some researchers examine the phenomenon of causal understanding at 
either a low level of understanding (using procedural rules and associations) or a high level 
of understanding (comprehending abstract relations of causality without trial and error 
behavior). Silva et al. (2008) noted that Povinelli and colleagues (2000) used the “all or 
nothing” approach to the study of causality. Silvia et al (2008) noted this is problematic and 
that researchers need to go beyond this dichotomous approach and ask what conditions led to 
different levels for comprehension of causation (also see Silva, Page, & Silva, 2005; Silva & 
Silva, 2006; Machado & Silva, 2003, Weir & Kacelnik, 2006). Tomasello and Call (1997) 
also proposed that causal understanding might come in different varieties, ranging from 
simple to complex understanding. Further research pertaining to what conditions (such as 
environmental factors, development, and experimental design) influence causal 
understanding is needed (as suggested by Silva et al., 2008; Machado & Silva, 2003). Silva et 
al. (2008) argued that the continued persistence of different cognitive labs publishing 
conflicting results regarding whether a subject understands a given phenomenon is slowing 
progress in the field. The focus instead should be on what causes such differences (also see 
Boesch, 2007). 
Our limited understanding of how children use tools limits the interpretation of these 
data. As Casler and Keleman (2005) noted, despite the importance of this field of study, little 
is actually known of how children learn about artifacts and how to use them. Their study 
suggests that learning to use a tool correctly is not necessarily a simple process for humans. 
In their study of 2 to 3 year old children, they found children did not necessarily recognize 
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appropriate properties of tools, nor did they flexibly use a tool for another purpose once they 
discovered its use. Instead, tool use in young children depends on social learning, with 
appropriate use of a tool improving dramatically after observing an adult using the tool only 
once (Casler & Keleman, 2005). In contrast, other research supports that human causal 
cognition emerges early in development (Bullock & Gelman, 1979; Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; 
Shultz, 1982; Shulz, Altmann, & Asselin, 1986). Clarification of the development of causal 
cognition and tool use in human children is critical to arrive at accurate conclusions 
regarding comparative cognition.  
Causal cognition regarding tool related behaviors have been explored in non-primate 
animals as well, which leads to specific questions regarding its evolution. The discovery of 
causal understanding in animals distinct from humans, such as crows and rooks, raises 
questions as to what led to its evolution (Tebbich et al., 2007; Weir et al., 2002). The support 
of causal understanding in both some corvids and some great apes may be a result of 
convergent evolution (Mendes, Hanus, & Call, 2007).  Documentation of future planning in 
apes and corvids also supports convergent evolution in cognition (Mulcahy & Call, 2006; 
Osvath & Osvath, 2008; Emery & Clayton, 2001, 2004). Mendes et al. (2007) hypothesized 
that tool use in great apes was attributable to a cognitive generalization, allowing for the 
ability to solve problems with flexibility. They proposed that in birds, tool use arose through 
a cognitive specialization, suggesting less cognitive flexibility. However, they admit that 
some studies with corvids have also indicated a great deal of cognitive flexibility (Seed et al., 
2006; Weir et al., 2002; Dally et al., 2005). For example, Seed, Tebbich, Emery, and Clayton 
(2006) found rooks could solve a modified trap-tube problem and could transfer their 
knowledge to a following control task. They concluded their results support a sophisticated 
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level of causal understanding. Taylor, Hunt, Holzhaider and Gray’s (2007) documentation of 
spontaneous metatool use in New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides), a behavior 
previously only documented in chimpanzees, and now in orangutans as a result of this 
dissertation research, also suggests convergent evolution between the ape and avian taxa. 
Convergent evolution, specifically regarding social behavior, language comprehension, and 
self-recognition, has also been suggested between primates and cetaceans (Marino, 2002). 
More research with a variety of species, primate and non-primate, is required to explain the 
evolution of these behaviors. In particular, as regards to primate evolution, research with 
gorillas and bonobos is critical in supporting the hypothesis that causal understanding was 
present in the LCA of the African and Asian great apes. The possibility exists that convergent 
evolution between orangutan, chimpanzee, and human cognition is responsible.   
My research supports the conclusion that causal understanding is multifaceted, with 
different levels of comprehension apparent between individuals and between tasks. In my 
introductory chapter, I review the four forms of causal reasoning discussed by Visalberghi 
and Tomasello (1998), comprehension, prediction, postdiction and production. In my 
research, I found support for comprehension of cause and effect relations, with subjects 
understanding the mediating force between cause and effect relations. The orangutans also 
demonstrated production, with the cause and effect relations of the situation directly in their 
control. My research did not investigate the forms of prediction or postdiction, which involve 
the subject observing either the event to predict the result or the result to infer the cause. 
Future research should include experiments involving these forms of causal reasoning to 
further extrapolate the level of orangutan cognitive complexity on this topic.  
The aim of this study was to elucidate the cognitive skills involved in tool use and 
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manufacture in orangutans to assist in the reconstruction of hominid evolution. The present 
research demonstrated that causal understanding is not only a hallmark of humankind. These 
analyses suggest that the suite of cognitive skills involving causal understanding was present 
in the hominid lineage a minimum of 11-18 mya when orangutans last shared a common 
ancestor with the lineages leading to the other great apes. The present study provides support 
for the hypothesis that the cognitive skills allowing for comprehension of tool properties and 
how to use tools effectively is a shared trait between humans and nonhuman great apes, 
suggesting it also characterized our last common ancestor. As causal understanding allows 
the user to comprehend how and why objects (or beings) interact, it may have impacted 
hominid evolution substantially, having a pivotal role in the technological evolution of stone 
tool use, which along with language and symbolic thought transformed human existence. 
Future research should assist in delineating limits in the complexity of causal cognition in 
nonhuman apes, and expand such studies in non-apes. As I have demonstrated, the simple 
dichotomies between human and nonhuman animals have again been breached. If we are to 
truly understand the evolution of humanity, we must dedicate ourselves to accepting the 
continuity between human and nonhuman cognition and learn what we can from this 
continuum.   
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